1. Resolutely renew political thinking based on the creative application of Marxist-Leninist theory to the practical realities of colonial revolutions in order to determine the correct strategic direction.
Before becoming General Secretary of the Party (July 1936), Ha Huy Tap spent a long time working abroad and made important contributions to the struggle to restore the Party's organizational system after the 1930-1931 revolutionary movement. Like some other pioneering revolutionary fighters, Ha Huy Tap did not have the opportunity to fully study the practical situation of the country and was influenced by left-wing viewpoints existing within the Communist International and some fraternal Communist Parties.[1]Therefore, in the process of applying Marxist-Leninist theory to the practical realities of colonial revolution, setbacks were inevitable. He once harshly criticized the Vietnam Revolutionary Youth Association and its works.Revolutionary path[2], criticizing leader Nguyen Ai Quoc and the policies of the Party's founding conference.[3], defending the viewpoint that emphasized one-sided class struggle and agrarian revolution in the Resolution of the First Conference of the Central Committee of the Party andThe Political Thesis of the Indochinese Communist Party (Project Platform)October 1930.
"Revolutionary zeal and a strong sense of organizational discipline diminished Ha Huy Tap's creative and independent thinking."[4]However, with the courage and will of a communist, he changed his perspective and resolutely overcame the limitations imposed by historical circumstances.
On July 25, 1936, Ha Huy Tap, together with Le Hong Phong, convened a Central Committee meeting to revise and supplement the Party's resolutions in accordance with the spirit of the 7th Congress of the Communist International; it was decided to move the headquarters of the Central Executive Committee to Saigon. In early August 1937, Ha Huy Tap returned to Vietnam, where he had the opportunity to directly observe the situation, interact with the masses, and listen to reports from various localities. Under conditions where the Central Executive Committee had not yet been re-established and there was no supporting apparatus, Ha Huy Tap handled almost all tasks himself. Based on the vibrant realities of the mass movement, in his capacity as General Secretary, Ha Huy Tap resolved a series of issues concerning the strategic and tactical guidelines of the Vietnamese revolution.
Regarding strategic directionThe Central Committee of the Party, headed by Ha Huy Tap, boldly raised the issue of re-evaluating the nature of the revolution in the colonies, as well as the relationship between the two tasks of anti-imperialism and agrarianism as outlined in...The Political Thesis of the Indochinese Communist Party (Project Platform)Announced at the first meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Party in October 1930[5].
DocumentRegarding the issue of strategy new(10-1936) affirmed: “From the perspective of an oppressed nation, from the perspective of an exploited class, everyone recognizes French imperialism as the legitimate enemy of the people of Indochina. This is contrary to the Trotskyist faction's statement in issue 2 of the Millant newspaper, which asserts that: Native capital is the fiercest enemy of the people; the struggle of the proletariat must first and foremost be a struggle against native capital (the main enemy is within our country).” If our country were an independent country with developed capitalism like England or France, then the statement that native capital is the fiercest enemy of the people would be partly true. However, France and Indochina are completely different…”[6].
Based on an analysis of the social realities of Indochina, the Central Committee of the Party analyzed the relationship between the two tasks of anti-imperialism and agrarianism, emphasizing that the struggle against imperialism was a common task of the people of Indochina and put forward a new viewpoint:The national liberation movement does not necessarily have to be closely linked with the agrarian revolution.(The author emphasizes this). This means that it cannot be said that: to overthrow imperialism, it is necessary to develop an agrarian revolution; to solve the land problem, it is necessary to overthrow imperialism.That theory has some inaccuracies."...If the struggle for territorial division is to develop and hinder the anti-imperialist struggle, then we must choose which issue is more important and address it first. That is, we must choose the main, most dangerous enemy and concentrate the forces of a nation to achieve complete victory."[7]That was a very harsh criticism from General Secretary Ha Huy Tap and the Central Committee ofPolitical Thesis of October 1930, and at the same time, initially reaffirmed the correct path of national liberation infirst political programof the Party and Ho Chi Minh's ideology on the national liberation revolution in colonies.
