There have been numerous studies on the fighting of the army and people of Hanoi in the early days of the nationwide resistance against the French. There are also many studies on the military campaigns of the Vietnam People's Army (VPA) during the two resistance wars against the French (1945-1954) and the Americans (1954-1975). All published studies affirm that the Autumn-Winter Campaign of 1947 was the first campaign of the Vietnam People's Army.
Based on the realities of the battlefield and the general criteria for military campaigns, we wish to define the 60-day and 60-night battle fought by the Vietnamese revolutionary armed forces in the heart of Hanoi from late 1946 to early 1947 as the first counter-offensive campaign of the Vietnam People's Army. We welcome your feedback and comments.
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Assessments by research institutions, primarily the Vietnam Military History Institute, are quite consistent regarding the military campaigns of the Vietnam People's Army during the two resistance wars. The fundamental point is that the first military campaign was the Viet Bac Autumn-Winter Campaign of 1947, and the last was the General Offensive and Uprising of Spring 1947, culminating in the Ho Chi Minh Campaign.1.
Regarding the types of campaigns, prior to 1972, they were divided into two forms: Firstly, counter-offensive campaigns, characterized by the enemy attacking while our forces proactively defend to thwart the enemy's intentions. Typical campaigns of this type include the Viet Bac Autumn-Winter 1947 campaign during the resistance against the French and the counter-offensive campaigns of the Southern Liberation Army during the first dry season (1965-1966) in the Southeast battlefield and Zone V. Secondly, offensive campaigns, meaning the troops proactively attack the enemy. Typical campaigns include the Border Campaign (1950) – considered the first offensive campaign of the revolutionary armed forces – and other campaigns such as Khe Sanh (1967), the Tet Offensive (1968), the strategic offensive of 1972, and especially the campaigns in the Spring of 1975.
During the 1972 strategic offensive, based on the practical experience of fighting in the Quang Tri battlefield, the revolutionary armed forces organized and implemented a new type of campaign called the defensive campaign. The Thach Han River served as a prominent defensive line in this type of campaign during the 1972 strategic offensive.
In recent years, the Vietnam Military History Institute has researched and published more specific information about several campaigns. Previously, the Spring Offensive of 1975 was considered to have three key campaigns: the Buon Ma Thuot-Central Highlands Campaign (the opening campaign of the Ho Chi Minh Campaign). Recent conferences have suggested that, although closely related, the Hue-Da Nang Front should, in reality, be separated into two distinct military offensive campaigns: the Hue Campaign and the Da Nang Campaign.
Scientists have defined military campaigns. These are classic definitions. However, in summary, the main criteria for distinguishing a military campaign of the Vietnamese revolutionary armed forces can be identified as follows:
They have clear political and military objectives and a unified command structure to achieve those specific goals.
The force typically comprises multiple units, including a main unit, supporting units, and frequent coordinated operations between units participating in the campaign, as well as coordination with units on the flanks.
The area of operation is vast, not limited to the small operational area of a single battle.
A campaign typically lasts a relatively long time, unlike a specific battle which is often fought quickly and efficiently.
The campaign involved many battles, but at least one pivotal battle determined the entire course of the campaign.
By comparing the situation in Hanoi in late 1946 and early 1947 with the basic criteria for a military campaign as described above, we can better determine its position in the national liberation cause.
Regarding the organization and command of combat missions:
In late 1946, faced with the French colonialists pushing to the brink of overthrowing the fledgling revolutionary government, the Central Committee of the Party and President Ho Chi Minh launched a nationwide resistance war. The two-month battle fought by the army and people of Hanoi marked the beginning of the vibrant first phase of the sacred resistance war.
Handwritten copy of President Ho Chi Minh's "Call for National Resistance," dated December 19, 1946.
The strategic task assigned to the army and people of the capital by the Central Committee and President Ho Chi Minh was to fight the enemy and keep them pinned down in the city for as long as possible, creating conditions for the General Headquarters (Central Committee, Government) to have enough time to withdraw to a safe zone; on the other hand, to prepare the whole country to proactively enter a protracted resistance war. This was a momentous but extremely difficult strategic task for the army and people of the capital: to launch a surprise attack that would usher in a new era.total battle 2between the Vietnamese people and the French colonialists.
