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The December 1972 air defense campaign coincided with the Paris peace talks on Vietnam.

Monday - December 18, 2017 04:54
In war, victory at the negotiating table is impossible without victory on the battlefield. The Tet Offensive of 1968 forced the US to de-escalate the war and enter negotiations, opening up a situation of "fighting and negotiating simultaneously." Through courageous and intelligent struggle, closely combining three fronts: military, political, and diplomatic, in October 1972, the Paris Agreement was formed and agreed upon by the representatives participating in the negotiations.

However, the US reneged on its promise, not only failing to sign the agreement as planned, but also resorting to the most brutal form of warfare: launching a strategic bombing campaign using B52 bombers to destroy Hanoi and the port city of Hai Phong, with the ambition of weakening North Vietnam and committing further barbaric crimes against the Vietnamese people.

With the "Dien Bien Phu in the Air" battle, the Vietnamese army and people crushed the United States' best efforts in the war of aggression against Vietnam, forcing the US to return to the negotiating table, accept the Paris Agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam, and withdraw its expeditionary forces from the South. The Vietnamese people fundamentally accomplished the task of "driving the Americans out," creating the conditions to advance towards complete victory.

1. The protracted and fierce struggle on the battlefield, at the Paris Conference, and the duplicity of the United States.

Implementing the Resolution of the 14th Conference of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, during the Tet Offensive of 1968, the army and people of South Vietnam launched a special campaign, simultaneously attacking and rising up against most of the key institutions of the US and the Republic of Vietnam government. Although it did not achieve maximum results, it stunned the entire United States and shocked world public opinion. According to Kissinger, the Tet Offensive "overturned the entire rising strategy of the United States."

The Tet Offensive disheartened the hawks in America. Cliffort, a "tough guy," the most "hawkish" of the "hawks," chosen by Johnson to replace McNamara as Secretary of Defense (March 1, 1968), was the one who most resolutely wanted the US to withdraw from the war. At the consultations on March 25 and 26, 1968, "the majority of senior advisors agreed to end the escalation and take steps toward withdrawal from the war, ranging from limiting bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to reducing US forces and transferring many war responsibilities to the Republic of Vietnam." The Tet Offensive "strengthened the opposition. By the summer of 1968, those Americans who thought sending troops to Vietnam was a mistake far outnumbered the supporters."[1]Former U.S. President Eisenhower said: "I have never encountered a situation as sad as the present state of America, so deeply divided over a war."[2].

Under pressure from various sides, President Johnson decided not to increase the number of American troops in Vietnam as requested by Westmoreland. On March 31, 1968, he announced a de-escalation of the war: ceasing bombing of North Vietnam north of the 20th parallel; not seeking a second presidential term; being ready to negotiate with the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to end the war; and expanding the military forces of the Republic of Vietnam so that they could gradually replace the role of the United States.

After about a month of discussions on the location of the meeting, on May 13, 1968, formal negotiations began in Paris between the delegations of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States. By November 1968, the US had completely stopped bombing North Vietnam. On January 25, 1969, the Paris Conference, with the participation of four parties, opened.

Thus, from escalating the bombing campaign against North Vietnam on an increasingly large scale and with increasing intensity, the US decided to de-escalate the war, unilaterally halting bombing and sitting down at the peace negotiating table. From massively pouring military forces into South Vietnam to conduct a "limited war," the US had to consider withdrawing troops from South Vietnam by declaring the "de-Americanization" of the war, and then proceeding to implement the "Vietnamization of the war" strategy. These actions demonstrate a turning point in the US's war of aggression against Vietnam.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam Xuan Thuy and Advisor Le Duc Tho met with the US diplomatic delegation at the Paris Conference.
1973 (Photo courtesy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

The Vietnam War was entering its final phase but dragged on for a variety of reasons:

FirstThe US implemented the Nixon Doctrine, pursuing the "Vietnamization of the War" strategy, aiming to gradually withdraw American troops from South Vietnam, while still wanting to maintain the army and government of the Republic of Vietnam;

MondayThe revolutionary armed forces of South Vietnam suffered losses after numerous attacks on cities in 1968 and faced many difficulties in 1969-1970, losing their foothold in many rural areas of the delta;

TuesdayRelations between the Soviet Union and China became increasingly tense and deteriorated significantly, leading to a border war between the two countries (1969);

WednesdayThe US-China and US-Soviet relations developed in a conciliatory direction. The US wanted to exploit the conflicts between Vietnam's two biggest allies to compromise with China and ease tensions with the Soviet Union, hoping to win these countries' support in resolving the Vietnam issue in a way that benefited the US;

ThursdayThe US hoped to divide the solidarity of the three Indochinese countries, fragment the forces worldwide supporting Vietnam, put pressure on Vietnam, and give the US the strength to force the enemy to accept a solution to end the war that would benefit the US.

