The historical basis of historical decisions

1. Historical context

By the end of 1967, the Vietnam War had become extremely fierce. The United States had mobilized nearly half a million troops. Including the forces providing support from several US military bases in Asian countries, Guam, and the 7th Fleet, approximately 650,000 US troops had been deployed to the war.[1]Regarding the army, the United States mobilized almost all of its domestic units to Vietnam. Therefore, the press humorously remarked that the dozens of states of the United States were protected by only a few army brigades – a number that could be counted on the fingers of one hand.

All the most modern military branches and the most powerful and newest war equipment were deployed to the Vietnam battlefield. Bombs and ammunition ravaged the area: the United States dropped millions of tons of bombs and ammunition, tens of millions of liters of defoliants, and hundreds of thousands of tons of chemical bombs and mines. All types of aircraft, from helicopters to B-52s, and artillery barrages of the invading army bombarded indiscriminately. By 1967, all the most modern and devastating weapons, except for nuclear weapons, had been used by the US military in South Vietnam.

With tens of billions of dollars spent on the Vietnam War, it had a tremendous impact on the economic and social life of the United States. At that time, the US spent around $30 billion annually on the war, a colossal sum, and the more dollars poured into the battlefield, the more brutal the war became.

Along with half a million American troops, tens of thousands of soldiers from other countries that the United States called allies also fought in Vietnam. Over 50,000 combatants, along with medical and logistical personnel, came from seven countries.US allied forcesThey operated in the South. The involvement of this nationalist force contributed to the war in the South taking on the characteristics of an international conflict.

The military power that the United States used in Vietnam during the Limited War reached its peak by the end of 1967, and some military elements of this war were teetering on the brink of total war. The professional army of the world's number one military power was verycrowded and strong[2].

Alongside the US forces was the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. By the end of 1967, after several coups, the force had become more stable and numbered approximately 550,000 to 600,000 troops. The Saigon army had a dozen main divisions, a diverse military structure, and was fully equipped with modern weapons by the United States. Compared to other armed forces in the region at that time, this army was large and quite powerful.[3].

Regarding the Liberation Armed Forces, by the end of 1967 there were 9 main divisions (F2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 324, 325, 304, 320). In addition, there were local troops, these two groups totaling approximately 300,000 people. The guerrilla forces were numerous, numbering hundreds of thousands of fighters. The revolutionary armed forces included urban commando units, security forces, and especially intelligence groups and individuals operating even within the central agencies of the enemy.

The revolutionary armed forces, though only a fraction in number to the US and Saigon forces, and lacking the modern and numerous weapons of their opponents, were present throughout the region, forming the core force for the invincible people's war that was developing and expanding throughout the South.

Soldiers on the march during the Spring Offensive and Uprising of 1968. (Archival photo)

By the end of 1967, the United States had been pursuing the Limited War for two and a half years without an end in sight. When it was launched, the US government believed it would resolve the conflict.rebellion(Insurgency) in a short period of time. The White House believed that, with hundreds of thousands of American troops again, they hadResolution on the Gulf of Tonkinpassed by the United States Congress[4]The American troops would be sent to the South to quickly suppress the Viet Cong counterinsurgency. Even American soldiers had the mindset of going to Vietnam as a...fun expedition(Funny Travel Adventure). However, the reality of the Vietnam battlefield, with the courageous and resourceful battles fought by the Liberation Army, gradually diminished the arrogance and superiority of the American soldiers.[5].

The dynamics of the battlefield in South Vietnam during the strategic offensive campaigns of the two seasons of 1965-1966 and 1966-1967 reflected the military strength of the warring parties. In the first dry season, the United States and its allies launched two strategic offensives (into the Southeast and Military Region 5). The Liberation Army counterattacked, thwarting the US military's attempt to break the Viet Cong's main backbone. In the second dry season, the situation changed: the United States launched an offensive in Tay Ninh, the Liberation Army once again carried out a counterattack, defeating the enemy's intentions on the main battlefield, and the Liberation Army proactively launched an offensive on Route 9 – Northern Quang Tri. Thus, after about two and a half years of fighting, by the beginning of the third year of the localized war, a balance of power had emerged between the sides.

During the third dry season, MACV—the US Military Assistance Command in Vietnam, essentially the US Army Command in Vietnam—was strategizing for the Vietnam War. General William Childs Westmoreland, commanding MACV, was considering new strategies, adopting a much more cautious approach after two years of conflict with the enemy. Despite optimistic pronouncements, General Westmoreland was in a difficult dilemma.

