Historical basis of historical decisions

1. Historical context

By the end of 1967, the Vietnam war had become extremely fierce. On the battlefield, the United States had mobilized nearly half a million troops to fight. If we include the supporting forces from some US military bases in some Asian countries, Guam Island, and the 7th Fleet, then about 650,000 US troops had been mobilized to serve the war.[1]. As for the army, the United States mobilized most of its domestic units to Vietnam. Therefore, the press humorously commented that there were dozens of states in the United States of America that were protected by only a few army brigades, the number of these units could be counted on the fingers.

All the most modern military branches, the most powerful and newest means of war were sent to the battlefield in Vietnam. Bombs and bullets plowed everywhere: the United States dropped millions of tons of bombs and bullets, tens of millions of liters of toxic defoliants, hundreds of thousands of tons of chemical bombs and mines. All types of aircraft, from helicopters to B52s, then artillery swarms, artillery batteries of the invading army bombarded everywhere. By 1967, all the most modern and brutal weapons, except for nuclear weapons, had been used by the US military in the South.

With tens of billions of dollars spent on the Vietnam War, it had a huge impact on the economic and social life of the United States. At this time, the United States spent about 30 billion dollars annually on the war, a huge amount of money and the more dollars poured into the battlefield, the more fierce the war became.

Along with half a million American troops, there were tens of thousands of soldiers from several other countries fighting in Vietnam that the United States called allies. Over 50,000 soldiers fought along with a number of medical staff and war logistics technicians from seven countries calledAllied Forces of the United Stateswas active in the South. The participation of this multinational force contributed to the war in the South taking on the appearance of an international conflict.

The military power that the United States used in Vietnam during the Local War by the end of 1967 had reached its peak and some military elements in this war had touched the threshold of total war. The professional army of the world's number 1 military power was veryeast and strong[2].

On the same front as the US forces was the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. By the end of 1967, after many coups, the force was more stable than before and had about 550,000-600,000 troops. The Saigon army had dozens of main divisions, a multi-ethnic structure, and was fully equipped with modern weapons by the US. Compared to the armed forces in the region at that time, this army was large and quite strong.[3].

Regarding the Liberation Armed Forces, by the end of 1967 there were 9 main divisions (F2,3,5,7,9, 324, 325, 304, 320). In addition, there were local troops, these two groups had a strength of about 300,000 people. The guerrilla force was large, with hundreds of thousands of soldiers. The revolutionary armed forces had special units, security forces and especially intelligence groups and individuals operating even in the central agencies of the enemy.

The revolutionary armed forces were only a few percent larger than the US and Saigon armies, and their weapons were not as modern and numerous as those of the enemy, but they were present in all areas, forming the core force for the invincible people's war that was developing deeply and widely throughout the entire region.

Troops marching during the 1968 Spring Offensive and Uprising. Photo: Archive

By the end of 1967, the United States had been engaged in the Local War for two and a half years with no end in sight. When it initiated it, the U.S. government believed that it would resolve the conflict.Rebellion(Insurgency) in a short time. The White House believes that with hundreds of thousands of US troops, there will beGulf of Tonkin Resolutionpassed by the US Congress[4], the American army will go to the Southern battlefield, will quickly eliminate the Viet Cong uprising (Counterinsurgency). Even the American army has the mood to go to Vietnam as afun adventure(Funny Travel Adventure). However, the reality of the Vietnam battlefield with the brave and intelligent battles of the Liberation Army gradually eroded the arrogance and superiority of the American soldiers.[5].

The form of movement on the Southern battlefield through strategic offensive campaigns in the two seasons of 1965-1966 and 1966-1967 demonstrated the military strength of the warring parties. In the first dry season, the United States and its allies proactively launched two strategic offensives (into the Southeast and Zone 5). The Liberation Army counterattacked, defeating the US army's intention to break the main backbone of the Viet Cong. In the second dry season, the situation was different: the United States launched an offensive campaign in Tay Ninh, the Liberation Army once again carried out a counterattack campaign, defeating the enemy's intention on the main battlefield, and on the other hand, the Liberation Army proactively launched an offensive campaign on Route 9 - North Quang Tri. Thus, after about two and a half years of fighting, by the beginning of the third year of the Local War, a balance of strength between the parties had emerged.