From May 1968 to January 1973, both Vietnam and the United States employed a strategy of fighting while negotiating. The complex developments on the battlefield and in international relations were reflected in the protracted and fierce diplomatic struggle that lasted for 4 years and 9 months in Paris.

Taking advantage of Vietnam's slow shift in offensive focus towards rural areas after the Tet Offensive, the US military and the Saigon government launched a large-scale counterattack by implementing aggressive "pacification" plans that lasted from mid-1968 to early 1970, causing significant difficulties for the revolutionary forces in South Vietnam. Following the coup that overthrew the Sihanouk government and established the Lon Nol government (March 1970), the US launched major military operations into Cambodia and the Route 9 - Southern Laos region, turning Indochina into a battlefield.

However, with renewed efforts, the Vietnamese People's Armed Forces thwarted the US "rapid pacification," "special pacification," "supplementary pacification," and "Phoenix" programs in the South; shifted their strategy towards the countryside, maintaining and expanding liberated areas; and, in coordination with the Cambodian and Laotian resistance forces, crushed major offensives by the US and Saigon army. Building on this victory, they launched the Spring-Summer 1972 strategic offensive, pushing the Saigon army to the brink of collapse. The US became even more chaotic. World public opinion demanded that the US withdraw its troops, stop bombing North Vietnam to end the war, and quickly reach an agreement at the Paris Peace Conference.

In a precarious military and diplomatic situation, Nixon decided to "Americanize" the war again, intensifying the use of air power, including B-52 strategic bombers, to launch devastating attacks in the South, resuming the bombing campaign against North Vietnam on an unprecedented scale and intensity, blockading sea routes to and from North Vietnam, and threatening to expand the Indochina War. The US tried to gain leverage at the negotiating table, but could not reverse the situation. The Vietnam War became a major source of pressure for the Nixon administration as the US presidential election approached.

In August 1972, the US and the Saigon government indefinitely postponed the Paris Peace Conference sessions, but the US continued to maintain secret contacts with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

The Central Committee of the Party advocated for a breakthrough in negotiations. In a directive to the negotiating delegation in Paris (October 4, 1972), the Politburo clearly stated: “Our greatest demand now is to end the American war in the South. The US must withdraw completely, ending its military involvement in the South and ending the air and naval war, and the bombing campaign against the North. Ending the US military involvement in the South and a ceasefire in the South would lead to the de facto recognition of two governments, two armies, and two territories in South Vietnam. Achieving this demand would be a victory of significant importance for both sides under the current balance of forces in South Vietnam, creating a new balance of forces advantageous to us.”[3].

At the Paris Conference, Vietnam focused on demanding the withdrawal of US troops and an end to the war; acknowledging the reality of two governments, two armies, two zones of control, and three political forces in the South; and not yet demanding the removal of the Saigon government.

In an effort to prevent negotiations from reaching a deadlock, on October 8, 1972, the Vietnamese side presented a document.Draft AgreementBoth sides completed the "Draft Agreement on Ending the War" and the "Draft Agreement on the Self-Determination of the People of South Vietnam." President Nixon and Prime Minister Pham Van Dong exchanged notes agreeing on the content of the agreement; they also agreed that Kissinger would go to Hanoi and initial the agreement between October 24 and 31, 1972. It seemed that the US had decided to "go it alone" and abandon the Nguyen Van Thieu government. American voters easily believed Kissinger's declaration in late October 1972 that "peace was within reach." Furthermore, Nixon visited China and the Soviet Union. These actions helped Nixon easily win the presidential election with an overwhelming victory.

However, on October 25, 1972, the US reneged on its promise and did not initial the agreement as planned. Nixon sent a diplomatic note proposing a private meeting to discuss further issues and announced the postponement of Kissinger's trip to Hanoi. On October 26, 1972, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam released the documents and demanded that the US sign the agreement within the agreed timeframe. American and international public opinion intensified pressure on the Nixon administration.

From November 20, 1972 to December 13, 1972, the meeting between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States resumed. The US requested revisions to several points in the agreement.Draft AgreementKissinger demanded the symbolic withdrawal of some North Vietnamese troops from the South and proposed changes to the text to weaken the political standing of the National Liberation Front, limit the power of the Tripartite Commission, and establish a demilitarized zone as a de facto boundary. He threatened that the U.S. would not hesitate to “do whatever is necessary to protect American interests.”[4]Seeing the duplicity of the US, Le Duc Tho refused to compromise, resolutely rejecting the US proposal and reiterating his previous opinion to depose Nguyen Van Thieu. The negotiations were tense, and by mid-December 1972, both sides returned to the original agreement, except for the issue of access to the demilitarized zone, which was temporarily postponed. Advisor Le Duc Tho informed Kissinger that he needed a week to return to Hanoi to finalize the demilitarized zone issue and would provide an answer to the US side. However, with a deliberate new war strategy, the Americans did not wait for Le Duc Tho's return to Paris, but decided to halt negotiations and resolve the issue by force as soon as he arrived in Hanoi.

