The trap setters and the victims of the trap at Dien Bien Phu in 1954.

1. "THE DIEN BIEN PHU TRAP" OF THE FRENCH

After numerous major defeats and the loss of initiative on the main battlefield in North Vietnam, colonial France faced the risk of complete defeat in the Indochina War. As a well-trained general with many military achievements, and having volunteered to be the Commander-in-Chief of the French expeditionary forces in Indochina, General Henri Navarre undoubtedly possessed brilliant military and political ideas that earned the trust and high hopes of both the French and American governments. Indeed, upon arriving in Indochina, with his plan bearing his name, H. Navarre created new war situations that his predecessors had not anticipated. During the 1953-1954 winter-spring campaign, relying on large funds allocated by the US and French governments (750 billion francs), he advocated against large-scale battles in North Vietnam, instead focusing on building approximately 100 strong mobile battalions. The goal was to launch a major offensive in the 1954-1955 winter-spring campaign to destroy the main Vietnamese army divisions, thus ending the war in France's favor.

Through the Navarre Plan, the French intended to attack the enemy in the 1953-1954 Winter-Spring Campaign and the Battle of Dien Bien Phu on three main fronts.

Firstly, the general principle of military strategy is secrecy in planning and combat strategies, but H. Navarre flaunted his intentions ostentatiously through a very extensive propaganda campaign. The French propaganda machine, both in France and in Indochina, lavishly praised the plan of the commander-in-chief of the expeditionary forces. Later, when choosing Dien Bien Phu as the decisive strategic battle, they also confidently asserted that it was an "invincible fortress," challenging the Viet Minh to engage in battle. Such propaganda was essentially a "false show of strength," overwhelming the enemy with pre-battle power, primarily the strength of the rear, logistics, money, troops, and weapons. By exaggerating the strength of the rear and logistics, France hoped to create the image of being in a strong position, the one in control on the battlefield, to appease public opinion in the home country, boost the morale of its expeditionary soldiers, and dazzle and intimidate the enemy, forcing them into a defensive posture, or, if they accepted a large-scale battle, they would lose.

Secondly, H. Navarre said that not launching a major offensive in North Vietnam during the 1953-1954 winter-spring campaign would lead to complacency, vulnerability, and the exposure of enemy forces, allowing them to strike first, especially in the North. However, in October 1953, he launched a large-scale military operation into southwestern Ninh Binh and northern Thanh Hoa (Operation Seagull). This was a strategically important free zone of Vietnam, where the 320th and 304th Divisions of the Vietnamese army were stationed. The French plot was to force us to expose our forces, passively accepting a large-scale battle without preparation. If Vietnam engaged in a large-scale battle, it would have to deploy its main divisions, drawing us into a passive position to counter the French, creating conditions for the French to launch a large-scale attack, inflict heavy losses, and regain the initiative as they intended. Without a major battle, Vietnam would lose a foothold, a crucial logistical base, and even the strategic Thanh-Nghe-Tinh free zone, and the 320th Division would be annihilated.

Thirdly, when the Seagull campaign failed and the main Vietnamese forces were discovered advancing into the Northwest, the French decided to build Dien Bien Phu (Lai Chau) into the strongest fortified complex in Indochina, making it the decisive strategic battleground. The French believed that the Dien Bien Phu battlefield was "ideal for the Viet Minh," attracting the main Vietnamese forces to engage in combat. The Viet Minh thought that this mountainous region suited the combat strengths of the large infantry divisions that Vietnam possessed. However, the ultimate victory went to the French. A quick attack would be disadvantageous to Vietnam, which lacked advanced weapons and experience in modern conventional warfare command; a protracted war would be impossible to sustain due to the battlefield's distance from major rear areas. Meanwhile, the French, with their guaranteed logistical support from transport aircraft, modern weapons, and strong defensive fortifications, would be able to destroy the main Vietnamese divisions and maintain control of Northwest Vietnam, Upper Laos, and other regions.

Clearly, the "Dien Bien Phu trap" (Lepiège Dienbienphu - the French term) that France created for its enemy had profound implications from many aspects, the most important of which was the self-inflicted contradictions designed to trap the enemy. H. Navarre pretended to be passive in terms of planning, timing, location, and forces during the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. H. Navarre believed that the enemy would perceive these as French mistakes and would fall into the trap, rushing into battle due to their own way of thinking. This was a clever and ingenious scheme, worthy of a general of a professional army, a former Chief of Staff of the NATO army.

