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Attitude of the Great Powers before the Event of December 19, 1946

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Thái độ của các cường quốc trước sự kiện 19-12-1946
Attitude of the Great Powers before the Event of December 19, 1946

The August Revolution of 1945 succeeded, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was born. But the young independence faced an extremely fierce challenge from the beginning. That was the return of the French colonialists. On the night of September 23, 1945, gunfire erupted in Saigon, then spread to the Southern and South Central regions. From December 19, 1946, fighting broke out nationwide. This was a 9-year war (1945-1954) between Vietnam and France, the struggle of a former colony that had just gained independence against the re-invasion of a colonial empire. But involved in this event - directly or indirectly - were all the great powers: France, England, China.1, the United States and the Soviet Union. This article reviews the attitudes of those countries toward the war in Vietnam.

1. French colonialists decided to reoccupy Indochina.

World War II broke out, France had to gradually give in to the demands of the Japanese fascist army that was invading deeper and deeper into Indochina. On the night of March 9, 1945, Japan staged a coup, arrested Governor-General Decoux and the entire French governing system, and directly took over Indochina. Two weeks later, on March 24, General De Gaulle - the leader of the French people's resistance movement against Germany - announced that France would return, establish an Indochina Federation consisting of 5 regions (Tonkin, Annam, Cochinchina, Laos and Cambodia) as a part of the French Union; establish an Indochina government headed by a French Governor-General; elect a parliament with the participation of French people in Indochina, only having the right to discuss economics, taxes... while foreign affairs were decided by France. Thus, in essence, the French authorities still advocated restoring the colonial regime in Indochina after the end of World War II.

To carry out this plan, on April 17, De Gaulle decided to mobilize military units to form the French Expeditionary Force in the Far East, commanded by General Leclerc, to send to Indochina. Leclerc went to India to meet the British Army Commander there, offering to help the French army return to Indochina. To carry out this plan, immediately after Japan surrendered, De Gaulle quickly reformed the command apparatus in Indochina, appointing Navy Admiral D'Argenlieu as High Commissioner with the directive: "The first mission of the High Commissioner is to restore French sovereignty over the territories of the Indochinese Federation" and assigning General Leclerc as Supreme Commander of the expeditionary force with the task of "taking all necessary military measures to restore that sovereignty."2. During the same period, De Gaulle went to England and the United States to conduct diplomatic campaigns, asking the governments of these two countries to support France's plan to return to occupy Indochina. From Washington, General De Gaulle declared: "France's position in Indochina is very simple. France affirms that it will reclaim sovereignty in Indochina."3. In response to the journalist's question about what other intentions France had in the Indochina issue, the general replied in an arrogant tone: "No, we will return to Indochina because we are the strongest."4.

2. The British Empire helped France return to Indochina.

According to the Potsdam Agreement signed between the three heads of state leading the Allied forces: Truman (USA), Atlee (UK) and Stalin (USSR)5In Indochina, the British army would enter the South, and the Chinese Nationalist army would enter the North of the 16th parallel (through Da Nang) under the name of the Allies to disarm the Japanese army.

On August 22, three days after the people of Hanoi had launched the General Uprising to seize power, a British plane from Calcutta (India) secretly carried two “French Republican Commissioners”, Cédile, who successfully parachuted into Cochinchina and Messmer, who was captured by the Vietnamese militia, into Bac Ky. In mid-September, British troops led by General Gracey landed in Saigon. Mixed in were French units. In Saigon, Gracey released the French who had been imprisoned by the Japanese, who became a source of reinforcements for the French forces in Vietnam. On the night of September 23, the French colonialists opened fire in Saigon, starting a new war of aggression against our country.

The reason why Britain fully supported France's return to Indochina was because Britain had many colonies on the continents, and was known as the empire "on which the sun never sets". In Asia, Britain had India, Malaya (which at that time included Singapore), Burma (now Myanmar) and many other countries, so it did not want the turmoil in Vietnam to affect the countries under British rule.

