The basis upon which the Supreme Command formulated the plan for the Liberation of South Vietnam.

After leading the resistance against the US for national salvation for two decades, in early spring of 1975, the Supreme Command of the resistance – including the Politburo, the Central Military Commission, etc. – decisively decided to advance the cause of the Vietnamese people's resistance against the US for national salvation from complete victory to decisive victory.

In this article, we will only present the issue within the specific scope of what scientific basis led the Supreme Command, meeting at the end of 1974 and beginning of 1975, to decide to liberate South Vietnam in the shortest possible time.

These objective foundations include both subjective and objective factors; stemming from the results of previous periods' directives as well as newly emerging factors. These factors can be identified and analyzed as follows:

1. Inheriting the consistent approach of using revolutionary strength to liberate the South.

After years of restraint and persistent pursuit of a peaceful reunification of the country, which was rejected by the enemy, in 1959, the Supreme Command of the Vietnamese Revolution decided to liberate the South through revolutionary violence. From then on, through periods of arduous and fierce struggle against three brutal forms of warfare waged by the United States, the Vietnamese people persistently and resolutely used violence to defeat the special war, the localized war, and by 1972 had fundamentally defeated the US's Vietnamization of the war in the South. With the victory on the Southern front in 1972, along with...Dien Bien Phu in the airforcing the opposing side to sign the Paris Agreement on Vietnam (1973).

With the signing of the Paris Agreement, the United States was forced to withdraw its troops from South Vietnam, committing to ending its military involvement in the country. This event marked the beginning of the revolutionary period in South Vietnam, aiming to overthrow the puppet regime. However, a problem arose: the agreement stipulated certain provisions.to restore peace and end hostilities.Acknowledging the existence of two governments, two zones of control…, the overthrow of the Saigon regime – a force that never implemented the Agreement – ​​forced the revolutionary side to…exceeding the AgreementHow would that unfold? This was one of the major questions facing the entire Party, the entire people, and the entire army at that time.

The Resolution of the 21st Central Committee Meeting of the Party (October 1973) addressed this issue, with the following general content:

- With the offensive and victory of the armed forces and people of both North and South Vietnam, forcing the enemy to sign the Paris Agreement, it was a decisive victory for the Vietnamese people in their struggle against the US and for national salvation. The agreement stipulated that the Vietnamese people would have free elections to unify the country. However, due to their nature, the enemy still plotted to permanently divide our country.[1]and the other party has been and continues to violate the Agreement in extremely serious ways.[2].

- The situation in South Vietnam at that time was developing according to two possibilities. Firstly, the Vietnamese people would gradually force the enemy to implement the Agreement, peace would be truly restored, and the people of South Vietnam would overcome complex difficulties to achieve independence and democracy. Secondly, the enemy would sabotage the Agreement, leading to..."We must wage another arduous and fierce revolutionary war to defeat the enemy and achieve complete victory."[3](Resolution emphasizes).

Considering the scenarios that would unfold, the 21st Conference affirmed that the key issue in completing the struggle for national reunification was:Under any circumstances, we must maintain firm control over the armed forces." [4].

On the Southern battlefield at that time, after the agreement was signed, some localities, due to a lack of understanding of the enemy's schemes, were encroached upon by the enemy, losing land and people. Meanwhile, in Zone 9, although the forces had not been reinforced as much as in other areas, they proactively attacked the encroaching enemy, thus consolidating and expanding the liberated areas.

From this context, the Central Committee of the Party directed the revolutionary forces in the South to...We must resolutely counterattack and attack the enemy, maintaining and developing our initiative in all aspects.”[5].

In short, the most fundamental spirit of the 21st Conference of the Central Committee of the Party, instilled in the entire Party, army, and people, was to prepare and be ready to use revolutionary violence, maintain the strategic offensive of the revolution in the South, and be ready to transcend the Agreement if the enemy refused to implement the signed terms.

From October 1973 onwards, this consistent ideology was thoroughly instilled in all revolutionary forces, creating a synchronized strategic and ideological offensive to bring the resistance war against the US to its final conclusion. The loss of land and people in some localities due to a failure to resolutely counter the Saigon army's encroachment after January 1973 was quickly rectified. Imbued with the spirit of Resolution 21, from the beginning of 1974 onwards, the Liberation Army not only held its ground but also launched direct attacks on centers where Saigon had sent troops to encroach.

The idea of ​​using revolutionary violence to liberate the South was the premise that the Supreme General Staff continued and further developed in the expanded Politburo meeting in December 1974/January 1975.