DocumentRegarding the new policy issueThis marked a profound revolutionary shift in the political thinking of General Secretary Ha Huy Tap and the Central Committee of the Party, a scientific understanding based on the creative application of the dialectical materialism method and the specific historical perspective of Marxism-Leninism to the practical realities of colonial revolution. It clearly identified the main contradiction that needed to be resolved in the colonies as the contradiction between the entire oppressed nation and the imperialist aggressors and their collaborators, correctly resolving the relationship between the two tasks of "national independence" and "land revolution," so that later, when entering the direct national salvation movement phase of 1939-1945, the Party put forward the policy of "strategic change."[8]They resolutely upheld the banner of national liberation, placing the task of national liberation first, temporarily setting aside the slogan of "land revolution," and leading the August Revolution of 1945 to success.
With a truly open-minded spirit and a firm resolve to overcome rigid and dogmatic thinking, General Secretary Ha Huy Tap closely followed the realities of the Vietnamese revolution, and together with the Central Committee, determined the correct strategic direction, contributing to maintaining the Party's sole leadership role over the Vietnamese revolution amidst numerous changes in the international and domestic situations. This is the most profound lesson for building a politically strong Party.
2. Properly resolving the relationship between strategic goals and immediate goals, determining tactics appropriate to the requirements of the 1936-1939 democratic movement.
Revolution is a process, encompassing many different stages of development, each preceding step creating the prerequisites and conditions for the next, progressing from achieving victory step by step to achieving complete victory.
Lenin once said that a radical revolutionary must never forget the ultimate goal, because sacrificing the future for the present is the worst manifestation of opportunism. But on the basis of firmly grasping the strategic goal, one must also know how to achieve victory step by step in the right way. That is the law of revolutionary struggle.
In the documentRegarding the new policy issue(October 1936), the Central Committee of the Party, headed by Ha Huy Tap, clearly distinguished between revolutionary strategy and tactics. Revolutionary strategy remains unchanged throughout a period, but tactics must change depending on the specific historical conditions of each stage.
During the 1936-1939 democratic movement, a special period of the Vietnamese revolution, when the demands for world peace and democratic reforms, and improvements in people's lives became urgent aspirations of the masses, General Secretary Ha Huy Tap and the Central Executive Committee decided to temporarily set aside the slogans of "national independence" and "land revolution," and establish the Indochinese People's Front (later renamed the Indochinese Democratic Front) to broadly unite all democratic forces against fascism, from the basic masses to the upper classes, from national forces to a non-national segment (French people with anti-fascist tendencies in Indochina); not aiming to overthrow all enemies of the nation (the invading French imperialists and their collaborators), but only targeting the most dangerous part of the enemy (the reactionary colonial forces that refused to implement the policies issued by the French People's Government); demanding freedom, democracy, food, clothing, and peace. Thoroughly utilize all forms of organization and struggle, including open, legal, semi-open, semi-legal, and secret, illegal methods.
Ha Huy Tap's views on identifying the enemy, the goals of the struggle, mobilizing forces, and revolutionary methods in the democratic movement were clearly evident from the end of August 1938.Open letterRegarding the Indochina CongressTo the Vietnam Nationalist Party, revolutionary parties, the Constitutional Party, democratic reform groups, benevolent associations, worker-peasant-soldier organizations, women's organizations, student organizations, merchants' organizations, newspapers, mass organizations, and all the people of Indochina., and continued to develop in many subsequent documents. General Secretary Ha Huy Tap and the Central Committee affirmed:Whoever is the most dangerous enemy at the present moment will certainly be the target of our attack.. .The main task was to establish a broad anti-imperialist people's front to collectively fight for basic democratic rights.”[9].