The third dry season, MACV - the US Military Assistance Command in Vietnam, essentially the US Army Command in Vietnam, was calculating the war plan in Vietnam. General William Childs Westmoreland, the commander of MACV, was calculating a new strategy, with a much more cautious attitude after two years of clashes with the enemy. Despite his optimistic statements, in reality, General Westmoreland was in a dilemma.

In the final months of 1967, the Liberation Army attacked Dak To - Tan Canh (November 1967), destroying many US and Saigon troops. But when the country presented the war situation in Vietnam, in a meeting at the Pentagon, Westmoreland said the Dak To battle was the beginning of a great defeat for the Viet Cong.

The US commander in the South assessed this battle as a sign of opening the third phase of defeating the Viet Cong.[6]But in reality, there were no signs of the enemy weakening as the US generals had predicted. The largest-scale sweeps, using bombs at maximum destructive levels...but half a million US troops could notsearch and destroyenemy.

Despite his efforts to show off, Westmoreland was somewhat shaken when the third dry season arrived. Westmoreland declared victory was near, but there was almost no solution to achieving that goal other than asking for reinforcements.[7]. But the request for reinforcements made President LB Johnson worried. According to the analysis of US military experts, if the troops were not increased, with the force Westmoreland had at that time (half a million troops), it would take about 5 more years to hope to achieve the goal of completely resolving the enemy. Westmoreland's plans were not approved because if the President accepted, he would have to mobilize the reserve force and spend billions of dollars more on the war. If General Westmoreland's requests were implemented, the White House would almost go unconstitutional. Even giving more time for the expeditionary force to continue fighting in the South would be difficult to convince the executive branch. Moreover, even the previously approved Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (1964) was at risk of being reviewed.[8].

When strategysearch and destroyWhile bogged down on the pacification front, the Saigon government was also stuck and unable to carry out its annual plan. The weakness of the Saigon army in this area forced the United States to send tens of thousands of troops and thousands of foreign experts to support the Saigon government in carrying out its plan.pacifyHowever, by the end of 1967, the Saigon government still had not completed the pacification of thousands of hamlets around key areas as planned.

On the Northern front, the bombing of the North did not yield the results the United States expected. From the first provocation campaign to the massive bombing, to the last rung of the US escalation ladder, all failed miserably.[9]. Bombing to the point of saturation of the attack targets, after escalating the bombing of the Hanoi area in 1967, but did not shake the will to fight and liberate the South of the Northern people. The number 1 target of the 7 US bombing targets, which was to prevent the North from supporting the South, was not achieved.[10]Moreover, the North had prepared a plan to defeat the American army, so if this force recklessly attacked the North, it would certainly suffer a miserable defeat.[11].

Stuck in war, with no fundamental solution to escape the deadlock, while the election season was heating up and the Vietnam issue was becoming a key issue in the election. Those two hot winds on both sides of the Pacific Ocean greatly influenced American politics.

The political climate in Washington over Vietnam in 1967 was different from 1964. The American people opposed the war in increasing numbers, with increasingly fierce forces and forms.

The conflicts, cracks, and divisions of American society by 1967 were clearly revealed, and the important cause came from the war the government conducted in Vietnam. The struggles against the US war in Vietnam that began to appear in 1961 became a large-scale movement in 1967. With increasingly large participation forces, many components, many forms, and increasingly fierce nature. In particular, it combined with the anti-racism movement.[12]created a second war within the United States. These struggles, along with the enormous costs of the Vietnam War, bankrupted the nation.Great Social Program(Great Society)[13]of President Johnson.

In addition to the number of ordinary voters who opposed the war, there were more and more anti-war politicians. Many figures in the US Senate and House of Representatives asked the president to reconsider his policy in Vietnam.[14].

An event associated with the name of a famous figure who advocated expanding the war, Robert S. McNamara, who, together with President LB Johnson, proposed conducting a local war in Vietnam.[15]. He was famous for being called “the man with the electronic brain”. But from the reality in Vietnam, he suggested that the President find a solution to end the Vietnam War and withdraw troops from the country. When his proposal was not accepted, at the end of 1967, McNamara resigned as Secretary of Defense.

In his memoirs, McNamara assessed the dilemma in Washington in late 1967 and early 1968 as multi-sided: The pressure from the left for us to de-escalate or withdraw, with this strong opposition, contributed to Johnson’s re-election. But the main concern came from the right: The hawks accused us of forcing the military to fight with one hand tied behind its back, and they demanded the full force of America’s military power.[16].