In the final months of 1967, the Liberation Army launched an offensive at Dak To - Tan Canh (November 1967), inflicting heavy casualties on US and Saigon forces. However, when presenting a report on the war situation in Vietnam at a Pentagon meeting, Westmoreland stated that the Battle of Dak To marked the beginning of a major defeat for the Viet Cong.

The US commander in South Vietnam assessed this battle as a sign of the beginning of the third phase of defeating the Viet Cong.[6]But in reality, there was no sign of the enemy weakening as the US generals had anticipated. Even with the largest-scale sweeps, using bombs and ammunition at maximum destructive levels…half a million American troops were unable to stop them.search and destroyenemy.

Despite their best efforts, Westmoreland were finding themselves at a disadvantage as the third dry season arrived. Westmoreland declared victory close at hand, but achieving that goal seemed impossible except for requesting reinforcements.[7]However, the request for reinforcements worried President Johnson. According to analyses by US military experts, without troop reinforcements, with Westmoreland's forces at the time (half a million troops), it would take approximately five more years to achieve the goal of defeating the enemy. Westmoreland's plans were not approved because accepting them would require mobilizing reserve forces and spending billions of dollars more on the war. Implementing General Westmoreland's demands would almost certainly lead the White House into unconstitutional actions. Even granting more time for the expeditionary forces to continue fighting in the South was difficult to convince the executive branch. Moreover, even the previously approved Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (1964) was in danger of being reviewed.[8].

When strategyfind and destroyWhile bogged down on the pacification front, the Saigon government was also stuck, unable to implement its annual plan. The weakness of the Saigon army in this area forced the United States to send tens of thousands of troops and thousands of foreign specialists to support the Saigon government in carrying out its plan.pacifyHowever, by the end of 1967, the Saigon government had still not completed the pacification of several thousand hamlets around key areas as planned.

On the Northern Front, the bombing campaign against North Vietnam did not yield the results the United States had hoped for. From the initial provocation to the massive bombing campaign, to the final stage in the US escalation hierarchy, it all ended in disastrous failure.[9]The bombing reached saturation point, following the escalation of bombing in the Hanoi area in 1967, but it failed to shake the fighting spirit of the North Vietnamese people in their quest to liberate the South. The number one objective among the seven US bombing targets – preventing the North from providing support to the South – was not achieved.[10]Furthermore, North Vietnam had already prepared a plan to defeat the American forces, so if these forces recklessly launched an attack on North Vietnam, they would certainly suffer a disastrous defeat.[11].

Trapped in a war, with no fundamental solution to the impasse in sight, while the election season heats up and the Vietnam issue becomes a key campaign topic. These two hot winds on opposite sides of the Pacific Ocean are significantly influencing American politics.

The political climate in Washington regarding Vietnam in 1967 was different from that of 1964. The anti-war movement in the United States was growing in number, encompassing a wider range of forces and taking increasingly forceful forms.

By 1967, the conflicts, rifts, and divisions within American society were clearly evident, with a major cause stemming from the government's war in Vietnam. The protests against the US war in Vietnam, which began in 1961, had become a widespread movement by 1967. With increasingly large and diverse groups, forms, and increasingly fierce nature, these movements were particularly effective, especially in conjunction with the anti-racism movement.[12]This created a second war within America. These struggles, along with the enormous cost of the Vietnam War, ultimately led to bankruptcy.Great social program(Great Society)[13]of President Johnson.

In addition to ordinary voters participating in anti-war protests, there was a growing number of anti-war politicians. Many figures in the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives urged the president to reconsider his policy in Vietnam.[14].

One event is associated with the name of a famous figure who advocated for expanding the war: Robert S. McNamara, who, along with President Johnson, proposed conducting the Limited War in Vietnam.[15]He was famously known as "the man with the electronic brain." However, based on his experience in Vietnam, he urged the President to find a solution to end the Vietnam War and withdraw troops. When his proposal was not accepted, Macnamara resigned as Secretary of Defense at the end of 1967.

In his recollections, Macnamara assessed the Washington dilemma in late 1967 and early 1968 as coming from multiple sides: Left-wing pressure urging us to de-escalate or withdraw, with such strong opposition, contributed to Johnson's failure to seek re-election. But the main concern came from the right: These hawks accused us of forcing the military to fight with one hand tied behind our backs, and they demanded the full military might of the United States be deployed.[16].