Such was the crucial strategic objective. The military task of the people and army of Hanoi was to organize fighting within the city, aiming to wear down and destroy a portion of the enemy's forces, implementing a scorched-earth resistance strategy. President Ho Chi Minh directly assigned the people and army of Hanoi the task of trying to hold the enemy at bay for about a month in the city, giving the Central Committee and the entire country time to evacuate agencies, transport equipment, etc., to the resistance zone in preparation for a protracted war.
Acting on orders from the Central Committee and President Ho Chi Minh, the General Staff directly directed combat operations for the army and people of the capital. The Command and Committee for the Protection of Zone 11 (Hanoi) were quickly established.3The command structure was headed by Comrade Vuong Thua Vu as commander-in-chief and Tran Do as political commissar. The General Staff appointed Comrade Hoang Van Thai, Chief of the General Staff, to directly lead this front. Thus, the command structure of this strategic front was designated by the Central Committee and the General Staff from the outset.
The Hanoi Front was born as a result of years of meticulous preparation by the entire Party and the entire people. At the end of November 1946, during an expanded Standing Committee meeting with the Command and the Committee for the Protection of the Hanoi Special War Zone, the General Command decided:The Hanoi war zone cannot afford to be caught by surprise; if the enemy attacks first, we can retaliate immediately. The battle in the capital of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam must exemplify the spirit of resistance of the entire nation. Hanoi needs to hold back the enemy for at least a month, creating conditions for the whole country to transition to war.”4.
When the nationwide resistance war broke out, the combat orders reached the capital as quickly as possible. The capital opened fire on schedule, marking the beginning of the nationwide resistance. Throughout the two months of fighting, the Hanoi Front Command made timely decisions for the combat zones (Zones 1, 2, and 3); the Command directed the unified fronts in the inner and outer areas, promptly dividing fire and providing mutual support. Despite organizing large-scale combat for the first time, the Command's specific combat strategies (such as attacking from within and encircling from without, attacking from within and without simultaneously, organizing deceptive operations to mislead the enemy) were always implemented at the right time, creatively and flexibly. Although the army was young and the command lacked battle experience, and weapons were scarce, facing a professional invading army of the French colonialists, it is clear that the Hanoi Front Command successfully organized a battle of historical significance and brilliantly accomplished its mission.
After inflicting heavy losses on and holding back the enemy for two months, the Central Committee and the Front Command decided to withdraw the resistance forces fighting in Zone 1 from the city. The safe retreat of thousands of soldiers to the resistance zone amidst enemy encirclement was an outstanding achievement of the Hanoi Front Command.
Thus, in organizing and commanding combat missions in Hanoi, everything was done bystrategic level(Based on assessments from the Central Committee Conference to meetings of the Standing Committee of the Party, the General Staff, and the Hanoi Front Command) assessments and decisions were made. The operational planning agencies made many efforts, overcoming difficulties, actively and creatively researching and developing a complete plan. The decisions and plans made created the conditions for the formation of combat operations in the capital. Thanks to this, the 60-day and 60-night battle in Hanoi unfolded according to a unified plan, with specific tasks assigned to each front and close coordination among forces. This is a vivid demonstration of the command capacity of the Front Command.
Combat force.
The fighting forces within the city comprised various units. In addition to the large number of Hanoi residents actively participating in or supporting combat, the concentrated armed forces included the National Guard battalion.5Nine artillery batteries (ground artillery, anti-aircraft artillery) were deployed in the suburbs. In addition, there were several units of the Public Security Volunteer Force, along with thousands of "square star" soldiers from the self-defense forces and thousands of guerrillas from the outskirts – people who considered themselves "half civilians, half soldiers." A special feature was the emergence of suicide squads – soldiers ready to throw three-pronged bombs at enemy tanks. On January 13, 1947, the suicide squad of the Capital Regiment was organized and took an oath before entering a new battle with slogans such as "We would rather live and die with the Capital," "As long as we exist, the Capital will never be lost," "We will die for the Fatherland"... All these units were under the unified command of the Front Command, and they were tightly organized with a spirit of self-sacrifice for the Capital and the country.
A cannon positioned in Lang village was prepared to fire on French troops who were causing trouble in the inner city of Hanoi, 1946.