3. The matchThe "Dien Bien Phu" in the air shattered America's best efforts, ending the negotiations. The Paris Agreement was signed.

A section of Kham Thien street was destroyed by American B52 planes (internet)

With prior planning and preparation, President R. Nixon decided to play his final card, launching a strategic air offensive (from December 18 to 30, 1972) on Hanoi, the port city of Hai Phong, and several other locations in North Vietnam, codenamed "Linebacker 2," characterized by its relentless assault usingstrategic bomber B-52instead oftactical bomberUsing unrestricted force and methods, they launched direct attacks on the nerve centers of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. These were the most intense bombing campaigns in the Vietnam War and one of the most high-intensity raids in history.warAround the world, in Hanoi alone, the US Air Force launched devastating attacks, dropping tens of thousands of tons of bombs on numerous residential areas: Kham Thien, An Duong, Uy No, Bach Mai Hospital, Yen Vien, Gia Lam, Dong Anh, Van Dien, Giap Bat, Me Tri Radio Station... The US hoped to force the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to accept US demands. According to American history professor George C. Herring, Nixon's decision "appeared to force Hanoi to sign an agreement," but in reality, it "reflected the anger and pent-up frustration of four years and weakened North Vietnam to the point where they could not threaten South Vietnam after signing a peace agreement." Nixon pressured the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to carry out his resolve to inflict maximum damage on North Vietnam: “I don’t want to hear your nonsense about not being able to hit this target or that target. This is your chance to use military force to win this war, and if you fail, I will hold you accountable.”[5].

Six weeks after his re-election and a week before Christmas 1972, Nixon ordered the first B-52 bombers to Hanoi. Throughout the following Christmas holiday, the US continuously deployed B-52 strategic bombers to carry out the most intense and fierce bombing raids, dropping more than 36,000 bombs.[6]Tons of bombs dropped on boats in North Vietnam.

Our anti-aircraft artillery batteries protect the skies over Hanoi.

However, once again, the Nixon administration tasted defeat. Based on the strategic forecast: "Sooner or later, the American imperialists will bring B-52s to bomb Hanoi"... "The US will certainly lose, but it will only lose after losing in the skies over Hanoi," the Central Military Commission instructed the Air Defense and Air Force Command and the military regions to be ready to counter the possibility of the US using its air force, including strategic air force, to resume bombing the North. In November 1972, General Vo Nguyen Giap affirmed: The US plot to bomb Hanoi with B-52s would be the final act of pressure to force the Vietnamese people to make concessions. Therefore, we must resolutely defeat them in the skies over the capital... With high vigilance and a high fighting spirit, the people and armed forces of the North, especially the people and armed forces of the capital, in the people's war strategy, closely combined the three branches of the armed forces, combined various military services and branches, resolutely fighting not only with modern weapons, but also with intelligence and courage, creating the "Dien Bien Phu in the Air" battle, inflicting heavy losses on the American invaders. Even though the number of B52 "Flying Fortresses" shot down by each side differed.[7]However, it was certainly a major material loss for the US, particularly psychologically impacting the US military, because this was a campaign in which the US proactively chose the targets, timing, and methods of combat, and especially used modern weapons, yet it completely failed.

The US strategic bombing campaign against Hanoi and Hai Phong during Christmas, while causing heavy losses in human lives and material damage to the Vietnamese people, did not change the stance of the Vietnamese Party, Government, and people on the fundamental content of the Paris Agreement. It also created a wave of indignation among the American people, public opinion, and political circles around the world, including long-standing US allies. The Soviet Union and China angrily condemned Nixon's reckless war actions. Critics called Nixon "mad" and accused him of waging war to satisfy his anger. The American people were stunned and outraged by Nixon's "sad Christmas gift." Nixon's approval rating immediately dropped to 39%. Moderates in the US Congress declared they would resolutely fight against the president.[8].

The SAM fire dragon of our army in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in the air in 1972.

The last card had been played, and nothing more could be done. Facing effective resistance that inflicted heavy losses on the strategic air force, and facing strong condemnation from the entire world, the prestige ofThe US governmentThe situation deteriorated drastically. Facing domestic opposition, international isolation, and the inability to force the opposing side to change its position, on December 30, 1972, Nixon was forced to order an end to the bombing campaign that had previously held so much hope, and was ready to send representatives back to the negotiating table. Although both Nixon and Kissinger later claimed that the B-52 bombing during Christmas 1972 had forced Hanoi to accept a solution desired by the US, these were merely words to save face for those who had to flee.