The battlefield and domestic situation described above had an increasingly profound impact on the US executive branch. Recently released documents show that at that time, President Johnson began to realize that he could not win the Vietnam War, but it was too early to pursue a different course of action when the US had not yet gained any prestige from the war, and was paying an unexpectedly heavy price, burying its military reputation along with tens of thousands of soldiers' lives!

On the international stage, waging war in Vietnam isolated the United States. Except for a few Southeast Asian countries that, for various reasons, still relied on the US, and one overly traditional allied government that supported the US, most other governments and people opposed the US war in Vietnam. A de facto global people's front supporting Vietnam against the US had formed.

The United States' investment of human and material resources in Vietnam was so large that it could not intervene in other strategic areas as it had done before. Conflicts and disputes between countries and strategic regions during this period, such as the conflict between Arab countries and Israel, or the emergence of extremism in South Africa… In these areas, the United States could not proactively mediate as a mediator.world leadersAs before, as they themselves had assessed. The decline of the United States throughout the world was inversely proportional to the development of other countries, primarily the socialist bloc led by the Soviet Union.

Bogged down in Vietnam, the United States lost its economic competitive advantage over West Germany and Japan, who rose to compete with the US for market share throughout the 1960s. Furthermore, the enormous cost and use of state-of-the-art weapons in the Vietnam War led to a gradual loss of the US's advantage in the arms race. Several other major powers, taking advantage of the US's focus on the war in Vietnam, rapidly developed their own defense capabilities.[17].

While the United States was isolated, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Vietnamese people's resistance war against the US received support from many international governments and people. The Third World powers were gaining an increasingly important voice, and these nations were strengthening their moral support for the Vietnamese people in their fight against the US.[18].

First and foremost, the assistance of socialist countries, especially the effective assistance of the Soviet Union and China, were decisive factors contributing to the victory of the Vietnamese revolution. These socialist countries formed the great rear base of the Vietnamese people's resistance war against the US, for national salvation.[19].

The Vietnamese people's struggle at this time was receiving immense support from the people of Laos and Cambodia. The resistance of the Lao and Vietnamese people was back-to-back, fighting side-by-side. With the support of the Royal Government of Cambodia, the Vietnamese people had a great advantage.holy land[20]Cambodia protected and assisted the Vietnamese people in preserving their strength. Laos, Cambodia

By the end of 1967, the United States was at a disadvantage on the battlefield in Vietnam, while its adversary was increasingly developing its strength and influence. The limitations of the US expeditionary force and its war strategy in Vietnam were becoming more apparent. This situation made it even more difficult for the White House and the Pentagon to find a solution to the war in Vietnam as the presidential election approached. The safe period during which the president could act freely, with little concern for voter opinion, was over. A quick victory or a neutral solution, at least to reduce the intensity of the Vietnam War, was the dilemma facing American politicians in the final months of 1967.

On the revolutionary armed forces' side, their strengths lay in their invincible people's war strategy, the courage and strategic brilliance of their officers and soldiers. The Liberation Army employed extremely intelligent, creative, and flexible tactics, and possessed the ability to endure all difficulties and shortages.[21]It can be said that the Vietnamese revolutionary army had the greatest capacity to endure hardship in the world. The soldiers and guerrillas' skill in fighting the enemy stemmed not only from patriotic motives but also from an objective requirement: destroying the enemy was the only way to protect themselves. Their forte was...Ambush, night attack, mountain and jungle warfare.The liberation forces defeated all of the enemy's military schemes.

The US military, its allies, and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam had the advantage of being larger (several times the size of the Liberation Army), equipped with very modern weapons and war equipment, and having ample and abundant logistical support, including ammunition. This army possessed high mobility, proficient coordinated combat, and well-organized tactics…

The fatal flaw of this army (the US and the Saigon army) was their unclear fighting ideals. The main force on the battlefield, the US army, was unfamiliar with the terrain and struggled to withstand the weather and climate. This pampered, wealthy army, fighting like spoiled rich kids, could not fight effectively against a tenacious and resilient opponent like the Liberation Army, rendering them incapable of achieving modern, victorious victories.

The Saigon army, relying heavily on the American forces, would be thrown into disarray if the American forces were severely and decisively attacked by the enemy. This would create further opportunities for the Liberation Army to exploit their weaknesses and inflict even greater losses.

The strengths and weaknesses of each side will be revealed in the upcoming conflict.