During the period 1936-1939, the Central Executive Committee of the Party, headed by General Secretary Ha Huy Tap, successfully resolved the relationship between revolutionary strategy and tactics; issued many resolutions clarifying the Party's policies, combating Trotskyism, aiming to unify thought and action within the Party to advance the mass movement.
While emphasizing the immediate goals of the struggle, General Secretary Ha Huy Tap always affirmed that the Party would never forget the ultimate goal of the revolution, not considering simple democratic rights as everything, but fighting for those goals "to prepare the conditions for the national liberation movement to develop."[10].
While Trotskyists, with their left-leaning slogans, advocated class struggle and opposition to the indigenous bourgeoisie to reject the Party's plan to establish a front, accusing the Party of class compromise, General Secretary Ha Huy Tap and the Central Committee resolutely placed the class issue within the national issue, resolving the national issue from a class perspective. The General Secretary clearly explained that the plan to establish a broad people's front, encompassing many different classes and strata, was not intended to abolish class struggle, but rather to unite all democratic forces, to highly differentiate and isolate the reactionary colonial forces, and to direct the struggle against them. The Party did not abolish the right of workers to fight against the bourgeoisie for improved living and working conditions, nor the right of peasants to fight against landlords for exorbitant rents and interest rates.
When the Party put forward the slogans "Support the French Popular Front" and "Support the Léon Blum Government," Trotskyists dismissed them as reformist slogans advocating "Franco-Vietnamese harmony." Countering this argument, General Secretary Hà Huy Tập clarified the revolutionary nature of these slogans. "Support the French Popular Front" meant supporting a front that included the Communist Party, the working class, and the people of France. This slogan expressed the solidarity of the Vietnamese people with revolutionary forces in France in the struggle against fascism, preventing the threat of war, and protecting world peace. While the slogan "Support the Léon Blum Government" represented the French Popular Front's program, the Party vehemently opposed them when they acted against the interests of the French people and their colonies, and resolutely opposed the brutal colonial policies of reactionary forces in the colonies.[11].
Regarding revolutionary methods, the Party advocated utilizing conditions of open operation to broadly mobilize the masses, combining open and semi-open methods, but not in the sense of open ideology (l'égalisme). Instead, it maintained a secret organizational unit within the Party, ready to retreat into clandestine activities in case of changing circumstances.
The Central Executive Committee meeting of the Party in September 1937 emphasized: "In the mass mobilization campaign, Trotskyism is the most dangerous; without thoroughly combating Trotskyism, it will be difficult to implement the strategy of establishing a united people's front in Indochina and supporting the world popular front against fascism and imperialist war."[12].
3. Strive to build strong Party organizations, set an example in criticism and self-criticism, uphold a sense of responsibility, and voluntarily abide by Party discipline.
Before returning to Vietnam, Ha Huy Tap made significant contributions, especially in his activities within the country.Command Post outside, aiming to restore the Party's organization, which had been destroyed by the French colonialists after the 1930-1931 revolutionary movement. After the Central Committee meeting in July 1936, he returned to Vietnam and directly led the revolutionary movement. The Party's Central Committee secretly moved from China to Ba Diem, Hoc Mon District, Gia Dinh Province.
On October 12, 1936, Ha Huy Tap convened a conference of cadres to elect a provisional Central Executive Committee, with Ha Huy Tap as General Secretary. The very next day, the Central Executive Committee sent cadres to Central Vietnam, Northern Vietnam, and Cambodia to restore contact. Under the leadership of General Secretary Ha Huy Tap, party members operating secretly, openly, semi-openly, those who had escaped from imperialist prisons, or those who had returned from abroad, all worked hard to rebuild the Party's base and organizational system. The provincial committees were strengthened. The Central Executive Committee was supplemented with two members who had just returned from Con Dao prison (Nguyen Van Cu and Nguyen Chi Dieu).