On October 8 in London, Britain and France signed a Provisional Agreement on the British Government handing over to France the administrative and judicial management rights south of the 16th parallel. British Prime Minister Atlee publicly announced Britain's policy on Indochina, which included three main points: 1) The British Government supported France in retaking Vietnam; 2) Britain recognized the French government in Saigon; 3) Handed over the governance rights in the South to France. The above content meant that when the British army completed the disarming of the Japanese army and withdrew, France would naturally be the owner of this land. Thus, the collusion between Britain and France had practically started the war in Vietnam.

3. China and France compromise behind Vietnam's back

Also according to the Potsdam Agreement, the Chinese Nationalist army of Chiang Kai-shek would enter North Vietnam under the name of the Allied forces to disarm the Japanese army. That made the French government worried about China's intention to occupy Indochina. To reassure France, the Prime Minister of the Chongqing government, Song Ziwen, pledged to De Gaulle during a meeting in Paris on September 19 that China had no territorial ambitions in Indochina and, if possible, would be ready to support France's return to Indochina.6. On October 10, during a meeting with High Commissioner D'Argenlieu in Chongqing, Song Ziwen also reiterated this commitment. The above content was also announced by Chiang Kai-shek and later officially stated by General Lu Han at the launching ceremony in Hanoi. In fact, their initial plan was to use the Viet Quoc and Viet Cach puppet forces to seize power without having to openly occupy and rule Vietnam.

But the situation in China changed very quickly. After the end of World War II, the cooperation between the Nationalist (Chiang Kai-shek) and Communist (Mao Zedong) parties during the resistance war against Japan quickly fell apart. On June 16, 1946, the civil war between the two parties broke out. Chiang's government was preparing to deal with the Communist forces pouring down from the North, so it was ready to compromise with France on the Indochina issue. On the other hand, China also wanted to take advantage of France's intention to return to Indochina, so it set conditions to demand the rights that the Qing Dynasty had previously ceded to France according to the treaties signed in 1900-1903. After negotiations from October 1945 in Chongqing, on February 28, 1946, the Sino-French Treaty was signed between French Ambassador Jacques Mayrier and Foreign Minister Wang Shijie. It can be summarized in the following 3 main points: 1) France returned to China the concessions and areas of influence in Shanghai, Tianjin, Hankou, Guangdong (including Guangzhou Loan); cut off and returned to China the Hai Phong - Yunnan railway section running through the territory from Hekou to Kunming; Chinese goods imported and exported through Hai Phong port were exempted from tax. 2) France was allowed to send troops to North Vietnam to replace Chinese troops who would withdraw from the country from March 15 to March 31, 1946 (but in reality, they were not completely withdrawn until the end of October). France advanced the payment for the transfer of Chinese troops, 60 million Indochinese piastres per month (a total of 7 months). 3) China would arm 5,000 French civilians in Hanoi (this was kept secret and not announced).7.

Thus, the Franco-Chinese Treaty was signed by both sides without taking into account the interests of the Vietnamese people. The Chongqing authorities opened the door for the French troops to return to Vietnam. However, the existence of the Ho Chi Minh Government supported by the people was a reality that forced France to negotiate if it wanted to send troops to North Vietnam. That was the reason why the French representative in Vietnam, J. Sainteny, had a long negotiation with President Ho Chi Minh and ended with the Preliminary Agreement on March 6, 1946.

4. The United States from opposition to "neutrality" in the face of France's plot

While the world war was raging, General De Gaulle sought every way to lobby the international community so that France could return to Indochina. On September 18, 1943, De Gaulle sent a note to the heads of state of Britain (Churchill), the United States (Roosevelt) and the Soviet Union (Stalin) proposing “the participation of French units in the liberation of Indochina (from Japanese fascism)”. However, France faced opposition from US President Roosevelt, who declared: “after a hundred years of French rule over Indochina, the people here still have to live as badly as they did before” and suggested establishing an international trusteeship to prepare the local people for independence within a specified period of time, possibly 20-30 years”.8. In response to the British proposal to support France, the US President emphasized: “France has milked Indochina for 100 years. The Indochinese people have the right to enjoy better things than that… I do not want any French to return to Indochina.”9. But later, due to the lobbying of Britain and France, the US's argument softened. In August 1944, the US made a new proposal on dependent territories after the war, according to which the international trusteeship regime would only be established in the following three cases: a) If the territory was still under the administration of the League of Nations; b) If the territory was in the hands of the enemy during the war; c) If the territory was voluntarily placed under the trusteeship regime by the countries responsible for administrative management.10.