2. Historic Decision

From 1967 until the simultaneous offensive and uprising across cities in South Vietnam, numerous meetings of the Politburo and the Central Committee were held to direct the 1968 offensive. Typically, the content of the Politburo meetings was discussed at the Central Committee. After the Politburo sought the Central Committee's opinion, resolutions were issued. Among the resolutions related to this issue, there are three key documents:Resolution 154-NQ/TW dated January 27, 1967, on intensifying military and political struggle in the South.[22],Resolution 155-NQ/TW dated January 27, 1967, on strengthening diplomatic struggle, proactively attacking the enemy, serving the cause of the Vietnamese people's resistance against the US and national salvation.[23],Resolution of January 1968[24]In addition, there were several secret telegrams from the Politburo sent to revolutionary leaders at all levels in the South.

The meetings of the Politburo and the Central Committee during that period analyzed the battlefield situation, the general situation nationwide, the situation in the United States, the Saigon government, and compared the strengths of the enemy and our forces. Based on this assessment, they outlined the direction for the Vietnamese people's resistance war against the US in 1968. The main contents of the Party's directive for the Tet Offensive included the following points.

President Ho Chi Minh presided over a meeting to discuss the 1968 Spring Offensive. (Archival photo)

One of the key issues throughout the Central Committee's leadership of the revolution in South Vietnam was determining the most appropriate and advantageous course of action for the struggle against the US, for national salvation, and for the liberation of South Vietnam. How would this struggle end? Could it be like the General Uprising of the August Revolution of 1945, or a resounding victory like Dien Bien Phu in the war against the US? This pressing question was posed to the Supreme General Staff from the very beginning of its leadership of the South Vietnamese people's uprising (1959-1960).

Based on the principle of national independence and national unity as paramount, the fundamental and overarching spirit guiding the resistance war against the US and for national salvation by the Politburo and the Central Committee was:Winning step by step, progressing towards achieving complete victory..

The first crucial step in the process of achieving complete victory is to win.decisive victoryFor the revolution in the South, the idea of ​​achieving decisive victory before achieving complete victory was a creation of the Central Committee during the anti-American war for national salvation. At the historical moment in the fight against the Special War, in 1964, the Supreme Command - the Politburo and the Central Committee of the Party directed the achievement of decisive victory for the revolution in the South. However, due to the historical context at that time, the Vietnamese people only defeated the US Special War, but did not achieve a pivotal victory that would usher in a new chapter for the resistance.[25].

The offensive and uprising in South Vietnam in 1964-1965 defeated the Special War. However, the United States quickly implemented the Local War. The resistance war against the US continued with even greater ferocity. After two dry seasons of fighting against the enemy's Local War, by early 1967, the Central Committee assessed the situation in South Vietnam and decided to bring the resistance war against the US to a new turning point.

On January 23, 1967, the Central Committee met to discuss...Strengthening proactive diplomatic efforts and political offensives, employing the strategy of fighting while negotiating, and negotiating while fighting.[26]The conference concluded that the US was failing, becoming confused and passive militarily and politically in Vietnam; the localized war was bogged down and failing, and the US was facing internal difficulties.[27]. MeanwhileWe achieved great military and political victories, thus creating a favorable situation for us to employ the strategy of fighting and negotiating simultaneously.[28](Resolution emphasizes).

Thus, in its leadership, the Vietnam Labor Party created a new situation for the struggle: Vietnam opened diplomatic negotiations even when the war was at its peak. This idea demonstrated the decisive leadership of the Supreme General Staff. In the nation's history, agreements and treaties between Vietnam and its partners only took place when the war was nearing its end. During the nine years of resistance against French colonialism, the Geneva Accords were only signed after France's defeat at Dien Bien Phu.

Drawing on revolutionary struggle experience and with its independent and self-reliant spirit, the Central Committee outlined the strategy of fighting and negotiating even when the war was at its peak and the outcome was still undecided. Although Vietnam's policy of fighting and negotiating at this time was not supported by all allies, the reality shows the creativity and effectiveness of this directive for the revolutionary cause in the coming period.

Negotiation is not about bargaining; achieving results depends on one's own strength. The 13th Conference of the Central Executive Committee (January 27, 1967) outlined the principle for negotiations as follows:We can only win at the negotiating table what we win on the battlefield.[29]"

Throughout its diplomatic history, the United States has almost always held the upper hand in negotiations. So how can it force its opponents to sit at the negotiating table as equal partners, rather than as a great power?

