The attitudes of the major powers toward the events of December 19, 1946

Following the successful August Revolution of 1945, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was established. However, this fledgling independence faced an extremely fierce challenge from the very beginning: the return of French colonialism. On the night of September 23, 1945, gunfire erupted in Saigon, then spread to the Southern and South Central regions. From December 19, 1946, fighting broke out nationwide. This was a nine-year war (1945-1954) between Vietnam and France, a struggle of a former colony that had just gained independence against the renewed invasion of a colonial empire. But involved in this event – ​​directly or indirectly – were all the major powers: France, Great Britain, and China.¹The United States and the Soviet Union. This article reviews the attitudes of those countries towards the war in Vietnam.

1. The French colonialists decided to reoccupy Indochina.

With the outbreak of World War II, France was forced to gradually concede to the demands of the increasingly invading Japanese fascist army in Indochina. On the night of March 9, 1945, Japan staged a coup, arresting Governor-General Decoux and the entire French administrative system, directly taking control of Indochina. Two weeks later, on March 24, General De Gaulle – the leader of the French people's resistance movement against Germany – issued a declaration advocating the return of France, establishing an Indochinese Federation comprising five regions (Tonkin, Annam, Cochinchina, Laos, and Cambodia) as part of the French Union; forming an Indochinese government headed by a French Governor-General; and electing a parliament with French citizens residing in Indochina, whose only authority would be to discuss economics and taxation, while foreign affairs would be decided by France. Thus, in essence, the French ruling class still advocated restoring colonial rule in Indochina after the end of World War II.

To implement this plan, on April 17, De Gaulle decided to mobilize military units to form the French Expeditionary Force in the Far East, commanded by General Leclerc, to be sent to Indochina. Leclerc traveled through India to meet with the British military commander there, requesting assistance in returning the French army to Indochina. To execute this plan, immediately after Japan's surrender, De Gaulle hastily reorganized the command structure in Indochina, appointing Admiral D'Argenlieu as High Commissioner with the directive: "The High Commissioner's first mission is to restore French sovereignty over the territories of the Indochinese Federation," and appointing General Leclerc as Supreme Commander of the expeditionary force with the task of "taking all necessary military measures to restore that sovereignty."²During the same period, De Gaulle traveled to England and the United States to lobby diplomatically, requesting the support of their governments for France's plan to return and occupy Indochina. From Washington, General De Gaulle declared: "France's position in Indochina is very simple. France affirms its intention to regain sovereignty in Indochina."³When asked by a journalist about France's other intentions regarding Indochina, the general replied arrogantly, "No, we will return to Indochina because we are the strongest."⁴.

2. The British Empire aided France in its return to Indochina.

According to the Potsdam Agreement signed by the three leaders of the Allied forces: Truman (USA), Atlee (UK), and Stalin (Soviet Union)⁵In Indochina, British troops would enter the South, and the Republic of China's troops would enter the North of the 16th parallel (passing through Da Nang) under the pretext of being Allies to disarm the Japanese army.

On August 22nd, three days after the people of Hanoi launched the General Uprising to seize power, British planes from Calcutta (India) secretly transported two "French Republican Commissioners": Cédile, who successfully parachuted into Southern Vietnam, and Messmer, who landed in Northern Vietnam but was captured by Vietnamese militia. In mid-September, British troops under General Gracey landed in Saigon. They were infiltrated by French units. In Saigon, Gracey released French prisoners previously held captive by the Japanese; these individuals became a source of reinforcement for the French forces in Vietnam. On the night of September 23rd, the French colonialists opened fire in Saigon, beginning another war of aggression against our country.

The reason Britain fully supported France's return to Indochina was because Britain had numerous colonies across continents, earning it the reputation of being the "empire on which the sun never sets." Even in Asia, Britain controlled India, Malaya (which at the time included Singapore), Burma (now Myanmar), and many other countries, so it did not want the turmoil in Vietnam to affect its British colonies.

On October 8th in London, Britain and France signed a Provisional Agreement ceding administrative and judicial authority south of the 16th parallel to France. British Prime Minister Attlee publicly declared Britain's policy on Indochina, consisting of three main points: 1) British support for France's reoccupation of Vietnam; 2) Britain's recognition of the French administration in Saigon; 3) Transfer of control over the South to France. This meant that once the British army completed the disarmament of the Japanese and withdrew, France would naturally become the owner of this land. Thus, the collusion between Britain and France effectively launched the Vietnam War.