The Central Executive Committee meeting in March 1937, chaired by General Secretary Ha Huy Tap, advocated for revising organizational plans, requiring the recruitment of new party members without age restrictions, and focusing on recruiting outstanding workers into the Party.Press release dated March 20, 1937Emphasizing the issue of Party purification: Reactionaries and provocateurs who infiltrate the Party must be secretly expelled immediately. However, those newly arrested who reveal Party secrets, leading to the arrest of other comrades, the destruction of organizations, etc., must not be allowed to remain at any level of Party organization. Party members who are lazy in their studies and work, and who do not change despite criticism and assistance, must be expelled from the Party. Suspicious individuals must be suspended from their duties for a probationary period; if deemed suitable, they may be readmitted or reassigned to work elsewhere; attention should be paid to quality—fewer good members are better than many complicated ones. In the work of developing new Party members, genuine and enthusiastic revolutionary elements from the peasantry, petty bourgeoisie, and other strata of the population must be recruited. The Party must pay utmost attention to recruiting workers; attention should also be paid to recruiting working women, foreigners, and ethnic minorities. Vigilance is needed to prevent provocateurs and reactionaries from exploiting opportunities to join the Party. Those who are lazy, hesitant, and opportunistic must be expelled from the Party…
The expanded meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Party (August 1937) emphasized the consolidation of established Party branches, the promotion of Party development in important economic regions, and the "organization of close communication between Party branches at all levels." Party organizations were to guide the activities of mass organizations, but "must avoid complicity and undermine the organizational independence of mass organizations," and "explain to the people and persuade them to follow, rather than using authoritarian methods to direct mass organizations."[13]This conference elected a Central Executive Committee consisting of 11 members and appointed a Central Standing Committee consisting of 5 members.[14], with Ha Huy Tap as General Secretary.
During Central Committee meetings, General Secretary Ha Huy Tap constantly engaged in criticism and self-criticism to correct errors in understanding and action. In particular, at the Central Committee meeting in September 1937, General Secretary Ha Huy Tap recognized a "very serious mistake" of the Party Central Committee, including his own, which was "acknowledging in principle that mass organizations could use clandestine methods in special circumstances," causing "mass organizations that could have developed significantly to fail in many places."[15]At the Central Committee meeting in March 1938, with the participation of Ha Huy Tap in preparing the content and drafting the resolution, that mistake was further examined through his rigorous self-criticism. In a handwritten report sent to the Communist International on April 5, 1938, he wrote: "Due to political errors, because the Party advocated that mass organizations should be organized in an open and semi-open manner, while you said 'open and semi-open organization is correct, but where those things are not present'..."begrudge"It is possible to temporarily organize it secretly"; the Party considered this a compromise with the tendencies of the left-wing, isolated elements, so they no longer appointed him as Secretary-General, but he still retained a position in the Secrétariat (Secretary) and Bureau Politique (Standing Committee)"[16]As a responsible communist, Ha Huy Tap set a shining example of self-discipline in adhering to Party regulations.
After being arrested twice, on March 25, 1941, the colonial authorities sentenced Ha Huy Tap to death for "spiritual responsibility for the Southern Uprising," even though the uprising broke out after he had been arrested. Before the imperial court, he boldly declared: "I have nothing to regret. If I live, I will continue my activities."
In just 18 months as General Secretary, Ha Huy Tap worked tirelessly and made immense contributions, together with the Central Committee, determining the correct strategic and tactical revolutionary line; becoming one of the Party's outstanding theorists. With sharp thinking and high fighting spirit, Ha Huy Tap demonstrated the fortitude of a staunch communist fighter against all the enemy's attacks and distortions. In the 16 years from the time he joined the revolutionary movement until his sacrifice (August 26, 1941) at the age of 35, Ha Huy Tap lived a vibrant and glorious revolutionary life, wholeheartedly devoted to the communist ideal and the revolutionary cause of the people.
"If I live, I will continue to work," that was the last instruction of the late General Secretary Ha Huy Tap, not only to his contemporaries who are sacrificing and striving for the independence and freedom of the Fatherland, but also to all cadres and members of the Communist Party of Vietnam in the cause of building and defending the country today.
