It's time to shift from "management" to "governance".

Ultimately, how exactly should we understand the Western model of liberal democracy? And is it a standard model that all political systems around the world should necessarily strive for?

This is a question that humanity has been intensely questioning since the late 1990s, when the socialist system in Eastern Europe collapsed, and many believed that the "bipolar order" had shifted to a "unipolar order." However, it seems things are not unfolding as they have. Professor Pham Quang Minh, a political scientist and international relations researcher with numerous insightful studies on this issue, has accepted an invitation to participate in the "Dialogue & Reflection" column of ANTG GT - CT to share his research with readers from various perspectives.

ButJournalist Phan Đăng: Professor, before discussing the characteristics of the Western-style liberal democracy model, we must first talk about the timing of its "rise to power." In my opinion, it "rose to power" at the time of the collapse of the socialist system in Eastern Europe, is that correct?

- Prof. Dr. Pham Quang Minh:In the latter half of the 1980s, the world witnessed structural and global changes. These included the end of the Cold War, leading to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the collapse of people's democracies in Eastern Europe, and the end of the bipolar world order that had existed for over 50 years since World War II (1947-1989).

Witnessing such earth-shattering changes, in 1989, Professor Francis Fukuyama published a treatise on what he called "The End of History" in the journal "The National Interest".

According to Fukuyama, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the bipolar order, humanity witnessed the end of ideological evolution and the triumph of Western liberal democracy as the ultimate model of human governance in the long term.

However, looking back at what has happened from the late 1970s and mid-1980s to the present, when socialist countries in general, especially China and Vietnam, have carried out reforms and opened up, implementing policies in line with the development trends of humanity, we see that things are not like that.

ButEveryone knows that socialism was "transplanted" from Eastern Europe to East Asia, yet ultimately, the reformed form of socialism in East Asia survived, while the original form of socialism in Eastern Europe died out. If this is considered a paradox of our time, how would you explain it from the perspective of a political scientist?

- The crisis in Eastern Europe had many causes, but fundamentally it centered on two main reasons: the inefficiency of collectivized agriculture and the inflexibility of the centrally planned economy. While these two issues could help the state control and redistribute much of the overall output, they hindered, or even completely eliminated, the impetus for production growth.

Therefore, in a socialist system, the state can only fulfill its role in the initial stage; later on, its weaknesses become apparent, and it becomes increasingly backward compared to states with high economic growth.

Compared to Europe, socialist countries in East Asia differ significantly in that they have hardly experienced a true industrial revolution; to this day, farmers still constitute the majority of the population. In Vietnam alone, as of 2019, 65.6% of the population lived in rural areas. Many studies suggest that rural populations are more sympathetic to the socialist regime. Studies in the Balkans also show that the majority of farmers continue to support the communist party in free elections.

Countries like China, Vietnam, and North Korea share a common characteristic: their governments have closely integrated national liberation revolutions with people's democratic revolutions. In China, unlike the Kuomintang, Mao Zedong's Communist Party succeeded in uniting forces, leading the people, and using the national question as a tool in World War II against fascist Japan, thus gaining the support of the entire population.

Similarly, in Vietnam, the Indochinese Communist Party successfully combined communism and nationalism, creating a nationwide force in the national liberation war and thus achieving victory, something no other political party could do.

- Does that mean the Communist Party here has a very high degree of "legitimacy"?

That's right, legitimacy!

But relying solely on "legitimacy" is unlikely to be sustainable in the long run, so perhaps besides "legitimacy," which offers significant initial advantages, the most important factor also comes from reforms and transformations within the system itself?

- A noticeable trend is that socialist countries in East Asia tend to learn from or be influenced by their neighbors, mainly newly industrialized countries due to historical and cultural similarities, such as South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand.

- Specifically, what did they learn, sir?

- They thoroughly studied the authoritarian democratic model of these newly industrialized countries to lead a multi-sector economy or a socialist-oriented market economy. In addition, there is another very special factor that researchers often mention: China, North Korea, and Vietnam all share a common cultural heritage: Confucianism.