3. China and France made a deal behind Vietnam's back.

According to the Potsdam Agreement, Chiang Kai-shek's Republic of China army would enter North Vietnam under the guise of Allied forces to disarm the Japanese. This worried the French government about China's intentions to occupy Indochina. To reassure France, Chongqing Prime Minister Song Ziwen pledged to De Gaulle during their meeting in Paris on September 19th that China had no territorial ambitions in Indochina and would be willing to support France's return to Indochina if possible.⁶On October 10th, during a meeting with High Commissioner D'Argenlieu in Chongqing, Song Ziwen reiterated this commitment. This content was also declared by Chiang Kai-shek and later officially stated by General Lu Han at his inauguration ceremony in Hanoi. In reality, their initial plan was to use the puppet forces of Viet Quoc and Viet Cach to seize power without openly occupying and ruling Vietnam.

However, the situation in China changed rapidly. After the end of World War II, the cooperation between the Kuomintang (Chiang Kai-shek) and Communist (Mao Zedong) parties during the war against Japan quickly broke down. On June 16, 1946, a civil war broke out between the two parties. Chiang Kai-shek's government frantically prepared to confront the Communist forces pouring in from the North, and was therefore ready to compromise with France on the Indochina issue. On the other hand, China also wanted to take advantage of France's intention to return to Indochina, so it demanded the rights that the Qing dynasty had previously ceded to France under the treaties signed in 1900-1903. After negotiations that began in October 1945 in Chongqing, the Sino-French Treaty was signed on February 28, 1946, between French Ambassador Jacques Mayrier and Foreign Minister Wang Shijie. The agreement can be summarized in the following three main points: 1) France returned to China the concessions and spheres of influence in Shanghai, Tianjin, Hankou, and Guangdong (including Guangzhou Bay); it also returned to China the section of the Hai Phong – Yunnan railway running through its territory from Hekou to Kunming; and Chinese goods imported and exported through Hai Phong port were exempt from taxes. 2) France was allowed to send troops into North Vietnam to replace the Chinese troops who would withdraw between March 15 and March 31, 1946 (but in reality, the withdrawal was not complete until the end of October). France advanced 60 million Indochinese francs per month for the transfer of Chinese troops (for a total of 7 months). 3) China would arm 5,000 French civilians residing in Hanoi (this was kept secret and not publicly announced).⁷.

Thus, the Franco-Chinese Treaty was signed by both sides without regard for the interests of the Vietnamese people. The Chongqing authorities opened the door for the French army to return to Vietnam. However, the existence of the Ho Chi Minh government, supported by the people, was a reality that forced France to negotiate if it wanted to send troops into North Vietnam. This is why the French representative in Vietnam, J. Sainteny, had lengthy negotiations with President Ho Chi Minh, culminating in the preliminary agreement of March 6, 1946.

4. The United States shifted from opposition to "neutrality" in the face of France's schemes.

While World War II was raging, General De Gaulle sought international support to secure France's rightful return to Indochina. On September 18, 1943, De Gaulle sent diplomatic notes to the heads of state of Great Britain (Churchill), the United States (Roosevelt), and the Soviet Union (Stalin), proposing "the participation of French units in the liberation of Indochina (from Japanese fascism)." However, France faced opposition from US President Roosevelt, who had declared: "After a hundred years of French rule in Indochina, the people here are still living as badly as they have before," and suggested establishing an international trusteeship to prepare the local population for independence within a specified period, possibly 20-30 years.⁸In response to Britain's request to support France, the US President reiterated: "France has milked Indochina for 100 years. The people of Indochina have the right to better things than that… I do not want a single Frenchman to return to Indochina."⁹However, later, due to lobbying from Britain and France, the American position softened. In August 1944, the US put forward a new proposal regarding post-war dependent territories, according to which an international trusteeship regime would only be established in the following three cases: a) If the territory remained under the administration of the League of Nations; b) If the territory was in the hands of the enemy during the war; c) If the territory was voluntarily placed under trusteeship by the countries responsible for its administration.¹⁰.

On April 12, 1945, President Roosevelt died, and his successor was Harry Truman. In early May, Nazi Germany surrendered, bringing the war to a close, with only the defeat of the Japanese remaining. This was decided at the Potsdam Conference (July 1945). On August 15, the Japanese Emperor declared unconditional surrender, ending World War II.