2. People Trapped in Dien Bien Phu

The surprise that the French created during the 1953-1954 Winter-Spring Campaign and the Battle of Dien Bien Phu was like a "chess game" where a single wrong move would lead to the opponent losing the entire game. Ironically, in the end, they themselves were trapped by Vietnam.

Regarding the plan, the Vietnamese military strategy outlined by the Politburo and Ho Chi Minh in September 1953 was: "Concentrate a portion of the main force to attack enemy weak points and vulnerable areas that are strategically important and which the enemy cannot abandon, in order to disperse the enemy's main force from the Northern Delta, to engage in combat in unfavorable areas, creating conditions for us to destroy the enemy, liberate the people and land; once the enemy has been drawn out of the delta, another portion of the main force will attack the delta, develop people's war, and destroy another portion of their military forces..."

According to that policy, which may have been "intentional" or "strategic," it is clear that initially Vietnam did not intend to launch a major offensive in the North, especially during the 1953-1954 winter-spring campaign, nor did it consider Dien Bien Phu as the main strategic objective. However, by December 1953, Vietnam flexibly changed its strategic approach, deciding to choose Dien Bien Phu as the decisive battle of the resistance war. This means that Vietnam decided to "counter-strategy," using the enemy's tactics to execute its own, seemingly falling into a French trap, but in reality setting a trap for the French army at Dien Bien Phu. This involved shifting from not launching a major offensive to launching a major offensive in the North, from targeting areas where the French army was vulnerable to attacking areas where the French army was well-defended with strong fortifications, and from attacking only the enemy's weakest points to attacking the strongest enemy in Indochina...

The Vietnamese strategy of countering and resetting traps (from a quick-strike, quick-victory approach to a steady, sure-strike, sure-win approach) has been discussed in many studies. Here, we will only add to the counter-traps in the logistical field, vividly demonstrated in the mobilization of human and material resources from the rear for the front lines and the organization of supplies for the front.

From a logistical standpoint, choosing Dien Bien Phu as the strategic decisive battle was an ideal trap devised by H. Navarre. It was a major surprise, forcing the Viet Minh into a seemingly "50/50" situation, but in reality, it was a deception designed to lure them into a trap. The French believed that regardless of Vietnam's choice, they would ultimately be the losing side. Without a large-scale battle, Vietnam would not be able to end the resistance and would be at a disadvantage in negotiations; a large-scale, rapid attack would be hampered by a lack of modern weapons and command expertise, while a prolonged siege would lead to insufficient food supplies. H. Navarre argued that, while both sides faced logistical difficulties, the Viet Minh's problems were greater and undoubtedly insurmountable, regardless of the chosen strategy.

Indeed, logistics, more specifically the supply of food, provisions, and weapons to the troops fighting on the battlefields during the 1953-1954 Winter-Spring strategic offensive in general, and the Dien Bien Phu campaign in particular, was extremely important and decisive for the success or failure of the front lines. The great surprise that Vietnam inflicted on the French in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu was its ability to build and mobilize enormous human and material resources from the rear and organize the transportation of those resources to the front. The way Vietnam created this surprise was by establishing a Front Supply Council, organizing transportation in a "supply-station" manner, and using the Thanh Hoa-Nghe An-Tinh Gia region as its main rear area.

Following the major campaigns of 1950-1952, especially the experience of the Northwest Campaign, the General Supply Department of the Army studied the issue of organizing supplies for the troops and arrived at the idea of ​​organizing transportation in a "supply and station" manner. This meant dividing the transportation route from the rear to the front lines into sections called the rear line, the middle line, and the fire line. The rear line was the responsibility of the rear, tasked with mobilizing rear resources according to the front's requirements and delivering them to the strategic transportation route. The middle line was the responsibility of both the rear and the army, delivering mobilized resources to the front and entrusting them to the army's logistics. The fire line was the responsibility of the army's logistics forces, delivering resources to combat units. Stations were located along these routes. Stations were places to receive resources from the rear and transfer them to the front, where transport forces rested, where warehouses were set up, where medical stations were located, and where vehicles were repaired after a transport leg.

Based on proposals from the Government Economic Committee, as reported by the General Department, on July 27, 1953, the Government Council decided to establish the Front Supply Council, a special agency responsible for supporting the front lines. The establishment of the Front Supply Councils at all levels was the result of a process of reflection and experience accumulation by the Party, Government, and Army of Vietnam in leading and organizing the work of supporting the battlefield, as well as building and protecting the rear areas. It was a significant innovation of Vietnam in the resistance war against France, a surprise to the French regarding the organization of frontline supplies.

