There have been research works on the fighting of the army and people of the capital Hanoi in the first days of the resistance war against the French of the whole nation. And there are also many research works on the military campaigns of the Vietnam People's Army (VPA) through the two resistance wars against the French (1945-1954) and the Americans (1954-1975). In the published research works, it is affirmed that the Autumn-Winter 1947 campaign was the first campaign of the Vietnam People's Army.
Based on the reality of the battlefield and the general criteria of the campaign, we would like to confirm that the 60-day and night battle in the heart of Hanoi by the Vietnamese revolutionary armed forces from late 1946 to early 1947 was the first Counter-offensive campaign of the Vietnam People's Army. We look forward to receiving comments from readers.
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The assessment of research agencies, first of all the Vietnam Military History Institute, is quite consistent about the military campaigns of the Vietnam People's Army in the two resistance wars. The basic content is that the first military campaign was the Viet Bac campaign in the fall and winter of 1947 and the last was the General Offensive and Uprising in the spring of 1947, culminating in the Ho Chi Minh campaign.1.
Regarding the type of campaign, before 1972, it was divided into two forms: One is the counter-offensive campaign, the characteristic of which is that the enemy attacks while we actively defend to destroy the enemy's intentions. Typical campaigns of this type are the Viet Bac campaign in the fall and winter of 1947 in the resistance war against France and the counter-offensive campaigns of the Southern Liberation Army in the first dry season (1965-1966) in the Southeast battlefield and the V region. The second type is the offensive campaign, meaning that the troops actively attack the enemy. Typical campaigns are the Border (1950) - considered the first offensive campaign of the revolutionary armed forces, other campaigns such as Khe Sanh (1967), the Tet Mau Than offensive (1968), the strategic offensive in 1972 and especially the campaigns in the spring of 1975.
In the 1972 strategic offensive, through the combat experience in the Quang Tri battlefield, the revolutionary armed forces organized and carried out a new type of campaign called the defensive campaign. The Thach Han River in the 1972 strategic offensive was the prominent defensive front line of this type of campaign.
In recent years, the Vietnam Military History Institute has researched and published a number of specific campaigns. Previously, the 1975 Spring Offensive and Uprising was considered to have three key campaigns: the Buon Ma Thuot-Tay Nguyen Campaign (the campaign that opened the Ho Chi Minh Campaign). Recent conferences have stated that the Hue and Da Nang Fronts, although closely related, historical facts show that they should be separated into two military offensive campaigns: the Hue Campaign and the Da Nang Campaign.
Scientists have defined military campaigns. These are classic definitions. However, in general, we can identify the main criteria to distinguish a military campaign of the Vietnamese revolutionary armed forces as follows:
Have clear political and military goals and a unified command to carry out those specific goals.
The force is often composed of many units, including the main unit, subordinate units, and regular coordination between units participating in the campaign and coordination between peripheral fronts.
The area of action is wide, not limited as small as the combat area of a battle.
The duration of a campaign is relatively long, not as quick as a specific battle.
The campaign has many battles, but there is at least one pivotal battle that determines the entire course of the campaign.
Comparing with the basic criteria of the campaign as above, we can analyze the situation of the battle in Hanoi in late 1946 and early 1947 to determine more clearly its position in the cause of national liberation.
On the organization of combat mission command:
In late 1946, when the French colonialists were at the brink of overthrowing the young revolutionary government, the Party Central Committee and President Ho Chi Minh launched a nationwide resistance war. The two-month-long struggle of the army and people of the capital in Hanoi opened the vibrant period of the first sacred resistance war.
President Ho Chi Minh's handwritten "Call for National Resistance", December 19, 1946.
The strategic mission of the army and people of the Capital assigned by the Central and President Ho was to fight the enemy and hold the enemy in the city for as long as possible to create conditions for the General Command (Central, Government) to have enough time to withdraw to a safe area; on the other hand, to prepare the whole country to proactively enter a long-term resistance war. This was a major but extremely difficult strategic mission for the army and people of the Capital: to conduct a raid that opened a period oftotal combat 2between the Vietnamese people and French colonialists.