Taking advantage of this opportunity, on August 11, 1945, the French government sent a diplomatic note to the four major powers—the United States, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union—requesting representation in the Allied Armistice Commission, including military representation alongside Allied commanders. De Gaulle wanted to use this event to enhance France's standing and regain its equal status with the great powers, a status France had lost due to the Vichy government's surrender to Germany during the war. This request was not accepted.

On August 14, General Peckhoff, representing the Parisian government in Chongqing, requested the deployment of 5,000 French soldiers to the Allied forces to disarm the Japanese in Indochina. Three days later, he received the reply: "We are ready to send 5,000 French soldiers back to Indochina, but they must be under the command of the generals of the Republic of China." This was a difficult decision to make, so on August 28, the French ambassador to the United States proposed that the British disarm the Japanese throughout Indochina, or that the Japanese generals in the North should hold a surrender ceremony at a location in Chinese territory, while in the South, France would accept the surrender ceremony under the British name (!). These events reveal the fact that De Gaulle – the leader of the liberated France – did not attend the two important Allied conferences in Yalta and Potsdam, and was not considered a victorious nation with the right to disarm those who surrendered. Therefore, France's "initiatives" were only aimed at regaining its prestige and status as a great power, participating in Allied activities, and getting involved in post-war affairs in Indochina to prepare for the next steps.

On August 30, the US Secretary of State told France that it was impossible to go against the resolutions of the Potsdam Conference, but France could negotiate with Britain. That same day, the US Ambassador in Chongqing received notification from the US State Department that Washington fully agreed if France and China could reach an agreement. Thus, with Truman's shift in policy, the US adopted an ambiguous stance, passing the ball to Britain and China, effectively leaving the door open for France's return to Indochina. On October 28, in his speech on US foreign policy, Truman addressed the Indochina issue with vague language about national equality as enshrined in the UN Charter.

On August 22, De Gaulle traveled to Washington to meet with U.S. President Truman. The meeting was not very cordial; De Gaulle felt that France was not being treated as a first-class power, while Truman suspected France was seeking relations with the Soviet Union. However, the French leader did not face the same fierce opposition as during Roosevelt's time; instead, he encountered hesitation and uncertainty. The United States shifted to what was called a policy of neutrality, ultimately leaving the door open for France's return to Indochina. A telegram from the U.S. State Department to its ambassador in Chongqing stated: "The United States neither opposes nor supports the re-establishment of French rule in Indochina."¹¹And issued the directive: "American representatives in Vietnam must be absolutely neutral."¹²The Americans belonging to the Deer Team, who had participated in activities with the Viet Minh Front in the Viet Bac base area, were ordered to gradually withdraw back to the United States.

Thus, De Gaulle had taken an important step in overcoming the obstacle posed by the United States.

5. The Soviet Union - its silence is not difficult to understand.

According to the Potsdam Agreement, Soviet troops entered North of the 38th parallel, while American troops entered South Korea. Therefore, in Vietnam, they only had representatives in the Allied missions. The Soviet representative was Stephane Solosieff – a lieutenant colonel, a political officer from Moscow, fluent in English, French, and Japanese.

Regarding the Soviet Union's attitude toward France's desire to return to Indochina, Solosieff stated: The French would have to pursue a gradual withdrawal and could not afford a return to the status quo. However, the Vietnamese were not yet ready for complete independence and still needed the protection of a major power. France remained the best-equipped of the major Western powers to rebuild the country and bring the Vietnamese people to a self-governing government. As for the Soviet Union's role, "Soviet intervention would create conflicts with the traditional interests of Britain and France, which would not serve the Soviet Union's supreme interests at this time."¹³The Soviet Union's top priority at this time was to focus on overcoming the devastating consequences of the war and enhancing its standing on the international stage. Therefore, the Soviet Union did not want to infringe upon the colonial possessions of Britain and France, especially since in December 1944, the Soviet Union had signed an agreement with France stipulating that neither country would join an alliance against the other.¹⁴That explains why the Soviet Union remained silent about the events in Vietnam, even though President Ho Chi Minh had sent letters to the heads of state of the Allied countries, including, of course, the Soviet Union. It is also for this reason that the Soviet representative in the Allied mission "had no contact with the Vietnamese revolutionary government."¹⁵.