On January 8, 1973, negotiations in Paris resumed. Delegations from the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam returned to the negotiating table as victors, to the jubilation of peace-loving people worldwide. Conversely, "the United States was at a serious disadvantage in the conflict with a strong and determined opponent on the 'fight and negotiate' stage."[9]Despite the brutal strategic bombing campaign by the United States, it could not alter the content of the Paris Agreement that they had previously demanded. Gorge C. Herring observed: “The changes from the October agreement were mostly formal, allowing both sides to claim they had made no concessions whatsoever. On a crucial point in December, namely the demilitarized zone, North Vietnam agreed to specify it in the agreement, but the United States accepted their view that the demilitarized zone was only ‘temporary and not a territorial border,’ thus preserving the fundamental nature of Hanoi’s position. The issue of civilian movement through the demilitarized zone was left to be resolved later in negotiations between North and South Vietnam.”[10].

Wreckage of an American plane shot down by Hanoi's people and army during the 12-day and 12-night battle.

After six consecutive days of meetings, the negotiating parties finalized the text and signed the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam (January 27, 1973). The United States agreed to withdraw its expeditionary troops from South Vietnam and recognized the fundamental national rights of Vietnam.

The failure of the B-52 bombing campaign against Hanoi not only forced the US to accept the Paris Agreement, but also prompted them to ruthlessly impose its terms on the Nguyen Van Thieu government. Nixon did not hesitate to reveal that if Thieu objected, he would cut off aid and the US would go it alone.

There have been many comments on the "Battle of Dien Bien Phu in the Air" and the Paris Agreement from different perspectives. In response...AirForce magazine(June 1973), the former Vice Chief of Staff of the US Air Force asserted, "North Vietnam clearly had extensive experience firing SAM missiles as well as other anti-aircraft guns. They also had extensive experience in detecting aircraft from ground control stations... The US Air Force conducted large-scale electronic warfare, but the aircraft remained vulnerable. We believe that North Vietnam had developed the most experienced air defense forces in the world. Clearly, they had more experience than any other country in launching missiles to shoot down aircraft."[11].

According to American historian George C. Herring, the outcome of the agreement was indeed a very high price for the United States, greatly affecting the trust of the American people and the people of the world in the prestige and power of this superpower. “Nixon was determined to seek a ‘peace with honor’ to maintain America’s position in the world, but America emerged from the war with a very tarnished image in the eyes of the world and the American people, who were already fed up with being involved in wars.”[12].

With the strategically significant victory in the "Dien Bien Phu in the Air" and the signing of the Paris Agreement, the Vietnamese people created a historical turning point in the war against the US, fulfilling the mission of "driving the Americans out," gaining an advantage in the balance of power on the battlefield, and creating conditions to continue advancing towards the complete liberation of the South and the reunification of the country. 45 years have passed, but the red flames of the B52 bombers burning in the skies over Hanoi still seem to be reflected in the waters of Ho Guom Lake.

 


[1]Gabriel Kolko:Anatomy of a War, People's Army Publishing House, Hanoi, 2003, p. 358.

[2]According to UPI, March 27, 1968.

[3]According to Luu Van Loi - Nguyen Anh Vu:The Le Duc Tho - Kissinger negotiations in Paris, People's Police Publishing House, Hanoi, 2002, p. 495.

[4]Gorge C. Herring:America's longest war., National Political Publishing House, Hanoi, 1998, p. 323.

[5]Gorge C. Herring:America's longest war., Ibid., p. 325.

[6]According to Daniel Ellsberg, the amount of bombs the US dropped on North Vietnam during Christmas 1972 was 20,000 tons, an amount of explosives equivalent to the atomic bomb the US dropped on Nagasaki (see...).Secrets of the Vietnam War (Memoirs of Vietnam and Pentagon Papers), People's Police Publishing House, Hanoi, p. 655. But according to Gorge C. Herring, this figure is 36,000 tons.America's longest war.(Ibid., p. 325)

[7]The Vietnamese side claims 34 B-52s, while the US side claims 15; further verification is needed.

[8]Gorge C. Herring:America's longest war., op. cit., p. 426.

[9] Summary of the U.S. Department of Defense's Vietnam War Review, Vietnamese translation preserved at the Vietnam Military History Institute, 1982, p. 2.

[10]George C. Herring:America's longest war., op. cit., p. 327.

[11]Truong Minh:Stop the Flying Fortress., VietNamNet, December 3, 2012.

[12]George C. Herring:America's longest war., Ibid., p. 229.

Author:Assoc. Prof. Dr. Vu Quang Hien

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