On April 12, 1945, President Roosevelt passed away and was succeeded by Harry Truman. In early May, Nazi Germany surrendered, the war entered its final phase, and all that remained was to destroy Japanese fascism. This was determined at the Potsdam Conference (July 1945). On August 15, the Emperor announced unconditional surrender, ending World War II.

Taking advantage of this opportunity, on August 11, 1945, the French government sent a note to the four great powers, the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union, requesting to have representatives in the Allied Armistice Commission, and to have military representatives alongside the Allied commanders. De Gaulle wanted to use this event to raise France's position, to regain its equal status with the great powers, which France had lost due to the Vichy government's surrender to Germany during the war. This request was not accepted.

On August 14, the representative of the Paris government in Chongqing, General Peckhoff, requested to send 5,000 French soldiers to join the Allied forces to disarm the Japanese army in Indochina. Three days later, he received the answer: "ready to let 5,000 French soldiers return to Indochina but must be placed under the command of the generals of the Republic of China." It was a difficult pill to swallow, so on August 28, the French Ambassador to the United States proposed that the British disarm the Japanese army throughout Indochina, or that the Japanese generals in the North perform the surrender ceremony at a location on Chinese territory, while in the South, France would accept the surrender ceremony in the name of the British (!). The above facts show that De Gaulle - the leader of liberated France - did not attend the two important conferences of the three Allied countries in Yalta and Potsdam, and was not considered a victorious country with the right to disarm the surrendered. Therefore, France's "initiatives" were only aimed at regaining its prestige and position as a great power, participating in Allied activities, and getting involved in post-war work in Indochina to prepare for the next steps.

On August 30, the US Secretary of State replied that France could not go against the resolutions of the Potsdam Conference, but that France could make arrangements with Britain. On the same day, the US Ambassador in Chongqing received a notice from the US State Department that Washington fully agreed if France and China could reach an agreement. Thus, with Truman's change in policy, the US had an ambiguous attitude, pushing the "ball" into the feet of Britain and China, in fact leaving the door open for France to return to Indochina. On October 28, in his speech on US foreign policy, Truman mentioned the Indochina issue with general words about national equality as in the Charter of the United Nations.

On August 22, De Gaulle went to Washington to meet with US President Truman. The meeting was not very cordial, De Gaulle felt that France was not being treated as a first-class power, and Truman suspected that France was seeking relations with the Soviet Union. However, the head of France did not encounter the fierce opposition as in Roosevelt's time, but instead was hesitant and unclear. The United States switched to a policy of so-called neutrality, eventually leaving the door open for France to return to Indochina. In a telegram from the US State Department to their Ambassador in Chongqing, it was announced: "The United States neither opposes nor supports the reestablishment of French rule in Indochina."11And issued a directive: "US representatives in Vietnam must be absolutely neutral."12. The Americans of the Deer Team who participated in activities with the Viet Minh Front in the Viet Bac base were ordered to withdraw from the country one by one.

Thus, De Gaulle took an important step in overcoming the obstacle from the United States.

5. Soviet Union - silence is not difficult to understand

According to the Potsdam Agreement, the Soviet army entered the North of the 38th parallel, the American army entered the South of the Korean peninsula, so in Vietnam, they were only represented in the Allied missions. The Soviet representative was Stephane Solosieff - a colonel, a political officer in Moscow, fluent in English, French and Japanese.