Such an important strategic goal. The military mission of the Hanoi army and people was to organize a battle within the city, aiming to wear down and destroy a part of the enemy's forces, and carry out a scorched earth resistance. The Hanoi army and people were directly assigned by President Ho to try to hold the enemy in the city for about a month so that the Central Government and the whole country could take advantage of the time to evacuate agencies, transport machinery... to the war zone to prepare for a long-term battle.
Receiving orders from the Central Committee and Uncle Ho, the General Staff directly directed operations for the army and people of the Capital. The Command and the Committee to protect Zone 11 (Hanoi) were quickly established.3. The command had comrade Vuong Thua Vu as commander and Tran Do as political commissar. On the side of the General Staff, comrade Hoang Van Thai, Chief of the General Staff, was assigned to directly command this Front. Thus, the command of this strategic front was appointed by the Central Committee and the General Staff from the beginning.
The birth of the Hanoi Front was the result of years of careful preparation by the entire Party and people. At the end of November 1946, in an expanded Standing Committee meeting with the Command and the Committee for the Protection of the Hanoi Special War Zone, the General Command decided to "The Hanoi war zone cannot be caught by surprise. If the enemy attacks first, we can strike back immediately. The battle in the capital of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam must represent the resistance spirit of the whole country. Hanoi needs to hold the enemy at least for a month, creating conditions for the whole country to switch to war.”4.
The nationwide resistance war broke out, the combat order reached the capital the fastest. The capital opened fire at the scheduled time, starting the nationwide resistance war. During the two months of fighting, the Hanoi Front Command had timely decisions for the combat areas (Inter-zones 1, 2, 3); the Command directed the unification of the inner and outer fronts to promptly divide the fire and support each other. Although it was the first time organizing a large-scale battle, the specific combat principles of the Command (such as fighting inside - encircling outside, fighting inside and outside together, organizing diversionary operations to deceive the enemy) were always given at the right time, creatively and flexibly. Although the army was still young and the Command Zone was not experienced in battle, and weapons were lacking, having to fight against the professional invading army of the French colonialists, it was clear that the Hanoi Front Command had successfully organized a battle of historical significance and had excellently completed its mission.
After causing damage and holding the enemy at bay for two months, the Central Committee and the Front Command decided to withdraw the resistance forces fighting in Zone 1 from the city. While surrounded by the enemy, thousands of soldiers retreated to the safety of the war zone, which was an outstanding achievement of the Hanoi Front Command.
Thus, in organizing the command of combat missions in Hanoi, it was all due tostrategic level(from the comments from the Central Conference to the meetings of the Party Central Committee, the General Staff, the Hanoi Front Command) comments and decisions. The combat staff agencies have made many efforts, overcome difficulties, been proactive, creative, step by step research, and built complete plans. The decisions and plans made have created conditions for the formation of combat operations in the capital. Thanks to that, the 60-day and night battle in the capital Hanoi took place according to a unified plan, the fronts were assigned specific tasks and the forces were closely coordinated. This is a vivid manifestation of the command capacity of the Front Command.
Fighting force.
The fighting force in the inner city consists of many different units. In addition to the large number of people in the capital actively participating in combat or serving in combat, the concentrated armed forces include the National Defense Battalion.5, 9 artillery batteries (ground artillery, anti-aircraft artillery) were deployed in the suburbs. In addition, there were a number of units of the volunteer police force, along with thousands of "square star" soldiers of the self-defense force and thousands of guerrillas in the suburbs - people who considered themselves "half civilian - half soldier". A special point was that, in the fighting force in Hanoi, there were also suicide squads - soldiers ready to hug three-pronged bombs and rush into enemy tanks. On January 13, 1947, the Capital Regiment's Suicide Squad was organized and held an oath-taking ceremony before entering a new battle with slogans such as "We would rather live and die with the Capital", "As long as we remain, the Capital will never fall", "Determined to die for the Fatherland, determined to live"... All of these units were under the unified command of the Front Command, they were tightly organized with the spirit of self-sacrifice for the Capital and the country.
A cannon placed in Lang village prepares to fire at the French troops who are causing trouble in Hanoi's inner city, 1946.