2. The opponent's intentions and capabilities

A core issue in the guiding ideology of the revolution in South Vietnam after the Paris Agreement was how the enemy would react when the revolution in South Vietnam had no other option but to...exceeding the AgreementTo complete the liberation of South Vietnam and unify the country, the core issue was how the United States would react when we advanced to completely liberate South Vietnam. In reality, the United States is ready to break any commitment if necessary. This was evident during the Vietnam War. In 1968, the US committed to ending the bombing of North Vietnam, but then in 1972, it resumed its brutal bombing of the North… Therefore, how would the United States react if the revolution in South Vietnam overthrew the Saigon government and completely liberated South Vietnam? This was a life-or-death dilemma that the Central Committee considered throughout 1973-1974 and early 1975.

During that same historical period, many countries were also interested in the true attitude of the United States, which wasTo stay or to leaveLeaving South Vietnam and Southeast Asia to strategize, the Saigon government was also seeking answers to this question, though their intentions stemmed from a different perspective. Therefore, both Hanoi and Saigon were actively probing the United States' attitude.

The first event marking the US response to the situation in South Vietnam was the Tong Le Chan incident. This was a Saigon army base located in Minh Tam commune, Binh Long district, Binh Phuoc province. Tong Le Chan was an advance base manned by a Saigon commando battalion. However, because the base was located deep within the liberated zone and was completely isolated, Saigon's resupply of the garrison was very difficult, requiring the use of helicopters.

Surrounded by the Liberation Army, in a dilemma, holding this position proved to be more harmful than beneficial, so Saigon planned to withdraw its troops from Tong Le Chan and Saigon desperately wanted this position to be captured by the Liberation Army (which they called...).overflowing) to denounce the situation to the international community. But the Liberation forces understood the dilemma of the Saigon army here, so they only surrounded them and were ready to destroy any enemy reinforcements arriving by air. Finally, on April 11, 1974, the Saigon army at Tong Le Chan secretly withdrew from the base and later blamed the Liberation army for attacking their outpost.

President Nguyen Van Thieu used the public address system to "denounce" the Viet Cong.overflowingTong Le Chan was praised, with claims that "every soldier (of the Saigon army) was a hero!" and it was hoped that the United States would take notice of this event, even though it was orchestrated by Saigon. But the United States ignored all information about the Tong Le Chan incident from Saigon.[6].

During this same period in Washington, the struggle between the legislative and executive branches over U.S. military operations abroad—primarily in Vietnam—was intensifying.

On November 7, 1973, the War Powers Act (literally translated as...)War LawThe War Powers Act was passed by the U.S. Congress. Although there is still debate about the feasibility of the War Powers Act, this law limited the abuse of power by the U.S. President in using military forces in overseas conflicts. In particular, the timing and content of this Act impacted U.S. military operations in Vietnam, as the U.S. had committed to ending its military involvement in South Vietnam. Therefore, from the end of 1973 onwards, the U.S. President no longer had the almost unlimited right to use military force in the Vietnam and Indochina battlefields, as had been the case since the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution – a document passed by the U.S. Congress in August 1964.[7].

Another event that profoundly impacted the situation in Saigon and the United States at the time was the Watergate scandal—a humiliation for American democracy, as perceived by the American public.

Before the Watergate scandal was exposed, President Nixon and Kissinger had planned to find a pretext to resume bombing North Vietnam. They calculated that the Paris Agreement was merely a document advantageous to the United States because, according to the agreement, North Vietnam would return the American pilots captured when their planes were shot down during the two bombing campaigns against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Discussing this US intention, in the famous book "Without peace, there is no honor.In his assessment, Larry Berman, a prominent American scholar on the Vietnam War who served as a political advisor to President Johnson, stated that "The agreement became a ritual for the United States to withdraw its troops and receive prisoners of war, rather than a means to a lasting peace."[8].

Recently declassified documents in the United States reveal that both Nixon and Kissinger wanted to continue the bombing campaign against North Vietnam. Nixon wanted to bomb after North Vietnam returned its last group of pilots (March 29, 1973) and potentially continue the bombing until 1976 – the end of Nixon's second presidential term. Kissinger, on the other hand, wanted to carry out Operation Duckling (bombing to cripple North Vietnam) after he received his Nobel Peace Prize for his role in bringing peace to Vietnam through the Paris Peace Accords.