Besides the forces within the city, units surrounding Hanoi regularly coordinated combat with the capital's army and people. The suburban forces often organized attacks behind enemy lines, providing support to their comrades in the interior. During the fierce fighting in Military Region 1, the outer units launched attacks on the enemy in many places, especially from the direction of Ha Dong-Hanoi, forcing the French expeditionary forces to disperse their troops, preventing them from concentrating their forces in key combat zones. Assessing the revolutionary armed forces of the capital during this period, Delliver Phillipe remarked: “The elements of the regular Viet Minh armed forces… and a large number of self-defense units posed an extremely terrible problem; we (the French) could not loosen the Viet Minh noose.”6.
Thus, our fighting force within Hanoi was a combined army, comprising the main force, both front and rear forces, concentrated armed forces, and semi-armed forces. Under the centralized and unified leadership of the Front Command, the armed forces and people of the capital were tightly organized to carry out strategic combat missions. In combat, these forces coordinated their operations and collaborated relatively closely, creating a multi-layered, multi-tiered battle formation that caused the French expeditionary army considerable difficulty in responding. It can be said that this "combined" army, from the very beginning when the nationwide resistance war broke out, created a people's war within the city.
Looking at the overall history of the Vietnam People's Army's campaigns, we see that later campaigns were generally larger and more extensive than earlier ones. The emergence of these campaigns was linked to a significant increase in the combat capabilities of the armed forces. The development of these campaigns also progressed from incomplete to complete, from small to large scale, with participating forces gradually increasing in number and equipment. In this general context, specifically regarding the fighting in Hanoi during this period, we see that despite being a revolutionary armed force, they formed a unified fighting force, encircling the enemy and causing immense confusion for the French colonialists. In the history of later campaigns of the Vietnamese revolutionary armed forces, not every subsequent campaign possessed the same level of coordinated combat as the fighting conducted by the army and people of the capital during the winter of 1946.
Combat space
The operational space is the area of combat, with a defined width and depth, calculated according to the objectives and tasks of the campaign. However, its width or narrowness also depends on the characteristics of the enemy, the battlefield, and our own situation.
The sounds of the Hanoi armed forces' offensive echoed throughout the military zones, and fierce fighting ensued. The army and people of Hanoi proactively attacked the enemy in all important positions and areas within the city, using every weapon at their disposal. The fighting in Military Zone 1 was the most representative example of the fighting in the capital. In the plan for the resistance to defend the capital, the Zone Party Committee, the Defense Committee, and the Command of Zone 11 advocated "Building Military Zone 1 into a resilient steel stronghold in the heart of the capital, attracting and containing French forces, and holding the enemy captive in the city for an extended period."7Under the leadership of the Central Party Committee, the General Headquarters, the Resistance Committee, and the Command of Zone 11, the Inter-regional Committee and the Inter-regional Resistance Committee of Zone 1 successfully led the implementation of the above tasks, making the fighting of the army and people of Zone 1 the pinnacle of the resistance war in the capital.
Although the most intense and final battlefront of the two months of fighting was Military Region 1, the fighting between our forces and the enemy extended throughout the city streets and sometimes even beyond the city gates, spreading to the outskirts. Units in the suburbs shared the fire with the inner-city forces, launching attacks from multiple directions, forcing the enemy to defend themselves both front and rear. Thus, although the battlefront in Hanoi was fixed and not as widespread as the Viet Bac Autumn-Winter Campaign of 1947 or spanning hundreds of kilometers like the Border Campaign of 1950, the fighting in Hanoi was quite dynamic. The operational space extended beyond the scope of each specific battle. This involved the coordination of many simultaneous and successive battles, providing mutual support and assistance to each fighting force. There were also times when the capital's armed forces engaged the enemy in defensive trench battles, but generally, the movement of the war took place everywhere, even in enemy-controlled areas, where the troops launched surprise attacks.
The Command's policy was to avoid engaging in positional battles with the enemy and to avoid defensive positions, thus allowing the people's war strategy to unfold throughout the city and its surroundings. The battle at Dong Xuan Market on February 14, 1946, was a symbolic victory, a bright spot in this general offensive. Lieutenant General Vuong Thua Vu once remarked, ""I don't know how those guys fought, but they managed to hold out for quite a long time, far exceeding the leaders' expectations. They truly stunned the enemy on the spot and the whole of France, despite the enormous disparity in firepower and troop numbers."8Although the final and most intense battle took place in the Dong Xuan market area, generally speaking, fighting continued until the Capital Regiment withdrew from the inner city, albeit to varying degrees in different locations.