In addition to the inner-city forces, the units around Hanoi regularly coordinated with the army and people of the capital. The suburban forces often organized attacks behind enemy lines, supporting their comrades in the inner line. During the fierce fighting days in Inter-zone 1, the outer units attacked the enemy in many places, especially from the direction of Ha Dong - Hanoi, forcing the French expeditionary force to disperse its forces, unable to concentrate troops in key combat areas. Assessing the revolutionary armed forces of the capital at this time, Delliver Phillipe commented: "The regular armed elements of the Viet Minh ... and the large number of self-defense troops posed an extremely terrible problem, we (the French) could not widen the noose of the Viet Minh"6.
Thus, our fighting force in the heart of Hanoi was a combined army, including the main force, the front and rear forces, the concentrated armed forces and the paramilitary forces. Under the unified command and leadership of the Front Command, the armed forces and the people of the capital were tightly organized to carry out strategic combat missions. In combat, these forces coordinated and cooperated relatively closely, creating a multi-layered, multi-level battle formation that made the French expeditionary army struggle to cope. It can be said that it was this "combined" army that created, right from the beginning, when the nationwide resistance broke out, a people's war in the heart of the city.
Looking at the overall historical campaigns of the Vietnam People's Army, we see that the later campaigns are often larger and more extensive than the previous ones. The birth of the campaign is associated with a significant increase in the combat capability of the armed forces. The development of the campaign is also from incomplete to complete, from small to large scale, the participating forces also develop step by step from low to high in terms of quantity, equipment... In that general context, looking specifically at the battle in Hanoi at this time, we see that although the revolutionary armed forces created a combined fighting army, surrounding the enemy, making the French colonialists extremely confused. In the history of later campaigns of the Vietnamese revolutionary armed forces, not every later campaign has such a strong element of coordinated combat like the battle of the army and people of the capital carried out in the winter of 1946.
Combat space
The combat space is the combat area, with a certain width and depth, calculated according to the purpose and mission of the campaign. But on the other hand, its width or narrowness also depends on the characteristics of the enemy, the battlefield, and our situation.
The sound of the Hanoi Armed Forces' offensive guns exploded throughout the Inter-zones, and the fighting was fierce. The Hanoi army and people actively fought the enemy in all important positions and areas in the city with all weapons at their disposal. The fighting in Inter-zone 1 was the most typical of the fighting in the capital. In the resistance plan to protect the capital, the Zone Party Committee, the Protection Committee and the Command of Zone 11 advocated "Building Inter-zone 1 into a strong steel post in the center of the capital, attracting and restraining the French forces, and keeping the enemy in the city for a long time."7Under the leadership of the Party Central Committee, the General Command, the Resistance Committee and the Command of Zone 11, the Inter-Zone Party Committee and the Inter-Zone 1 Resistance Committee led the excellent implementation of the above task, making the fighting of the army and people of Inter-Zone 1 the peak of the resistance war in the Capital.
Although the hottest and also the last front of the 2 months of fighting was Inter-zone 1, the scope of the battle between us and the enemy took place throughout the streets and sometimes even beyond the city gates, spreading to the suburbs. The suburban units shared the fire with the inner-city army and civilians, attacking from many directions, forcing them to deal with both the front and the rear. Thus, although the front in Hanoi was fixed, not spread out like the Viet Bac Campaign in the Fall-Winter of 1947 or taking place over an area hundreds of kilometers long like the Border Campaign in 1950, the fighting in Hanoi was quite flexible. The combat space went beyond the scope of each specific battle. It was the coordination of many simultaneous and successive battles, which had the effect of supporting and interacting with each fighting wing. There were times when the Capital's armed forces fought the enemy with defensive battles in trenches, but in general, the mobile form of the war took place everywhere, even areas controlled by the enemy were still attacked by troops.
The policy of the Command was not to fight the enemy on the battlefield, not to defend the dangerous position, so the people's war situation took place throughout the city and outside. The battle at Dong Xuan market on February 14, 1946 was a symbol of victory, a bright spot in this general battle. Lieutenant General Vuong Thua Vu once commented: "I don't know how those guys fought but they held out for quite a long time, far beyond the leaders' expectations, truly shocking the local enemy and the whole of France while there was a huge difference in firepower and numbers.8Although the final battle was most fierce at Dong Xuan market, in general, until the Capital Regiment withdrew from the inner city, fighting still took place, although the level was different in many places.