Because of similarities between Confucianism and socialist thought such as collectivism, hierarchical principles, the abandonment of organized religion, aversion to commerce, and the veneration of the virtuous intellectual who sacrifices personal interests to serve and guide the people. Both Confucianism and East Asian socialist countries emphasize stability and harmony, avoiding pluralism and multi-party systems for fear of conflict and contradictions that could easily lead to instability and collapse.

Now, let's return to the issue I raised at the beginning of this dialogue, which is the fundamental characteristics of Western liberal and democratic values. From the perspective of a researcher, could you tell us exactly how we need to understand these values?

First of all, it must be understood that researchers have categorized the level of democracy in world politics into three types. The first is liberal democracy, the second is authoritarian democracy, and the third is authoritarianism, which has no democracy at all. So, what exactly constitutes a liberal democracy?

The most important characteristic of a liberal democracy is the need for competition for power in regular elections. And this competition must be fair. If you carefully analyze this fairness, you will see that there is no such thing as "the winner becomes king - the loser becomes a bandit," as a familiar Vietnamese proverb says.

- (Laughs...). Because losing doesn't mean you're a traitor!

- (Laughs...). That's right! In this case, it should be said: Win and be king - lose and be the opponent.

That's a great sentence.

- It is precisely because of this mindset that we understand why, after losing an election, the loser still calls to congratulate the winner. People understand that in this fair race, they may lose, but after 4 or 5 years (depending on the country), at the end of their term, they will have another chance to enter the race again.

Are there any other distinctive features of this type of democracy?

- The second characteristic of this model is that society must always have "social action groups" that operate freely and have the ability to influence the policymaking process, the most typical examples being the activities of trade unions, lobbying groups, social activists, etc.

- The state only provides guidance and creates the basic legal framework; the rest should be left to the market to operate and regulate.

- I once wrote what I consider the most important sentence in my research topic: "A good government must be the least interfering government." But now, for example, if an accident happens, they call the Prime Minister; if a fire happens, they call the Prime Minister; if a failed investment happens, they call the Prime Minister; everything is called to the Prime Minister, and they wait for the Prime Minister to step in and direct. How can the Prime Minister have the time and energy to solve macro-level problems? If the Prime Minister has to do this, the government has to do this, the state has to operate this way, it proves that the state apparatus is inefficient.

- In this model, it's clear that the state-owned economy is neither the driving force nor the central focus?

There are three factors that govern an economy: the state, the market, and society. For a time, Vietnam worried about the state-owned economy losing its role, so we emphasized state or collective ownership while neglecting the private sector. State-owned economic groups enjoyed numerous privileges and advantages regarding land, capital, and various other priorities. The result, as we all know, was that their operations did not achieve the desired efficiency.

But now we've changed and see the private sector as the driving force.

- (Nods). That's a welcome change. This change reminds me of the time of the liberation of South Vietnam in 1975. Right after the liberation, we raised the question: could we build a model of one state, two systems?

- So, the North remained under a socialist economic system, while the South experimented with a market economy?

- That's right, because the economic and social characteristics in the South are very different. But then, this wasn't approved. We introduced the Northern economic model there, collectivizing agriculture, reforming industry and commerce, and as a result, the economy operated inefficiently for a very long time.

- By the way, Professor, since you're recalling a story from the past, I'd like to respectfully offer a different perspective: suppose we had allowed South Vietnam to experiment with a market economy back then, what would the Soviet Union, the big brother of the socialist bloc, have thought? Would it have agreed with and supported us?

- Actually, even before that, during the war against the US, the Soviet Union itself only wanted us to resolve everything through peaceful negotiations, not through military force. China wanted Vietnam to wage a protracted war because they wanted the US and the Soviet Union to be drawn into this war. But we still found our own way.

Professor Pham Quang Minh speaks with a reporter from the ANTG GT - CT Special Issue.

- I've read some fairly reliable documents that say, at that time, First Secretary Le Duan once said: to fight the Americans, we must not only not be afraid of the Americans, but also not be afraid of the Soviet Union or China. Because only by "not being afraid" can we navigate between the major powers, with their intertwined interests and calculations, in the most rational and advantageous way for ourselves.