The above situation on the battlefield and in the country had an increasingly profound impact on the US executive branch. Recently released documents show that at that time, President LB Johnson began to admit that he could not win the Vietnam War, but it was too early to resolve it in another direction when the war there had not yet gained any prestige, but had to pay an unexpectedly high price, burying the military prestige and the lives of tens of thousands of soldiers!

In the international arena, conducting the war in Vietnam isolated the United States. Except for some countries in Southeast Asia that, for many reasons, still had to cling to the United States and one traditional allied government that still supported the United States, most governments and people of other countries opposed the United States' war in Vietnam. The world people's front supporting Vietnam against the United States was actually formed.

The human and material resources that the United States spent on Vietnam were so great that the United States could not intervene in other strategic areas as it had done before. Conflicts between countries and strategic areas during this time, such as the conflict between Arabs and Israel, or the extremism that appeared in South Africa... In these areas, the United States could not proactively settle as aworld leaderas before, as they themselves assessed. The decline of the United States around the world is inversely proportional to the development of other countries, first of all the socialist bloc led by the Soviet Union.

Stuck in Vietnam, the United States lost its economic competitive advantage with West Germany and Japan. These countries rose up to compete with the United States for market share throughout the 1960s. On the other hand, the cost was too high, using many of the most modern weapons for the Vietnam War, so in the arms race, the United States gradually lost its upper hand in the arms race, because some superpowers took advantage of the United States' efforts in the war in Vietnam, quickly developing their defense potential.[17].

While the United States was isolated, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Vietnamese people's resistance war against the US to save the country were supported by many international governments and people. The Third World forces were having an increasingly important voice and these countries were increasing their spiritual support for the Vietnamese people to fight against the US.[18].

First of all, it was the help of socialist countries, especially the effective help of the Soviet Union and China, which were decisive factors in the victory of the Vietnamese revolution. The socialist countries were the great rear base of the Vietnamese people's resistance war against the US to save the country.[19].

The struggle of the Vietnamese people at this time is receiving great support from the people of Laos and Cambodia. The resistance of the Lao and Vietnamese people is leaning on each other, fighting side by side to share the fire. With the support of the Royal Government of Cambodia, the Vietnamese people have a great advantage. Regionholy land[20]Cambodia has protected and helped the Vietnamese people preserve their strength. Laos, Cambodia

Thus, by the end of 1967, the United States was at a disadvantage on the Vietnam battlefield, while their opponents were increasingly developing their position and strength. The limitations of the US expeditionary force as well as the war strategy in Vietnam were increasingly revealed. This situation made it more difficult for the White House and the Pentagon to find a solution to the war in Vietnam when the presidential election season was approaching. The safe time from which the president could act freely, without paying much attention to public opinion of voters, was no longer there. Having to win quickly or finding a neutral solution, at least reducing the heat of the Vietnam War was what US politicians were struggling to calculate in the last months of 1967.

On the side of the revolutionary armed forces, the strengths are the invincible people's war posture, the bravery and strategic talent of the cadres and soldiers. The Liberation Army has an extremely intelligent, creative, flexible way of fighting and is able to endure all difficulties and shortages.[21]. It can be said that the Vietnamese revolutionary army has the ability to endure the most hardships in the world. For soldiers and guerrillas, fighting well does not only come from patriotism but also from an objective requirement: Destroying the enemy is the only way to protect oneself. With the strength ofsecret attack, night attack, mountain attack,The liberation forces defeated all military plots of the enemy.

With the US army, its allies and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, the advantage is that they have a large army (several times larger than the Liberation Army), are equipped with very modern weapons and means of war, have excellent logistics, and have abundant ammunition. This army has high mobility, skillfully coordinated combat; and methodical battles...

The common fatal limitation of this army (the US and Saigon soldiers) is that their fighting ideals are unclear. The main army on the battlefield, the US army, is not familiar with the terrain and cannot endure the harsh weather. The army of young masters, fighting like rich kids, if facing a resilient and resilient opponent like the Liberation Army, the US soldiers cannot fight according to the strengths of modern victory.

The Saigon army, relying entirely on the American army, if the American army was attacked hard, dangerously, and painfully by the enemy, both the Americans and the Saigon army would be in chaos and thus create conditions for the enemy, the Liberation Army, to exploit their limitations and the level of damage would be even more severe.