Of the five U.S. presidents involved in the Vietnam War, President Nixon was the most hawkish and cunning. However, the Watergate scandal prevented him from carrying out his schemes. Kissinger made a very apt observation about President Nixon's attitude towards Vietnam: he dealt with the issue in a strangely incoherent way; he was passive. He didn't do the work with the focus and energy that was characteristic of him.[9].

Ultimately, the Watergate scandal brought down President Nixon.August 9thyear1974President Nixon announced his resignation.

Nixon's forced resignation was a warning sign for the Saigon regime. This was something President Nguyen Van Thieu had to acknowledge in his resignation speech on April 21, 1975. Conversely, for the liberation of South Vietnam, this event further indicated that, whether they liked it or not, it would be difficult for the United States to return to South Vietnam once the Vietnamese people rose up to completely liberate their homeland.

Four months after Nixon resigned, the South Vietnamese Liberation Army launched the Highway 14-Phuoc Long campaign. Within three weeks at the end of 1974 and the beginning of 1975, the Liberation Army advanced and completely liberated Phuoc Long province. This was the first province in South Vietnam to be completely liberated during the war against the US.

Having lost an outpost in southeastern Vietnam, the Saigon government issued a loud communiqué hoping for a strong reaction from the United States. President Nguyen Van Thieu ordered a three-day national mourning period for the loss of Phuoc Long. However, after a perfunctory response, the White House declared that the war in Vietnam was no longer on the US agenda.

The victory at Phuoc Long took place while the Politburo was discussing plans for the liberation of South Vietnam. The Phuoc Long event served as a strategic reconnaissance mission, probing the reaction of the United States if the revolutionary forces in South Vietnam were to overthrow the Saigon regime. This provided a scientific basis for the Central Committee to formulate its plan for the liberation of South Vietnam at that time.

Thus, after two years of investigation and the three key events mentioned above, the question of the opportune moment for liberating South Vietnam was answered. The Central Committee of the Party reached a scientific conclusion that the United States was unlikely to intervene again in South Vietnam if the people of South Vietnam advanced to overthrow the Nguyen Van Thieu regime and unify the country.

3. The balance of power between the two sides on the battlefield.

During the two years of 1973-1974, the North sent hundreds of thousands of troops to the battlefields in the South. In the history of the war against the US, never before had the revolutionary forces in the South received such a large number of reinforcements in such a short period. Although the Saigon army still numbered around 1 million, the approximately 290,000 troops reinforced from the North significantly altered the balance of power between us and the enemy on the battlefield.

Along with the strengthening of military forces, main army corps were established. On October 24, 1973, the 1st Army Corps (also known as the Victory Corps) was established in Tam Diep. On May 17, 1974, the 2nd Army Corps (also known as the Huong Giang Corps) was formed. On July 20, 1974, the 4th Army Corps (Cuu Long Corps) was established. Other corps (Central Highlands and 232nd) were subsequently formed as well.

The formation of the corps represented a comprehensive development of the revolutionary army. Each corps had the equivalent of 3-4 divisions. However, it was not simply a summation of the breakthrough strength of the main divisions of the Vietnam People's Army. This was a qualitative change in the main force. The corps were truly a steel fist capable of crushing the enemy's main force, as would be demonstrated later. Also during these months, the main regiments of the Southern Region were merged into powerful divisions.

Along with increasing troop numbers and organizing a strong mobile main force, in 1973-1974 tens of thousands of civilian, technical, and other personnel from the North were reinforced to the Southern forces. Many civilian, Party, and government officials who had previously gone to the North have now returned to their hometowns to perform their duties.

From the beginning of 1973, the logistics system was reorganized. The Transport Department and the Truong Son Command (formerly 559) were strengthened with increased transport vehicles and personnel, as well as warehouses. Nearly a dozen motorized transport regiments operated regularly on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Warehouses and depots along the strategic and operational transport axis were newly established and expanded. In the first nine months of 1973 alone, the North Vietnamese rear area transferred 140,000 tons of goods to the battlefield, four times the amount in 1972. By the end of 1974, the fronts in the South had tens of thousands of tons of weapons and supplies. The Southern logistics system alone had stockpiled more than 100,000 tons of goods.[10].

The Ho Chi Minh Trail was expanded into a multi-lane strategic road system. Previously, the Ho Chi Minh Trail ended at the Vietnam-Laos or Vietnam-Cambodia border, but by 1974 it had expanded deep into the interior of South Vietnam.[11]Along with the strategic road system, tens of thousands of kilometers of operational roads connecting the Ho Chi Minh Trail to the fronts in the South were completed in 1973-1974. This strategic transportation system allowed units to march from the rear to the southern battlefield in just 20 days. During the historic Ho Chi Minh Campaign, thousands of motorized vehicles transported goods and troops to the South daily.