It can be said that the battle in Hanoi consisted of many combined battles. There was attack, there was defense; both attack and counterattack… meaning it went far beyond the framework of a normal battle in a fixed area.
combat time
Operational time is the time required to carry out the campaign mission. It includes the time of the phases (also known as steps, stages) of the campaign, in which the most important is to determine the first battle of the campaign, the key battle, the decisive key battle and the end time of the campaign. Depending on specific conditions, the campaign time can be long or short.9.
According to the Central Committee's request, the army and people had the task of both fighting and holding the enemy in the city for about a month. Given the balance of power at that time, facing directly against a professional invading army, having to maintain the position for several weeks was an extremely heavy task for the army and people of the capital in general, and especially for the young revolutionary armed forces in Hanoi in particular.
But, overcoming all difficulties, the brave soldiers fulfilled their mission excellently. They fought the enemy and held them back for 2 months. Then, they safely retreated to their base. That demonstrated the ability to organize and command and the steadfast fighting spirit of the barefoot soldiers. Surrounded by the enemy on all sides, the army and people of the capital fought and from this battle, a milestone was set in the history of the resistance war in general and the history of the Vietnam People's Army in particular in terms of the ability to attack and hold the area in the condition that we were many times inferior to the enemy in terms of troops and especially technical weapons. Different from the initial raid, after we took the initiative to open fire on the enemy (December 19, 1946), the form of war changed to a new direction: the French expeditionary army took the initiative to attack and destroy the enemy's troops. Although the advantage of surprise was no longer there and the longer the war dragged on, the more disadvantageous it was for the troops, thanks to the proactive fighting, active counterattacks against the enemy and good organization of defensive positions, the troops did not suffer many losses against the overwhelming illegal firepower of the enemy. The fighting time in the heart of the city lasted longer than the decisive strategic battle of Dien Bien Phu later on. Even the French had to admit that “The Viet Minh resistance was much more persistent and prolonged than expected. The French Command made the most of its means… but the estimated time for the liberation of Hanoi and its surroundings was greatly underestimated.”10.
It can be said that the history of world war has never seen an event where the resistance force could hold out in the capital for 2 months when the balance of power between the two sides was so different as the one between us and France in Hanoi at the end of 1946. The fighting experience for 2 months of the army and people of the capital left many important lessons for the Vietnam People's Army later.
Grown in combat.
The history of the Vietnam People's Army in the two resistance wars against French colonialism and American imperialism is closely linked to the maturity of Uncle Ho's soldiers. The two-month battle in Hanoi mentioned above is a vivid symbol and the first milestone marking the maturity of the revolutionary army in the two sacred wars of the nation.
Looking at the form of military movement in Hanoi from the revolutionary armed forces, our army went from simple defense, defense in the front to knowing how to guard against the flanks, the rear, knowing how to organize and use reserve forces, knowing how to use many ways to lure the enemy, feint, attack in the face, and surround the back... From small units, after a short period of combat, Battalion 101 was born and before withdrawing from Hanoi, the Capital Regiment was established. At that time, the French colonialists had to recognize the Capital Regiment as a unit "the elite of the Viet Minh”11. This is one of the first main units of the Vietnam People's Army, the predecessor and pillar of the 308th Division - the Vanguard Division later. During the first resistance war, many main divisions were born, and to this day, in the overlapping ranks of the People's Army, there are hundreds of powerful units, but the Vanguard Division is still the Elder Brother unit of the revolutionary army. The history of the 308th Division - the Vanguard Division is closely associated with the heroic years of fighting the enemy on the historic land of Thang Long.
National Guard and militia on Hang Buom Street, 1946-1947.
Of course, no battle as large as the one the Capital soldiers fought in was without sacrifices and losses. However, the death rate of the army during the 2 months of fighting in Hanoi was quite low. This contributed to clarifying the maturity and perfection of the organization, staffing, command level and fighting ability of the Hanoi army after 2 months of fighting to the death with the enemy.