The strengths and weaknesses of each side will be revealed in the upcoming war.

2. Historical decision

From 1967 until the simultaneous uprisings in all the cities in the South, there were many conferences of the Politburo and the Central Executive Committee to direct the offensive in 1968. Usually, the content of the Politburo meetings was discussed at the Central Committee. After the Politburo asked for the Central Committee's opinion, Resolutions would be issued. In the dossier of Resolutions related to this issue, there are 3 key documents:Resolution 154-NQ/TW dated January 27, 1967 on stepping up military and political struggles in the South[22],Resolution 155-NQ/TW dated January 27, 1967 on promoting diplomatic struggle, proactively attacking the enemy, serving our people's cause of fighting against the US and saving the country.[23],Resolution January 1968[24]There are also a number of secret telegrams from the Politburo sent to revolutionary leaders in the South.

The meetings of the Politburo and the Central Executive Committee during this time analyzed the battlefield situation, the general situation of the whole country, the situation of the United States, the Saigon government, compared the enemy's and our strengths, and from this assessment outlined the direction for the Vietnamese people's resistance war against the US to save the country in 1968. The main contents of the Party's direction for the Tet Offensive included the following contents.

President Ho Chi Minh chaired a meeting to discuss the 1968 Spring General Offensive. Photo: Archive

One of the key issues throughout the Central Committee’s leadership of the revolution in the South was to find a way to end the war in the most suitable and beneficial way for the cause of fighting against the US, saving the country, and liberating the South. How would this war end? Could it be like the General Uprising in the August Revolution of 1945, or with a great victory in Dien Bien Phu against the US… This urgent question was posed to the Supreme General Staff right from the first days of directing the people of the South to rise up (1959-1960).

On the basis of national independence and national unity being paramount, the fundamental and consistent spirit in directing the resistance war against the US to save the country of the Politburo and the Central Executive Committee iswin step by step, go for complete victory.

The first important step in the process of achieving total victory is to windecisive victoryfor the Southern revolution. The idea of ​​achieving decisive victory before achieving complete victory was the creation of the Central Committee during the period of resistance against the US, saving the country. At the historical moment of the Special War, in 1964, the Supreme Command - the Politburo and the Central Executive Committee of the Party directed to achieve decisive victory for the Southern revolution. However, due to the historical context at that time, the Vietnamese people had just defeated the US Special War, had not achieved a pivotal victory, opening a new chapter for the resistance.[25].

The offensive and uprising in the South in 1964-1965 defeated the Special War. But the United States quickly implemented the Local War. The resistance war against the US to save the country continued with much greater ferocity. After two dry seasons of fighting against the enemy's Local War, in early 1967, the Central Committee assessed the situation in the South and decided to bring the resistance war against the US to save the country to a new turning point.

On January 23, 1967, the Central Committee met to discussPromote proactive diplomatic work in political offensive, apply the strategy of both fighting and negotiating, and both negotiating and fighting.[26]The conference concluded that the US was failing, confused and passive militarily and politically in Vietnam; the Local War was bogged down and failing, and the US was facing internal difficulties.[27]. Meanwhile, we won great military and political victories, so the situation became favorable for us to apply the strategy of fighting while negotiating, negotiating while fighting.[28](Resolution emphasizes).

Thus, in its direction, the Vietnam Workers' Party has created a new situation for the struggle: Vietnam opened diplomatic negotiations right when the war was at its peak. This ideology demonstrates the courageous direction of the Supreme General Staff. In the history of the nation, the signings and agreements between Vietnam and its partners only took place when the war had already ended. During the 9 years of resistance against French colonialism, the Geneva Accords were only signed when France was defeated at Dien Bien Phu.

From the experience of revolutionary struggle, with its independent and self-reliant spirit, the Central Executive Committee proposed the direction of fighting and negotiating right when the war was at its peak and in reality, the battlefield had not yet been decided. Although Vietnam's policy of fighting and negotiating during this time was not supported by some friends, reality showed the creativity and effectiveness of this direction for the revolutionary cause in the coming time.

Negotiation is not bargaining, but to get results, one must rely on one's own strength. The 13th Conference of the Central Executive Committee (January 27, 1967) stated the principle for negotiation as "We can only win at the conference table what we win on the battlefield.[29]”.

Throughout its diplomatic history, the United States has often been in the upper hand in negotiations. So how can we force the other side to sit at the negotiating table as an equal partner, not as a great power?