Therefore, at that time, we had to say that our approach was relatively independent. Returning to the hypothetical situation after 1975, if there had been a "one state, two systems" scenario, creating a period for the South's economy to develop in its own way—that is, creating a gap for the two railway tracks to align—who knows, the North's economy might have also changed positively afterward. Of course, history doesn't have room for "ifs," but looking back at history, we still have to consider "ifs" to see that choosing the political system and development models is extremely important for a nation.

- The professor just analyzed the economic development model in liberal democracies. Are there any other points to note about this type of government?

- Liberal democracy has another characteristic besides being a democracy where the basic rights of the people are respected, such as freedom of speech, freedom of movement, freedom of education... there is a fifth characteristic, which is that the government is run by civilian forces. Look at the defense ministers of many countries; they are completely civilian figures, not necessarily generals with insignia. Ms. Inada Tomomi, currently the Japanese Minister of Defense, is a lawyer.

- Judging by some of the characteristics the professor just mentioned, most East Asian countries, including Vietnam, do not belong to this liberal democracy model. Perhaps we are at the second level, authoritarian democracy?

- Actually, we translate this second level of democracy into Vietnamese in many different ways. Some translate it as authoritarian democracy, others as centralized democracy, and still others as collective democracy. Personally, I think it can be called a soft authoritarian model of democracy. And according to our research, this model, rather than the Western-style liberal democracy, is very suitable for East Asian societies, including Vietnam. This is because the social, economic, cultural, and political foundations of Asian countries are very different from those of the West.

To illustrate one point, feudalism in many Asian countries lasted until the first half of the 20th century, while in many Western countries it only existed until the mid-18th or 19th century. Building any development model must depend on one's own cultural and social factors; it cannot be mechanically applied according to some fixed standard from outside.

- I agree with the professor's perspective because, to put it simply, look at our neighbor's house and you'll see they're wearing a very nice shirt. But, if we were to have the exact same shirt made for our family members, it might create a significant aesthetic disappointment. However, Professor, that doesn't mean we should cling to what we have without changing or adapting to the trends of the times, right? We may not be able to make a shirt exactly like our neighbor's, but we must understand the principles and trends to create a beautiful shirt that best suits us.

- There are many things we need to change in order to move towards a model of governance that promotes harmonious and sustainable social development. We have conducted very in-depth research on this, which can be summarized simply as: we must transform the management model into a governance model.

- What is the difference between management and administration, sir?

- Theoretically speaking, management is about doing what needs to be done, while administration is about doing what is right. Management is reactive and reactive; administration has a strategic vision. Management is micromanaging, directing everything without creating space for people to work and innovate; administration only creates a legal framework, leaving the specific actions to people to take.

- Management is clearly a different field?

- (Nods). Governance is often discussed in contexts where the state may not hold a particularly dominant position. Governance emphasizes the transformation and reduction of traditional institutional power of government in two directions: firstly, transferring it to transnational and regional institutions/entities, such as ASEAN; and secondly, transferring it to other entities such as social organizations and businesses.

Overall, social governance is the process by which the government, social organizations, businesses, communities, and individuals, as equal partners, regulate and manage social issues. In this governance process, the power of the government, the market, and society coexist.

So, there are three major pillars in the governance model: the State, the Market, and Social Organizations and Individuals. This breaks down the classical management model which had only a single pillar: the State.

- In today's context, if human resources, financial resources, and infrastructure for addressing social issues primarily come from the state, it will lead to a shortage of resources to adequately solve social problems. Therefore, resources must be supplemented from the market, i.e., businesses, and from individuals and social organizations. This mechanism will maximize the resources available to address increasingly diverse social problems.

Furthermore, the State-Market-Social Organizations and Individuals model in social development management helps to implement policies effectively. If the state alone were to handle all stages and tasks, the shortage and loss of financial resources would easily occur due to a lack of effective supervision.

Professor, throughout this dialogue, I've understood one overarching idea: we still uphold our core principles, but to thrive in an integrated and rapidly changing world, we must adapt, most notably by shifting from a model of social management to social governance, isn't that right?

- In my opinion, institutional reform must be comprehensive, and in addition to what we've just discussed, I'd like to add that this reform must be linked to the process of enhancing accountability, transparency, and predictability of institutions.

We sincerely hope to have the opportunity to hear Professor continue his analysis of these crucial innovative elements in the future. Thank you very much, Professor!

According to ANTG