The trappers and the trapped at Dien Bien Phu in 1954

1. THE FRENCH'S "DIEN BIEN PHU TRAP"

After many major failures, losing the initiative on the main battlefield of Northern Vietnam, colonial France was facing the risk of complete defeat in the Indochina war. As a well-trained general with many achievements, and volunteering to become Commander-in-Chief of the French expeditionary force in Indochina, General Henri Navarre certainly had very brilliant military and political ideas that made the French government and the US government trust and place great hope. Indeed, when he arrived in Indochina, with the plan named after him, H. Navarre created new war situations that his predecessors had not thought of. That was in the Winter-Spring of 1953-1954, relying on a large budget approved by the US and French governments (750 billion francs), he advocated not to fight a large battle in the North, but to focus on building about 100 strong mobile battalions, so that in the Winter-Spring of 1954-1955 he would launch a major battle to destroy the main forces of Vietnam, ending the war in favor of France.

Through the Navare plan, the French intended to attack the enemy in the 1953-1954 Winter-Spring campaign and the Dien Bien Phu battle on three main fronts.

Firstly, the general principle of military is to keep plots and battle plans secret, but H. Navare flaunted his intentions in a very large-scale propaganda campaign. The French propaganda apparatus both in the motherland and in Indochina highly praised the plan of the commander-in-chief of the expeditionary army. Later, when choosing Dien Bien Phu as the decisive strategic battle, they also firmly affirmed that it was an "invincible fortress", challenging the Viet Minh to fight. Such propaganda is essentially a "show-off" strategy, overwhelming the enemy with strength before the battle, mainly the strength of the rear, logistics, the strength of money, troops, weapons... With the strategy of exaggerating the strength of the rear, the strength of logistics, France hopes to create an image of being in a strong position, holding the initiative on the battlefield, to calm public opinion in the mother country, encourage the spirit of the expeditionary soldiers and make the enemy dazzled, fearful, retreating into defense, or even if accepting a large-scale battle, they will still lose the battle.

Second, H. Navarre said that he would not fight a big battle in the North during the Winter-Spring of 1953-1954 to make the enemy complacent, vulnerable, expose their forces, and strike first, especially in the North. However, in October 1953, he loudly launched a large-scale military operation to attack the Southwest of Ninh Binh and the North of Thanh Hoa (the Hai Au campaign). This was Vietnam's strategic free zone, where the 320th and 304th Divisions of Vietnam were stationed. The French plot was to force us to expose our forces, passively accepting a large-scale battle without preparation. If Vietnam fought a large battle, it would have to mobilize its main divisions, and would be drawn into passively dealing with the French, creating conditions for the French army to fight a large battle, destroy a large one, and regain the initiative as they intended. Without a major battle, Vietnam would lose a foothold, an important logistical base, even the strategic free zone of Thanh-Nghe-Tinh, and the 320th Division would be destroyed.

Third, when the Hai Au campaign failed and discovered that our main force was advancing to the Northwest, France decided to build Dien Bien Phu (Lai Chau) into the strongest stronghold group in Indochina, making the battle of strategic significance. France believed that the Dien Bien Phu battlefield was an "ideal place for the Viet Minh", which would attract Vietnam's main force to fight. Because the Viet Minh thought that this was a mountainous area, suitable for the combat strengths of the infantry divisions that Vietnam had. But the final victory belonged to France, because if they fought quickly, Vietnam would lack modern weapons and experience in commanding modern regular battles; and if they wanted to fight for a long time, they would not be able to solve the supply problem, because the commander was too far from the major rear areas. Meanwhile, on the French side, due to the logistics problem, which would be guaranteed by transport planes, with modern weapons and solid defensive fortifications, they would be able to destroy Vietnam's main force divisions and maintain the Northwest of Vietnam, Upper Laos, etc.

Obviously, the “Dien Bien Phu trap” (Lepiège Dienbienphu - French term) that France created for the enemy, had profound implications from many aspects, the most important of which was that he himself set up contradictions to trap the enemy. H. Navarre pretended to be passive about the plan, passive about the time, passive about the location, passive about the force in the Dien Bien Phu battle. H. Navarre meant that the enemy would consider those mistakes of the French and would fall into the trap and rush into battle due to his own way of thinking. That was a deep and clever plan that could not be underestimated, very worthy of a general of a professional army, who was the Chief of the General Staff of the NATO military bloc.