There were a series of resolutions from the Politburo and Central Committee conferences on the principles of negotiation as well as specific steps in the diplomatic struggle. The basic spirit of the Politburo and Central Committee conferences in 1967 and 1968 was to attack fiercely, fight hard, and win big to force the enemy to negotiate, to force the enemy to de-escalate the war, to fight so that the US would withdraw its troops but still save face for the opponent.

Regarding the battlefield situation, the Supreme General Staff analyzed the positions of both sides. In January 1968, the Central Executive Committee assessed that on the battlefield “we have"We defeated the enemy both strategically and tactically and our power grew stronger than ever."[30].

In the resolution of the 14th Conference of the Party Central Committee, it was affirmed: "Our armed forces have made remarkable progress, applied unique and flexible combat tactics, destroyed many enemy forces, especially successfully attacked a series of large and small cities, a series of enemy bases, airports, warehouses and strategic traffic routes."[31].

Meanwhile, due to the strategic failure of the US in the South and our victories,In this winter-spring, the enemy is unlikely to be able to launch a third "dry season counterattack". The new trend in the whole year of 1968 is that the enemy will increasingly move to a more passive defense than before.[32].

In the Letter to the South written by the First Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the Vietnam Workers' Party directing the revolution in the South on January 18, 1968 - 2 weeks before the Tet Offensive broke out, Le Duan emphasized that the American Empire was instrategic dilemmaCompared with the political and military goals set by the US, with the political, economic and social situation of the US,America's war efforts in Vietnam have now reached their peak.[33].

From the above assessment of the situation, the Politburo and the Central Executive Committee decided to bring the Vietnamese people's resistance war against the US to save the country to a new turning point.

At the January 1968 conference - the time of the General Offensive and Uprising, the Party Central Committee once again emphasized that: the situation allowed the Southern revolution to move to a new period, a period of offensive and uprising to gain decisive victory..The Central Committee emphasized the new opportunities, so "Our important and urgent task in the new period is to mobilize the highest efforts of the entire Party, the entire army, and the entire people in both regions, to bring our revolutionary war to its highest development, and to use the method of general offensive and general uprising to gain decisive victory."[34](emphasis added).

To achieve that strategic victory, the Politburo and the Central Executive Committee pointed out important military and political goals. To achieve the above goals, it was necessary to destroy and completely disintegrate the puppet army, overthrow the puppet government at all levels, and take over the entire government of the people. With the expeditionary army, it was necessary to destroy an important part of the American forces and means of war.

The above military victory will destroy the US's will to invade, forcing the US to admit defeat in the South, ending all acts of war against the North, achieving the immediate goal of the Southern revolution: independence, democracy, peace, neutrality and moving towards national reunification.[35].

The spirit of decisive victory for the Southern revolution in the 1968 offensive was summarized by President Ho Chi Minh as "Fight to drive the Americans out and the puppets down". Force the Americans to withdraw their troops from the South, ending the Vietnam War.

To achieve the above goal, we must concentrate military and political forces to the highest level, attack fiercely, and attack continuously.[36]. Must deploy maximum military and political strength, carry out a general attack and general uprising. That fight is carried out ina phase, a process of fierce and complex strategic attackmiscellaneous[37].

The attack took place in a process, fiercely everywhere in the South, the focus of the combined attack and uprising was in the "capital", especially cities X, Y, Z.sharp point stabbed into the enemy's throat[38].

At the entrance of the US Embassy on the morning of January 31, 1968. Photo: Archive

Regarding the time to launch the general offensive and uprising, it was determined to start from the New Year's Eve of Mau Than 1968. About 2 weeks before launching the offensive, in a letter to the Central Office for Southern Vietnam (January 18, 1968), the First Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the Party emphasized the timing of the offensive: The situation allows us to shift the revolutionary war toperiod of decisive victory. This is a great strategic opportunity to launch a general offensive and uprising. We started during Tet so this opportunity is even more special.[39].

The direction of the Politburo and the Central Executive Committee created the resounding moment of Tet Mau Than 1968. At that time, the armed and political forces attacked and rose up throughout the urban areas of the South, of which the two most important fronts were Saigon and Hue. Commenting on this important event of the Vietnamese revolution, General Vo Nguyen Giap said: Tet Mau Than 1968 was a historic strategic decisive battle.[40].