It could be said that the fighting within Hanoi comprised many interconnected battles. There were offensives and defenses; both offensive and counter-offensive actions… meaning it went far beyond the scope of a typical battle in a fixed location.
Operational time.
Operational time refers to the period of time required to carry out a campaign mission. It includes the duration of the campaign phases (or stages), most importantly determining the first battle of the campaign, the key battle, the decisive battle, and the campaign's conclusion time. Depending on specific conditions, the duration of a campaign can vary in length.9.
According to the Central Committee's directive, the army and people were tasked with both fighting and pinning down the enemy in the city for about a month. Given the balance of forces at the time, facing a professional invading army directly and maintaining the position for several weeks was an extremely arduous task for the army and people of the capital in general, and especially for the young revolutionary armed forces in Hanoi.
However, overcoming all difficulties, the courageous soldiers brilliantly fulfilled their mission. They attacked and held the enemy at bay for two months. Afterwards, they safely withdrew to their base. This demonstrated the organizational and command capabilities and the unwavering fighting spirit of these barefoot soldiers. Surrounded on all sides by the enemy, the army and people of the capital fought, and this battle marked a historical milestone in the resistance war in general and the history of the Vietnam People's Army in particular, demonstrating their ability to attack and hold their ground despite being outnumbered and, especially, outmatched in weaponry and technology. Unlike the initial surprise attack, after we took the initiative to open fire on the enemy (December 19, 1946), the course of the war shifted: the French expeditionary forces took the initiative to attack and destroy the enemy's troops. Although the element of surprise was gone, and the longer the battle dragged on, the more disadvantageous it became for the troops, it was precisely because of the proactive tactics, aggressive counterattacks, and well-organized defensive positions that the troops suffered relatively few losses against the enemy's overwhelming illegal firepower. The fighting within the city lasted even longer than the later strategic decisive battle of Dien Bien Phu. Even the French had to admit...The Viet Minh's resistance was persistent and lasted much longer than anticipated. The French High Command made full use of its resources… but the estimated timeframe for liberating Hanoi and its surroundings was underestimated.”10.
It can be said that the history of world warfare has never seen an event where resistance forces could hold out in a capital for two months when the balance of power was so vastly unequal as it was between Vietnam and France in Hanoi at the end of 1946. The experience of fighting for two months straight by the army and people of the capital left many important lessons for the Vietnam People's Army later on.
Mature through combat.
The history of the Vietnam People's Army during the two wars of resistance against French colonialism and American imperialism is closely linked to the maturation process of the soldiers of Uncle Ho's army. The two-month battle in the heart of Hanoi mentioned above is a vivid symbol and the first milestone marking the maturity of the revolutionary army in the two sacred wars of the nation.
Looking at the dynamics of the war in Hanoi from the perspective of the revolutionary armed forces, our army progressed from simple frontal defenses to flanking and rear defenses, organizing and utilizing reserve forces, employing various tactics such as luring the enemy, feigning attacks, frontal assaults, and flanking maneuvers… From small, scattered units, after a short period of combat, the 101st Battalion was formed, and before withdrawing from Hanoi, the Capital Regiment was established. At that time, the French colonialists had to recognize the Capital Regiment as a “unitthe most elite of the Viet Minh”11This was one of the first main units of the Vietnam People's Army, the predecessor and pillar of the 308th Division – the Vanguard Division later on. During the First Resistance War, many main divisions were established, and even today, among the vast ranks of the People's Army, there are hundreds of powerful units, but the Vanguard Division remains the elder brother of the revolutionary army. The history of the 308th Division – the Vanguard Division – is intertwined with the heroic years of fighting the enemy on the historical land of Thang Long.
National Guard and self-defense forces in Hang Buom Street, 1946-1947.
Of course, no battle on the scale that the soldiers of the capital fought was without casualties. However, the casualty rate of the troops during the two months of fighting in Hanoi was quite low. This further clarifies the maturity and completeness of the organization, structure, command skills, and combat capabilities of the Hanoi troops after two months of fierce fighting against the enemy.