2. THE MAN WHO FALLS INTO THE TRAP AT DIEN BIEN PHU

The surprise that the French created in the 1953-1954 Winter-Spring campaign and the Dien Bien Phu battle was like a "chessboard situation" where if the opponent made just one wrong move, they would lose the whole game. Ironically, in the end, they were the ones who "fell into the trap" of Vietnam.

Regarding the plan, Vietnam's combat strategy outlined by the Politburo and Ho Chi Minh in September 1953 was "Concentrating a part of the main force to attack the enemy's weak and vulnerable areas, but strategically important areas that the enemy cannot abandon, to disperse the enemy's main force out of the Northern Delta, to engage in combat in disadvantageous areas, creating conditions for us to destroy the enemy, liberate the people and the land; when the enemy has been pulled out of the delta, another part of the main force will be sent to attack the delta, develop people's war, and destroy another part of their military force...".

According to that policy, it could be "intentional" or "scheme", clearly at first Vietnam did not have a policy of fighting a big battle in the North, especially in the Winter-Spring of 1953-1954, and did not consider Dien Bien Phu as the main strategic direction. But by December 1953, Vietnam flexibly changed its strategic policy, deciding to choose Dien Bien Phu as the decisive battle for the resistance war. That is, Vietnam decided to "counter-strategy - counter-strategy", using the enemy's strategy to carry out its own strategy, seemingly falling into the French trap, but in fact setting a trap for the French army in Dien Bien Phu. That is, changing from not fighting a big battle to fighting a big battle in the North, from planning to fight where the French army had gaps to fighting where the French army had defenses with a solid fortification system, from only fighting where the enemy was weak to fighting where the enemy was strongest in Indochina...

Vietnam's breaking of traps and re-setting of traps in the way of fighting (from the policy of fighting fast, winning fast to fighting sure, advancing sure, fighting sure to win) has been mentioned in many works. Here we will only talk more about breaking traps in the field of logistics, vividly demonstrated in the work of mobilizing human and material resources from the rear for the front and the way of organizing supplies for the front.

From the perspective of the rear and logistics problem, choosing Dien Bien Phu as the strategic decisive battle was an ideal trap of H. Navarre, like a big surprise, forcing the Viet Minh to passively choose what seemed like "5 wins, 5 losses" but in fact was to deceive the Viet Minh, to pull the Viet Minh into the trap. The French side believed that no matter what choice Vietnam made, in the end it would be the losing side. Because if it did not fight big, Vietnam would not be able to end the resistance war, and would be at a disadvantage at the negotiating table; if it fought big and quickly, it would not have enough modern weapons and command skills, and if it encircled and attacked for a long time, it would not have enough food and provisions... H. Navarre believed that, in terms of logistics alone, although both sides were facing difficulties, the difficulties of the Viet Minh were greater and certainly could not be overcome, no matter what strategy was used.

Indeed, the logistics issue, more specifically the supply of food, provisions, and weapons for troops operating on the battlefields in the 1953-1954 Winter-Spring strategic offensive in general, and for the Dien Bien Phu campaign in particular, was extremely important, having a decisive meaning in the success or failure of the front line. The great surprise that the Vietnamese side caused to the French in the Dien Bien Phu battle was that they had built and mobilized a huge human and material resource from the rear and organized the transportation of that resource to the front. The way Vietnam created that surprise was to establish the Front Supply Council, organize transportation in the "supply-station" style and take the Thanh-Nghe-Tinh region as the main rear.

After the major campaigns of the 1950-1952 period, especially the experience of the Northwest campaign, the issue of organizing supplies for the troops was studied by the General Department of Supply of the Army and came up with the idea of ​​organizing transportation in the "supply and station" style. That is, dividing the transportation route from the rear to the front into routes called the rear line, the midline, and the fire line. The rear line was managed by the rear, with the task of mobilizing the strength of the rear according to the requirements of the front, bringing it to the strategic transportation route. The midline was managed by both the rear and the army, bringing the mobilized resources to the front, handing them over to the army logistics. The fire line was managed by the army logistics force, bringing resources to the combat units. On those routes, there were stations. The station was the place to receive resources from the rear and transfer them to the front, where the transportation force rested, set up warehouses, infirmaries, and repaired vehicles after a transportation leg.

Based on the proposals of the Government Economic Committee reported by the General Department, on July 27, 1953, the Government Council decided to establish an agency in charge of frontline support work, the Frontline Supply Council(). The establishment of the Frontline Supply Council at all levels was the result of a process of thinking and drawing on the experience of the Party, Government and the Vietnamese Army in the process of leading and organizing the implementation of battlefield support work as well as the work of building and protecting the rear, an important innovation of Vietnam in the resistance war against France, a surprise to the French in the issue of organizing frontline supplies.