The French knew that the Thanh-Nghe-Tinh liberated zone was a vast area with a large population, high revolutionary spirit, and abundant food supplies compared to the Viet Bac liberated zone or the newly liberated Northwest. However, they believed that because it was over 500 kilometers from the front lines, lacked motorized vehicles, had treacherous roads, and was constantly targeted by French air raids and blockades, this rear area would not be able to play its role in supporting the front lines. They did not anticipate that, with the establishment of the Front Supply Council and the organization of transportation through supply and transport stations, relying on this "Hoan Dien" region, Vietnam would achieve a new miracle in mobilizing and developing the strength of the rear area for the front lines.

In total, from the preparation phase to the end of the campaign, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam mobilized 25,056 tons of rice, 1,824 tons of meat and dried food. In the Thanh-Nghe-Tinh rear area alone, 214,924 people were mobilized for various types of labor, contributing 14,500,000 man-days of work. Each bicycle carried loads ranging from 165 kg to 215 kg, then 250 kg, and finally 320 kg. During the third offensive, Thanh Hoa mobilized a record amount: 120,000 people (25,000 women), 10,075 bicycles...

Even the French had to admit their surprise at the strength of the Vietnamese rear and Vietnam's creative and effective ability to organize support for the front lines.

In the book "The Tragedy of Indochina," edited by E. Krieg, the French authors wrote in Volume III - The Dien Bien Phu Trap (Lepiège Dien bien phu) about this mistake of H. Navarre as follows: "It was confirmed to Navar, and Navar also believed, that the Viet Minh could not supply Dien Bien Phu; that the coolies, wanting to reach it, would consume four-fifths of their food supplies; that the supply of ammunition would not allow the enemy to take advantage of the larger number of troops they could muster compared to the French. And also because, despite daily proof, Navar still believed that his air force, with its already inadequate means, could destroy the Viet Minh's supply lines." “General Navar didn't think that Giap (i.e., General Vo Nguyen Giap - N.D.T. note) was mobilizing tens of thousands of men and women, 50,000 or 80,000? No one knows the exact number. That group of people had begun to form a huge swarm of ants supplying the army, moving up to the Thai people's region.... When creating the Dien Bien Phu hedgehog, Navar thought he could lure the Viet Minh there. He thought he had seized the initiative, which he often complained the expeditionary army had lost since 1950. While he nonchalantly imagined himself luring the Viet Minh, he didn't know that he was letting Vo Nguyen Giap move his troops to shackle him (...) It was he (Vo Nguyen Giap), not Navar, who was setting a trap in the Thai people's region - in a region very dear to the enemy commander. And on November 20, 1953, the hedgehog named Navar fell into that trap" ().

Even the French had to admit their surprise at the strength of the Vietnamese rear and the creative and effective organization of support for the front lines. Historian Bernard Fall, in his book "The Viet Minh 1945-1960" (Le Viet Minh 1945-1960), said of Vietnam's victory at Dien Bien Phu: "First and foremost were the victories in organizing supplies" ( ). Later, H. Navarre himself, in his memoir "The Dying Indochina" (L'Agonie de L'Indochine), also confessed: "In the military field, the first lesson is not to underestimate the capabilities of the enemy" ( ). I-von Panhinet, a French scholar, in his book "Eyewitnesses in Vietnam," recorded the bitter lament of a French officer acknowledging their surprise and defeat, as well as Vietnam's victory, in the "supply trap" for the Dien Bien Phu campaign: "Alas! Our planes were defeated by the Viet Minh's civilian laborers."

A lieutenant general of the air force (formerly a lieutenant pilot in the French military at Dien Bien Phu) acknowledged to the author of this article (N-D-T) in Paris that the French air force had made great efforts to transport supplies to the front and heavily bomb Vietnamese supply lines, but due to unfavorable weather and the very discreet and skillful movements of Vietnamese troops and civilian workers, the effectiveness of the bombing raids was very limited. He also stated that the French were defeated at Dien Bien Phu largely because they were outmaneuvered by Vietnam regarding supplies, due to their powerlessness in the face of the will and effectiveness of Vietnam's rear-area and logistical support.

In summary, the 1953-1954 Winter-Spring campaign and the Dien Bien Phu campaign represent a prime example of the strategic maneuvering and the art of setting and countering traps by both the French and Vietnamese sides. The comprehensive and fierce battle of wits, intelligence, and strength, including the crucial logistical and rear-area support issues, in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, ultimately resulted in victory for Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap will undoubtedly remain a fascinating subject of study and a valuable historical lesson for future generations.