Regarding the Soviet Union's attitude towards France's desire to return to Indochina, Solosieff stated: The French will have to follow a gradual withdrawal policy and cannot advocate a return to the status quo. But the Vietnamese are not ready for complete independence and still need the protection of a major power. France is still the best equipped of the major Western powers to rebuild the country and bring the Vietnamese people to self-government. As for the role of the Soviet Union, "Soviet intervention would cause conflicts with the traditional interests of Britain and France, which would not satisfy the Soviet Union's highest interests at the moment."13. The Soviet Union's highest interest at this time was to focus on overcoming the severe consequences of the war and improving the Soviet Union's position in the international arena. Therefore, the Soviet Union did not want to touch the colonial ownership of Britain and France, especially in December 1944, the Soviet Union signed a treaty with France stipulating that neither country would join an alliance against the other.14. That is the reason why the Soviet Union remained silent about the changes in Vietnam even though President Ho Chi Minh sent letters to the heads of the Allied countries, including the Soviet Union of course. It is also because of this that the Soviet representative in the Allied mission "had no connection with the revolutionary government of Vietnam."15.

Looking deeper, that attitude may have originated from the distrustful relationship between the Third International and Nguyen Ai Quoc from the late 30s to early 40s of the 20th century around the issue of nationalist or international communist stance. The event of declaring the dissolution of the Indochinese Communist Party (November 1945), although a tactical measure, also increased Moscow's suspicion. Although in 1947 there was direct contact in Thailand between Vietnamese representatives (Tran Van Giau, Duong Bach Mai) and representatives of the Soviet embassy in Bangkok, the situation remained unchanged until January 1950, due to many fluctuations in the international arena, the Soviet Union officially recognized the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Conclusion: Vietnam's response to the attitudes of the great powers.

Vietnam in late 1945 and early 1946 was in a very dangerous situation. There were nearly 300,000 foreign troops present in the country, including British troops in the South, 1,500 French troops captured by Japan and now released, not to mention the number of French troops mixed in with British forces under the name of the Allies, 200,000 Chinese troops in the North and 60,000 Japanese troops who had not yet withdrawn and could be used to fight against the Vietnamese revolution. Following these troops was a force of Vietnamese people working as lackeys for foreign countries.

Meanwhile, diplomatically, Vietnam was also surrounded and isolated. The major countries, if they did not openly support France's re-invasion plan (England), then they assisted France (China), maintained a so-called neutral attitude (America) or remained silent (Soviet Union).

But this danger had been predicted in advance. At the Tan Trao Conference on August 13, 1945, the Party foresaw the situation, approved 10 major policies of the Viet Minh, and determined the foreign affairs mission as16:

- Taking advantage of the conflict between the two Allies on the Indochina issue (US-Chiang and UK-France) but must see that the conflict between the capitalist countries and the Soviet Union can make UK-US concessions to let France return to Indochina.

- Do our best to avoid the situation where we have to deal with many Allied forces at the same time flooding into our country and setting up their puppet government. Take advantage of the sympathy of the Soviet Union and the United States to fight against the plots of France and Chiang.

- Affirm that only our strength can decide our victory.

- Seek the sympathy and support of the people of weak countries, the French people and the Chinese people.

The Party's announcement emphasized: "Note that: If we are strong, they will accept."care about.If we are weak, we are just a tool in the hands of others, even if they may be our allies. Especially, do not have the illusion that the Chinese, British, and American armies will bring us freedom.No, in the fight to liberate us, of course we must seek allies, even if they are temporary, precarious, and conditional, but our work,first we have to do it17.

The above content reflects the Party's wise calculation in analyzing the main contradictions in our country, predicting the possibility of the French army reoccupying Indochina and the Chinese army's plan to "enter Vietnam". Faced with that complicated situation, the Party made a decision to avoid having to deal with many enemies at the same time, seeking the support of the Soviet Union and the United States, the sympathy of the French people and the Chinese people, but the essential thing was still to rely on one's own strength.

Thus, in just over 15 months from the day of the Declaration of Independence to the day of the National Resistance, the foreign affairs activities of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam were extremely urgent and complicated. While our army and people had to carry out the resistance war against the French colonialists in the South, the Party and Government still promoted diplomatic activities with other countries, mainly with China and France.