[1] The theoretical basis and guiding viewpoint that Ha Huy Tap was heavily influenced by was the Resolution of the Sixth Congress of the Communist International (1928) with the "leftist" line, far removed from Lenin's line inDraft of the Thesis on the National Question and the Colonial Question(1920). The resolutions of the Central Committee of the Indochinese Communist Party meeting in October 1930 and March 1931 contained many incorrect points, which were only changed at the Seventh Congress of the Communist International (1935).
[2] According to Joseph Marat (pseudonym of Ha Huy Tap), the Vietnam Revolutionary Youth Association and the Tan Viet Revolutionary Party are “two petty bourgeois revolutionary parties”, “having distortions of Marxism-Leninism”, “suffering from opportunism in theory and practice, sectarian and closed-minded ideology”, the Communist Party of Vietnam:Complete Collection of Party Documents, Vol. 4, National Political Publishing House, Hanoi, 1999, p. 385.
[3] Criticizing Nguyen Ai Quoc for “committing a series of opportunistic mistakes during the Unification Conference”, “the political line of the Unification Conference and of Comrade Nguyen Ai Quoc were wrong in many aspects”, see Ha Huy Tap:Some works, National Political Publishing House, Hanoi, 2006, pp. 151 and 266.
[4] Program for writing biographies of Party and State leaders:Ha Huy Tap - Biography, National Political Publishing House, Hanoi, 2006, p. 106.
[5] The October 1930 Political Thesis placed the two tasks of anti-imperialism and agrarianism on equal footing and emphasized class struggle, considering "the land issue as the core of the bourgeois democratic revolution". See: Communist Party of Vietnam:Complete Collection of Party Documents, Vol. 2, National Political Publishing House, Hanoi, 1998, p. 97.
[6] Communist Party of Vietnam:Complete Collection of Party Documents, Vol. 6, National Political Publishing House, Hanoi, 2000, p. 143.
[7] Communist Party of Vietnam:Complete Collection of Party Documents, Vol. 6, op. cit., p. 152.
[8] The Eighth Conference of the Central Executive Committee of the Party affirmed: "A change in strategy is needed." and explained: "The current revolution in Indochina is not a bourgeois democratic revolution, a revolution that must address two issues: anti-imperialism and agrarianism, but rather a revolution that must address only one urgent issue: "national liberation."", Communist Party of Vietnam:Complete Collection of Party Documents, Vol. 7, National Political Publishing House, Hanoi, 2000, pp. 118 and 119.
[9] Communist Party of Vietnam:Complete Collection of Party Documents, Vol. 6, op. cit., pp. 141 and 144.
[10] Communist Party of Vietnam:Complete Collection of Party Documents, Vol. 6, op. cit., p. 151.
[11] Communist Party of Vietnam:Complete Collection of Party Documents, Vol. 6, op. cit., p. 219.
[12] Communist Party of Vietnam:Complete Collection of Party Documents, Vol. 6, op. cit., p. 293.
[13] Communist Party of Vietnam:Complete Collection of Party Documents, Vol. 6, op. cit., pp. 288 and 298.
[14] Among the 11 Central Committee members, 9 are in the country (Ha Huy Tap, Vo Van Ngan, Nguyen Chi Dieu, Phan Dang Luu, Ha Ba Cang, Nguyen Van Cu, Nguyen Van Trong, Phung Chi Kien, Vo Van Tan), 2 are abroad (Le Hong Phong, Nguyen Ai Quoc); 5 members of the Central Standing Committee are: Ha Huy Tap, Le Hong Phong, Nguyen Van Cu, Nguyen Chi Dieu, Vo Van Tan.
[15] Communist Party of Vietnam:Complete Collection of Party Documents, Vol. 6, op. cit., p. 271.
[16] Communist Party of Vietnam:Complete Collection of Party Documents, Vol. 6, op. cit., p. 385.
Author:Assoc. Prof. Dr. Vu Quang Hien
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