Alongside the construction of strategic and tactical road systems, the fuel supply system built during 1973-1974 connected the large rear areas to the battlefields. This 1,700 km long pipeline system was sufficient to provide adequate and timely supplies to mechanized forces operating in distant battlefields.

The logistical system and battlefield design in 1973-1974 laid the groundwork for the 1975 spring offensive and uprising by our army and people in the South, which unfolded at a pace of "one day equaling 20 years".

During this period, the Liberation Army proactively counterattacked the encroachments of the Saigon forces. The victories of the Liberation Army at Thuong Duc, Minh Long, Gia Vut… demonstrated the weakening of the Saigon army's various units, including strategic reserve units. A series of base areas and footholds for the main divisions of the Saigon army were established in 1974…

The comprehensive strengthening of human resources for the revolution in the South during those two years, especially the revolutionary armed forces, laid the groundwork for the final, victorious battle in the coming period.

However, the Saigon army was still very large, totaling over 1 million troops. In terms of infantry, it was among the top 5-6 largest in the world. The Saigon army's artillery and air power were also greater, better equipped, more modern, and more numerous than that of the resistance forces.

Most strategic locations in the South remained under the control of the Saigon army. By the end of 1974, no province in the South had been completely liberated. The liberated areas were still limited to a few mountainous, remote, and isolated districts. The proportion of the population in the liberated areas was approximately 10% of the total population of the South.

With a strong strategic position at both ends (Quang Tri region in the North and the northern Saigon line), the Saigon army was still very strong in terms of position and force… The fatal weakness of the Saigon army was that when the US withdrew its troops from South Vietnam, their fighting spirit plummeted drastically. The mentality of defeat spread throughout all ranks of the soldiers…

Thanks to the combined effect of these factors, by the end of 1974, the resistance war against the US for national liberation waged by our people in the South, despite certain difficulties, had all the necessary conditions to advance towards achieving complete victory.

While the entire nation's armed forces and people were urgently working to bring the revolution to a victorious conclusion, several new objective factors emerged.

Having planned this beforehand, while the United States was withdrawing from South Vietnam and the Saigon government was in disarray, in January 1974, Chinese troops seized the Paracel Islands, which are under Vietnamese sovereignty.

Also stemming from external schemes, after Vietnam proactively signed the Paris Agreement, the forcesKhmer RougeThey sought to sabotage our people's resistance war against the US. From mid-1974, when the South Vietnamese Liberation Army attacked Saigon forces in positions near the Cambodian border, the Khmer Rouge repeatedly raided rear bases, medical stations, and looted logistical facilities. Therefore, many army units were forced to leave behind a significant number of troops, including tanks, to prevent Pol Pot's rear-end attacks. The Pol Pot regime's offensive against Vietnam after May 1975 was merely a continuation of pre-planned actions.

Meanwhile, in the Saigon-Chợ Lớn metropolitan area, some people were calledforeignThey have been plotting to establish several Party branches, manipulated from outside...

Clearly, all the seemingly isolated events mentioned above were part of a consistent plan to control and restrict the Vietnamese people's national liberation struggle at its final decisive moment. Because the victory of the Vietnamese people, to some extent, would thwart the great power's strategic expansionist ambitions.

These events highlighted the need for the entire Party and the entire nation to decisively resolve the South Vietnam issue as soon as possible, preventing any dark intentions that could be used to implement their expansionist nationalist strategies.

Considering all the circumstances mentioned above, in the conferences of the Supreme Command – including those held from late 1974 to early 1975 at the General Headquarters – it was decided that the revolution in the South hadeligible and necessaryWe must move forward to liberate the South and unify the country.

The Supreme Command correctly predicted the potential and resolved to lead the revolution in the South to complete victory in a short time, and selected the location and breakthrough front for that meticulous and scientific plan.

The resounding victory of Spring 1975 was the culmination and pinnacle of the Vietnamese people's resistance war against the US, saving the nation. This historic victory was the result of a protracted resistance war led by the Party, but directly, it originated from the urgent, meticulous, scientific preparation and timely guidance of the Supreme Command of the Vietnamese Revolution. Among the causes of victory, an extremely important factor was that the Supreme Command correctly identified the root causes and promptly directed the entire nation's armed forces and people to achieve a resounding victory, completely liberating the South in the spring of 1975.