Looking deeper, this attitude may stem from the strained relationship between the Third International and Nguyen Ai Quoc in the late 1930s and early 1940s regarding the issue of nationalist versus international communist stances. The announcement of the dissolution of the Indochinese Communist Party (November 1945), while a strategic measure, also increased Moscow's suspicions. Although direct contact took place in Thailand in 1947 between Vietnamese representatives (Tran Van Giau, Duong Bach Mai) and representatives of the Soviet embassy in Bangkok, the situation remained unchanged until January 1950, when, due to numerous international upheavals, the Soviet Union officially recognized the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Conclusion: Vietnam's response to the attitudes of the major powers.

Vietnam in late 1945 and early 1946 found itself in an extremely perilous situation. Nearly 300,000 foreign troops were present in the country, including British troops in the South, 1,500 French soldiers captured by the Japanese and now released, not to mention French units mixed in with British forces under the guise of Allies, 200,000 Chinese troops in the North, and 60,000 Japanese troops who had not yet withdrawn and could be used against the Vietnamese revolution. Accompanying these troops was also a force of Vietnamese collaborators working for foreign powers.

Meanwhile, diplomatically, Vietnam was also surrounded and isolated. The major powers either openly supported France's (Britain's) plan for renewed invasion, aided France (China), maintained a so-called neutral stance (the US), or remained silent (the Soviet Union).

But this danger had been foreseen. At the Tan Trao Conference on August 13, 1945, the Party foresaw the situation and, through the ten major policies of the Viet Minh, defined the foreign policy task as follows:¹⁶:

- While exploiting the conflict between the two Allied blocs over Indochina (the US and Chiang Kai-shek, and Britain and France), it's important to recognize that the conflict between capitalist countries and the Soviet Union could lead Britain and the US to make concessions, allowing France to return to Indochina.

- We must absolutely avoid a situation where we have to simultaneously confront multiple Allied forces invading our country and establishing their puppet governments. We must secure the support of the Soviet Union and the United States to counter the schemes of France and Chiang Kai-shek.

- To assert that only our own strength will determine our victory.

- To gain the sympathy and support of the people of weaker nations, the people of France, and the people of China.

The Party's communiqué emphasized: "Note that: They will only comply if we are strong."pay attention to.If we are weak, we are merely a tool in the hands of others, even if those others are our allies. Above all, let us not harbor the illusion that the Chinese, British, or American armies will bring us freedom.No, in our struggle for liberation, of course we must find allies, even if they are temporary, precarious, and conditional, but our task,First, we must do it ourselves.”¹⁷.

The above content reflects the Party's astute calculations in analyzing the main contradictions in our country, predicting the possibility of the French army reoccupying Indochina and the Chinese army's plan to "invade Vietnam." Faced with this complex situation, the Party formulated a policy to avoid having to confront multiple enemies simultaneously, seeking the support of the Soviet Union and the United States, and the sympathy of the French and Chinese people, but ultimately relying on its own strength.

Thus, in just over 15 months from the Declaration of Independence to the National Resistance War, the foreign relations activities of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam were extremely urgent and complex. While our army and people had to wage the resistance war against the French colonial invaders in the South, the Party and Government still promoted diplomatic work with other countries, mainly with China and France.

The signing of the preliminary agreement on March 6, 1946, demonstrated the strategy of "peace for progress," avoiding the need to confront multiple enemies simultaneously. We pushed the Chinese troops back home, prolonging the period of peace to consolidate our forces and prepare for a long-term resistance against French colonialism.

In its relations with France, from the Da Lat Conference to the Fontainebleau Conference, from the trip of the National Assembly delegation to President Ho Chi Minh's official visit to France, Vietnam has always expressed a consistent stance: Independence and national unity, friendship and cooperation with France.

Understanding the belligerent nature of the reactionary colonialists, we still implemented necessary flexible countermeasures from the Preliminary Agreement of March 6th to the Provisional Agreement of September 14th to buy time to build up forces and prepare for a people's war against aggression. This period, though short, was extremely important and practical for a nation that had just gained power, had to confront internal and external enemies, and was ready to embark on a challenging resistance war. It was also a time that yielded many important lessons about the combination of domestic and foreign policy, between a firm stance and flexible measures, between tactical concessions and strategic determination, and between seizing opportunities for peace and preparing for war. Thanks to this, the entire people steadfastly advanced into the resistance war to preserve independence and protect the Democratic Republic.

Professor Vu Duong Ninh

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1.^This article refers to the Republic of China, which was the Kuomintang government headed by Chiang Kai-shek as president, with its capital in Chongqing.