The signing of the Preliminary Agreement on March 6, 1946 was a demonstration of the strategy of Peace for Progress, avoiding the situation of having to deal with many enemies at the same time. We pushed the Chinese army back to our country, prolonging the peace period to consolidate our forces, and preparing for a long-term resistance war against French colonialism.

In relations with France, from the Dalat Conference to the Fontainebleau Conference, from the trip of the National Assembly delegation to the official visit of President Ho Chi Minh to France, Vietnam has always expressed a consistent stance: Independence and National Unity, Friendship and Cooperation with France.

Understanding the warlike nature of reactionary colonialism, we still put forward the necessary flexible policies from the Preliminary Agreement of March 6 to the Provisional Agreement of September 14 to gain time to build up forces to prepare for the people's war against the invaders. The period was not long but had extremely important and practical significance for a nation that had just gained power, had to deal with internal and external enemies, and was ready to enter a challenging resistance war. It was also a time that left many important lessons on the combination of internal and external affairs, between a steadfast stance and flexible measures, between tactical concessions and strategic determination, between taking advantage of the possibility of peace and preparing to wage war. Thanks to that, the entire people firmly entered the resistance war to preserve Independence and protect the Democratic Republic.

Prof. Vu Duong Ninh

_____________________________________________

1.This article refers to the Republic of China, the Kuomintang government led by Chiang Kai-shek, with its capital in Chongqing.

2.Philippe Devillers:Paris – Saigon – Hanoi. Archives of the 1944-1947 war. Ho Chi Minh City Publishing House, 1933, p. 131

3.William H. Wainwright: Faits et événements essentielsin the bookLe général de Gaulle 1940-1946. Plon Publishing House, Paris, p. 68

4.William H. Wainwright:ibid.p.73

5.Note: During World War II, in June 1940, the French government surrendered to Nazi Germany, so it was not considered an Allied country and therefore had no representatives at the Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam conferences. Only the force led by De Gaulle operated against fascism abroad, and in June 1944 returned to liberate Paris, establishing a provisional government headed by De Gaulle.

6.Righteousness:Vietnam Chronology 1939 – 1975. Volume I 1939 – 1945. Culture Publishing House, Houston 1996, p. 253

7. Refer to C.Cheng Sutra:Vietnam and China 1938-1954. Princeton University Press. Princeton 1969 p. 141-142; Ellen J. Hammer:The struggle for Indochina 1940 – 1955. Stanford University Press. California 1967, pp. 146-147; Chinh Daoibid.p. 311

8.William J. Duiker:Lé Etats Unis et l'Indochine Francaise" in the bookThe French Indochina1940 – 1945, PUS Publishing House, pp. 190-191. International Trusteeship: gives power to a committee consisting of representatives of several countries to gradually transfer to indigenous people the task of managing their country.

9.According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:Vietnamese diplomacy 1945 – 2000. National Political Publishing House, Hanoi 2002, p. 33

10.William J. Duiker:Les États Unis et l'Indochine Francaise.ibid.pp. 203-204

11.A. Patty:Why Vietnam?? Danang Publishing House, 1994, p. 368

12.A. Patty:ibid.page 360

13.According to Archimedes LA Patti:Why Vietnam?Danang Publishing House 1995, pp. 188 - 192

14.See Jean Baptiste Duroselle:Diplomatic History from 1919 to the Present Day. Academy of International Relations, H. 1994, p.332

15.A. Solokov:From the history of Russia - Vietnam relations, some events and characters are still unknown.FollowInternational Conference on Vietnamese Studies in the 20th Century. Summary of the report.World Publishing House, H. 2000. P. 207

16.Communist Party of Vietnam:Party Documents. Complete Works, Volume 7, op. cit., pp. 113-114

17.Communist Party of Vietnam:Party Documents. Complete Works, Volume 7, op. cit., p. 244

Author:Prof. Vu Duong Ninh

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