The French side knew clearly that the Thanh - Nghe - Tinh free zone was a large area, with a large population, high revolutionary spirit, and abundant food and provisions compared to the Viet Bac free zone or the newly liberated Northwest region. However, they thought that this place was more than 500 kilometers away from the front, had no motor vehicles, the roads were dangerous, and was always attacked and blocked by the French air force, so this rear area would not be able to play its role for the front line. They did not expect that, with the establishment of the Front Supply Council and the organization of transportation according to the supply stations, knowing how to rely on this "Hoan Dien" area, Vietnam had made a new miracle in mobilizing and promoting the rear strength for the front line.

In total, from the preparation stage until the end of the campaign, the HDCCMT mobilized 25,056 tons of rice, 1,824 tons of meat and dried food. In the Thanh-Nghe-Tinh rear area alone, 214,924 laborers of all kinds were mobilized with 14,500,000 working days. Each bicycle was able to carry from 165 kg to 215 kg, then 250 kg, then 320 kg. In the third offensive, Thanh Hoa mobilized a record number: 120,000 people (25,000 women), 10,075 bicycles...

Even the French had to admit their surprise at the strength of the Vietnamese rear and Vietnam's ability to organize creative and effective frontline support.

In the book "The Indochina Tragedy" edited by E.Krieg, the French authors wrote in volume III - The Dien Bien Phu Trap (Lepiège Dien bien phu) about this mistake of H.Navarre as follows: "People confirmed with Navar and Navarre also believed that the Viet Minh could not supply Dien Bien Phu; that the coolies, if they wanted to get there, would eat 4/5 of their food loads; that the supply of ammunition would not allow the enemy to take advantage of a larger number of troops than the French could muster. And also because, despite daily proof, Navar still believed that his air force with its already very limited means - could destroy the Viet Minh's supply lines". “General Navar did not think that Giap (i.e. General Vo Nguyen Giap - N.D.T's note) was mobilizing tens of thousands of men and women, 50,000 or 80,000? No one knew the exact number. That group of people had begun to form a very large ant colony to supply the army, moving up to the Thai ethnic area.... When creating the Dien Bien Phu porcupine, Navar thought he could attract the Viet Minh there. He thought he had the initiative, which he often complained about that the expeditionary army had abandoned since 1950. While he calmly imagined that he was luring the Viet Minh, he did not know that he was letting Vo Nguyen Giap mobilize troops to chain him up (...) It was he (Vo Nguyen Giap), not Navar, who was setting a trap in the Thai ethnic area - in an area very dear to the enemy commander. And on November 20, 1953, the porcupine named Navar fell into that trap" ().

The French themselves had to admit their surprise at the strength of the Vietnamese rear and Vietnam's creative and effective ability to organize frontline support. Historian Bernard Fall, in his book "Viet Minh 1945-1960" (Le Viet Minh 1945-1960), said about Vietnam's victory at Dien Bien Phu: "First and foremost were victories in the organization of supplies" (). H. Navarre himself later, in his memoir "Indochina in agony" (L'Agonie de L'Indochine), also confessed: "In the military field, the first lesson is not to underestimate the enemy's capabilities" (). I-von Panhinet, a French scholar, in his book "What I See in Vietnam" recorded the lament of a French officer bitterly admitting their surprise and failure as well as Vietnam's victory in the "supply trap" for the Dien Bien Phu campaign, as: "Alas! Our planes lost to the Viet Minh's pair of civilian workers"().

An air force lieutenant general (who was a French military pilot lieutenant in Dien Bien Phu) discussed and admitted to the author of this article (N-D-T), in Paris, that the French air force had made great efforts to transport supplies to the front as well as to bomb fiercely the Vietnamese transport routes, but due to unfavorable weather and the very discreet and clever movement of Vietnamese soldiers and laborers, the effectiveness of the bombings was very limited. That the French were defeated in Dien Bien Phu was mainly due to the fact that Vietnam had broken the trap in terms of supplies, due to their helplessness before the will and effectiveness of the Vietnamese rear and logistics work().

In short, the Winter-Spring of 1953-1954 and the Dien Bien Phu campaign were a typical time and place for the use of stratagems, the art of setting and breaking traps by both the French and Vietnamese sides. The fierce and comprehensive competition of will, intelligence and strength, including the issue of rear and logistics of the two sides in the Dien Bien Phu battle, in which the final victory belonged to Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh, and Vo Nguyen Giap, is certainly still an interesting research topic, a good historical lesson for future generations.