Thus, in this battle, the army matured rapidly, both in quantity, quality, and organizational structure... On the other hand, our losses during the two months of fighting in Hanoi were not significant. If we compare (mechanically) our casualties in this battle with the losses in the military campaigns of the Vietnam People's Army in the later stages - the high stage of people's war development - we can objectively say that in many later campaigns (during the resistance against France and the US), our forces suffered very heavy losses. But the battle in Hanoi during that period had a "happy ending." The army was preserved and matured amidst the smoke and fire of the capital. Therefore, the army of the capital was praised by President Ho Chi Minh."Holding the enemy at bay for a month was a great victory. Now, holding Hanoi for two months is a tremendous triumph."12The fledgling revolutionary army not only preserved itself but also sowed the seeds, accumulating enough "capital" to build a powerful main force later on.
The experience of the two months of fighting in the heart of Hanoi served as a crucial lesson for the long-term resistance of the entire army and people. The officers and soldiers of the "fight to the death for the Fatherland" army, after two months of fighting, quickly demonstrated their character, fighting spirit, courage, and intelligence. Although they withdrew from the capital, those soldiers left behind the elements of victory for the return to liberate the capital, and indeed, eight years later, they returned in triumph.
Looking back at the overall development of the Vietnam People's Army (VPA) and its growth in combat, as demonstrated in its campaigns, and comparing it with specific criteria for the heroic military campaigns of the VPA, we find that we have quite sufficient reasons to consider the glorious battle of the troops and people of the capital – the battle that marked the beginning of the nation's first sacred resistance war – as the first campaign of the VPA.
This event further illuminates the fighting tradition of the heroic Vietnamese People's Army, especially in the two sacred resistance wars of the nation: the Vietnamese people and People's Army began the first resistance war with a 60-day and 60-night battle in the heart of Hanoi, and 30 years later, concluded it with the historic Ho Chi Minh Campaign, liberating Saigon and reunifying the country.
The two-month battle fought by the army and people of the capital city, as described above, deserves to be ranked among the first historical campaigns of the Vietnamese revolutionary armed forces. This campaign, along with the "Dien Bien Phu in the Air" victory in Hanoi in 1972, contributes to glorifying the land of Thang Long during the upcoming 1000th anniversary of the founding of the capital city.
Nguyen Dinh Le - Pham Thi Hong Ha
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1Vietnam Military History Institute,History of Vietnamese Campaign Art (1945-1954)), People's Army Publishing House, Hanoi, 1995.
2. Vo Nguyen Giap,Fighting while surrounded,Memoirs, People's Army Publishing House - Youth Publishing House, Hanoi, 1995, p. 30
3Hanoi City Party Committee - Vietnam Military History Institute - Capital Military RegionHanoi marked the beginning of the nationwide resistance war, a significant event in terms of scale and importance.People's Army Publishing House, Hanoi, 2004, p. 19.
4. Vo Nguyen Giap,Fighting from within the encirclement, Memoirs, People's Army Publishing House - Youth Publishing House, Hanoi, 1995, p. 37.
5In early 1947, the Front received additional reinforcements from the 56th and 13th battalions (See Memoirs of Lieutenant General Vuong Thua Vu).Mature in combat(Hanoi Publishing House, 2006, p. 121)
6Delliver Philippe,Paris - Saigon - Hanoi: Archival documents of the 1945-1947 war., Ho Chi Minh City Publishing House, p. 419
7Hanoi City Party Committee - Vietnam Military History Institute - Capital Military RegionHanoi marked the beginning of the nationwide resistance war, a significant event in terms of scale and importance.People's Army Publishing House, Hanoi, 2004, p. 126.
8. Vu Tam, Le Bau,60 days and nights of defending Dong Xuan Market, Hanoi Publishing House, 1987, p. 7
9Ministry of Defence, Center for Military EncyclopediasVietnamese Military Encyclopedia, People's Army Publishing House, Hanoi, 2004, p. 941.
10. Deliverer Philippe,Paris - Saigon - Hanoi: Archival documents of the 1945-1947 war., Ho Chi Minh City Publishing House, p. 419
11. Memoirs of Lieutenant General Vuong Thua Vu,Mature in combat, Hanoi Publishing House, 2006, p. 130
12. Hanoi Capital Military Region,Hanoi, the capital city - History of the resistance war against French colonialism (1945-1954), Hanoi Publishing House, 1986, p. 180.
Author:Nguyen Dinh Le - Pham Thi Hong Ha
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