There were a series of resolutions from Politburo and Central Committee meetings on the principles of negotiation as well as specific steps in diplomatic struggle. The basic spirit of the Politburo and Central Committee meetings in 1967 and 1968 was to launch a fierce offensive, strike hard, and achieve great victories to force the enemy to negotiate, to force the enemy to de-escalate the war, to force the United States to withdraw its troops, while still preserving the opponent's dignity.

Regarding the battlefield situation, the Supreme General Staff analyzed the positions of both sides. In January 1968, the Central Committee assessed that on the battlefield "we have"We defeated the enemy both strategically and tactically, and our power grew stronger than ever before."[30].

The resolution of the 14th Conference of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam affirmed: "Our armed forces have made remarkable progress, applying unique and flexible combat tactics, eliminating many enemy forces, and especially achieving victories in attacking numerous large and small cities, bases, airfields, warehouses, and strategic transportation routes of the enemy."[31].

Meanwhile, due to the strategic failure of the US in the South and our victories,During this winter-spring period, the enemy is unlikely to launch a third "dry season counterattack." The new trend throughout 1968 is that the enemy will increasingly shift to a more passive defensive stance.[32].

In his Letter to the South, written on January 18, 1968—two weeks before the Tet Offensive—the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers' Party directed the revolution in the South. Le Duan emphasized that the American imperialists were...strategic dilemmaCompared to the political and military objectives set by the US, and given the political, economic, and social situation in the US,The US war effort in Vietnam has now reached its peak.[33].

Based on the above assessment of the situation, the Politburo and the Central Committee decided to bring the Vietnamese people's resistance war against the US to a new turning point.

At the January 1968 conference—the moment of the General Offensive and Uprising—the Central Committee of the Party once again emphasized that the situation allowed the revolution in the South to enter a new phase, a phase of offensive and uprising to achieve decisive victory..The Central Committee emphasized the new opportunity, therefore:Our crucial and urgent task in this new period is to mobilize the utmost efforts of the entire Party, army, and people in both regions, to advance our revolutionary war to its highest level, and to use the method of general offensive and general uprising to achieve decisive victory.”[34](emphasis added in the text).

To achieve that strategic victory, the Politburo and the Central Committee outlined key military and political objectives. To achieve these objectives, it was necessary to annihilate and dismantle the vast majority of the puppet army, overthrow the puppet regime at all levels, and seize complete power for the people. Regarding the expeditionary forces, it was necessary to destroy a significant portion of the American forces and war materials.

This military victory would shatter America's will to invade, force America to admit defeat in the South, end all acts of war against the North, and achieve the immediate goals of the Southern revolution: independence, democracy, peace, neutrality, and ultimately national reunification.[35].

The spirit of achieving decisive victory for the revolution in South Vietnam during the 1968 offensive was summarized by President Ho Chi Minh as "Fight to drive the Americans out and overthrow the puppet regime." This meant forcing the US to withdraw its troops from South Vietnam, ending the Vietnam War.

To achieve the above objective, it is necessary to concentrate military and political forces to the highest degree, launching fierce and continuous offensives.[36]We must unleash maximum military and political power, launch a general offensive, and initiate a general uprising. That struggle was waged ina phase, a process of intense and complex strategic offensivemiscellaneous[37].

The offensive unfolded in a fierce, continuous process throughout the South, with the focal point of the combined attack and uprising in the "capital cities," particularly cities X, Y, and Z.A sharp point thrust into the enemy's throat.[38].

At the entrance to the US Embassy on the morning of January 31, 1968. (Archival photo)

Regarding the timing of the general offensive and uprising, it was determined to begin on the eve of the Lunar New Year in 1968. Approximately two weeks before the offensive, in a letter to the Central Committee of the Southern Region (dated January 18, 1968), the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party emphasized the timing of the attack: "The situation allows us to shift the revolutionary war to..."period of decisive victoryThis is a great strategic opportunity to launch a general offensive and uprising. The fact that we're starting it during Tet (Lunar New Year) makes this opportunity even more special.[39].

The leadership of the Politburo and the Central Committee created the resounding moment of the Tet Offensive in 1968. At that time, armed and political forces launched attacks and uprisings throughout the cities of South Vietnam, with the two most crucial fronts being Saigon and Hue. Commenting on this momentous event in the Vietnamese revolution, General Vo Nguyen Giap stated that the Tet Offensive of 1968 was a historic strategic decisive battle.[40].