Thus, in this battle, the army matured rapidly, both in quantity, quality, organization and structure... On the other hand, our losses in the 2 months of fighting in Hanoi were not large. If we compare (mechanically) our casualties in this battle with the losses in the military campaigns of the Vietnam People's Army in the later period - the highly developed period of the people's war, then we can objectively say that in many later campaigns (in the resistance wars against France and the US), our forces suffered very heavy losses. But the battle in Hanoi during that time had a "happy" ending. The army was preserved and matured in the fire and smoke of the capital. Therefore, the capital's army was praised by Uncle Ho as ""You guys have held the enemy at bay for a month, which is a great victory. Holding Hanoi for two months now is a great victory."12The young revolutionary army not only preserved itself but also sowed the seeds, enough "capital" to build a strong main unit later.
The experience of 2 months of fighting in the heart of Hanoi was drawn for the long-term resistance of the entire army and people. The officers and soldiers of the army "determined to die for the Fatherland", after 2 months of fighting, very early demonstrated their character, fighting spirit, bravery and intelligence. Withdrawing from the capital, the soldiers of those years left behind the factors of victory for the day of returning to liberate the capital and just like that, 8 years later, they returned in triumph.
Looking back at the overall development process of the Vietnam People's Army in general and the steps of maturity in combat, demonstrated through campaigns in particular, compared with the specific criteria of the military campaigns of the heroic Vietnam People's Army, we see that we have quite enough reasons to place the heroic battle of the soldiers and people of the Capital - the battle that opened the first sacred resistance war of the nation, as the first campaign of the Vietnam People's Army.
This event further clarified the fighting tradition of the heroic Vietnam People's Army, especially in the two sacred resistance wars of the nation: The People and the Vietnam People's Army opened the first resistance war with a 60-day and night campaign in the heart of Hanoi and 30 years later, ended with the historic Ho Chi Minh campaign, liberating Saigon, bringing the country together.
The two-month battle of the army and people of the Capital mentioned above deserves to be ranked as the first historical campaign of the Vietnamese revolutionary armed forces, and this campaign, together with the victory of "Dien Bien Phu in the air" in 1972 in Hanoi, contributed to glorifying the land of Thang Long on the occasion of the upcoming 1000th anniversary of the founding of the Capital.
Nguyen Dinh Le - Pham Thi Hong Ha
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1Vietnam Military History Institute,History of Vietnam Campaign Art (1945-1954)), People's Army Publishing House, Hanoi, 1995.
2. Vo Nguyen Giap,Fighting in the siege,Memoirs, People's Army Publishing House - Youth Publishing House, Hanoi, 1995, p. 30
3. Hanoi Party Committee - Vietnam Military History Institute - Capital Military Region, Hanoi opened the nationwide resistance war of great stature and significance,People's Army Publishing House, Hanoi, 2004, p. 19.
4. Vo Nguyen Giap,Fighting in the siege, Memoirs, People's Army Publishing House - Youth Publishing House, Hanoi, 1995, p. 37.
5In early 1947, the Front was reinforced by the 56th and 13th battalions (See the memoirs of Lieutenant General Vuong Thua Vu,Grown in combat, Hanoi Publishing House, 2006, p. 121)
6. Delliver Phillipe,Paris- Saigon- Hanoi Archives of the 1945-1947 war, Ho Chi Minh City Publishing House, page 419
7. Hanoi Party Committee - Vietnam Military History Institute - Capital Military Region,Hanoi opened the nationwide resistance war in stature and significance,People's Army Publishing House, Hanoi, 2004, p. 126.
8. Vu Tam, Le Bau,60 days and nights to defend Dong Xuan market, Hanoi Publishing House, 1987, p. 7
9. Ministry of National Defense, Center for Military Encyclopedia Dictionary,Vietnam Military Encyclopedia, People's Army Publishing House, Hanoi, 2004, p. 941.
10. Delliever Phillipe,Paris- Saigon- Hanoi Archives of the 1945-1947 war, Ho Chi Minh City Publishing House, page 419
11. Memoirs of Lieutenant General Vuong Thua Vu,Grown in combat, Hanoi Publishing House, 2006, p. 130
12. Hanoi Capital Military Region,Hanoi Capital - History of resistance against French colonialism (1945-1954), Hanoi Publishing House, 1986, p. 180.
Author:Nguyen Dinh Le - Pham Thi Hong Ha
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