Organizing frontline support according to Cung-Tram, the meaning and experience of a Vietnamese innovation in the Dien Bien Phu campaign in 1954

1. THE ESTABLISHMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF THE FRONT SUPPLY COUNCIL

Before the Winter-Spring of 1953-1954, the work of ensuring human resources and material resources to support the frontline was often mobilized by local authorities and sent directly from the locality to the frontline according to the army's plan. Through the practice of organizing support for the frontline, the army's logistics agency and related localities had a common perception that the coordination of the two sides in ensuring the requirements of the frontline, although having many great successes, also had shortcomings and limitations, causing waste and tension for the rear and sometimes not being timely for the troops,...

From the summaries after each campaign on the causes of the advantages and limitations in the work of supporting the front line, the leaders of the General Department of Military Supply submitted a report to the Government Council for research and establishment of an independent organization, directly under the Government, with the function and task of coordinating the activities of the rear with the front line, connecting the local government apparatus with the army's logistics support force in mobilizing human and material resources from the rear and transporting them according to the supply lines and stations to the front line to serve the army in combat. That agency is called the Front Supply Council (FSC).

The Party Central Committee Standing Committee discussed the combat plan for the Winter-Spring Campaign 1953-1954.

After being agreed by the Standing Committee of the National Assembly, on July 27, 1953, the Government Council issued a resolution to establish the Council of Ministers. The resolution clearly stated:

“1. Establish at the Central and in the necessary regions and provinces Front Supply Councils to ensure the supply of human and material resources to the front.

2. The Central Front Supply Council consists of: Deputy Prime Minister: Chairman (ie Comrade Pham Van Dong); Mr. Nguyen Van Tran, Government Inspector General: Vice Chairman and Ministers, Deputy Ministers, members of the Administrative Resistance Committee of the Zone and senior officials at the Central level whose work is closely related to the supply of the front.

3. The Central Supply Council has the following tasks: Studying the supply capacity of localities; Planning and unifying the mobilization of human and material resources to serve the front line, investigating the needs of the front line and the rear; Studying and submitting to the Government for approval policies and regulations on mobilizing human and material resources; Directing the Front Supply Councils and ensuring transportation; Managing the supply budget within the scope of the Council's responsibility.

4. The establishment of Front Supply Councils in necessary regions and provinces shall be proposed by the Central Front Supply Council and decided by the Government Council”(^[1]).

Logistics for the Dien Bien Phu campaign

Along with this Resolution, the Government Council also issued documents appointing members of the Central Council of the Vietnamese Fatherland Front. They are: Mr. Le Van Hien, Minister of Finance; Mr. Nguyen Tao: Minister of Labor; Mr. Tran Quoc Hoan: Minister of Public Security; Mr. Le Dung: Deputy Minister of Transport and Public Works; Mr. Dang Viet Chau: Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade; Mr. To Quang Dau: Government Inspector; Mr. To Huu: Director of the Department of Propaganda and Arts; Mr. Le Loc: Member of the Administrative Resistance Committee of Inter-Zone IV. Of which, Messrs. Nguyen Van Tran, To Quang Dau and Le Loc hold the position of Standing Members.^[2]).

Following the establishment of the Central Council of the Fatherland Front, a number of inter-regional and provincial Councils of the Fatherland Front were also organized, such as the Viet Bac Inter-regional Council of the Fatherland Front, Inter-regional Council IV, Inter-regional Council III, the Council of the Fatherland Front of Thanh Hoa province, Phu Tho province, etc.

Regarding specific organization, the HĐCCMT is built according to the following principles:One is, The National Defense Council is only established at the central level and in some localities where it is necessary and has conditions, in free zones; in enemy-held areas when there is war, there will be temporary, light forms of organization.Two is, the organization of the National Campaign Council, although based on localities, is not fixed and limited within the scope of administrative units. Normally, based on the mobility and scope of the campaign, the National Campaign Council at local levels will include members of one or more Inter-zones, one or more provinces, one or more districts.Three is, between the tasks and organizational structure of the HĐCCMT and the military supply agency, although there are certain boundaries and scopes, they are not completely independent of each other, but closely coordinate with each other.^[3]).

Regarding the organizational system, according to the above principles, at the Central level, the Council has a Chairman who is the Deputy Prime Minister; the Vice Chairman is the Inspector General of the Government. The members are Ministers, Deputy Ministers, Department Directors, and a member of the Inter-Zone IV Commission for the National Defense and Security, where there is a free zone, the strategic rear of Thanh - Nghe - Tinh, with the largest human and material resources of the whole country, both the rear of the Binh - Tri - Thien battlefield, of the Central and Upper Laos battlefield, and of the main battlefield of the North.

At the Inter-zone level, the apparatus consists of a Chairman or Vice Chairman or Secretary or Deputy Secretary of the Inter-zone as the Chairman. The members are representatives of the sectors and a number of capable officers at the regional level. When participating in the Council, the members representing the sectors will mobilize a number of officers of the sector to form a department, a support agency of the Council. The Regional Supply Council also has an office consisting of departments like the Central one. The tasks of the Inter-zone Supply Council are to understand and grasp the local capacity, plan mobilization, coordinate and guide the subordinate provinces; directly organize transportation on routes and stations in campaigns; implement work plans and execute the mobilization regimes and policies of the superiors, ensure traffic in the area, etc.

At the provincial level, the composition of the Resistance Council is the same as at the Inter-zone level, and in addition to the same tasks as at the Zone level, there is an additional task of directly paying the people in the mobilization after each campaign. At the district and commune levels, there is no policy to establish the Resistance Council, but the work of mobilizing human, financial, and material resources for the frontline is also managed by close coordination between the government and mass organizations, in which the district and commune administrative resistance committees play the main decisive role.

2. FRONT SUPPORT ACTIVITIES AND DIEN BIEN PHU CAMPAIGN OF THE FRONT SUPPLY COUNCIL

In order to carry out its functions and tasks, the People's Councils at all levels have had to deal with many complicated situations when carrying out their functions and tasks. These include issues related to organizational structure, personnel mobilization, compensation and benefits for workers, advance budgets for campaigns, purchasing prices, traffic station supply, and group activities on service routes, etc.

According to regulations, the mobilization of human resources and material resources from the rear to the frontline is ordered by the authorities at all levels, according to the tasks assigned by the superiors and according to the plans drafted by the People's Council of the same level. In urgent cases, the People's Council of the same level can order the specialized branches of the lower level to carry out the tasks, but must also report to the agency of that branch and the authorities at the same level as its own. The orders of the government to mobilize to serve the frontline are considered priority orders. The specialized branches of the government all send a number of cadres to participate and assist the Council. All political organizations have the responsibility to coordinate the implementation of the mobilization plan of the entire Council, mobilize and educate the people to understand the service policies, help the Council understand the capabilities and reflect to the Council to set up appropriate mobilization plans.

The working style of the People's Council of the Central Committee ...

The activities of the HĐCCMT include all aspects of work in its fields and according to its scope of responsibility, but the main and most important is the mobilization and transportation of resources from the rear to the front. In which, the mobilization is closely coordinated and relies on local authorities and organizations in the rear, while the transportation focuses on coordination with military units at the front, with the traffic and transportation sectors, etc. The main task of the HĐCCMT is to work with localities to mobilize and receive resources from the rear and then organize the transfer of those resources to the mid-line and the front line, handing them over to the military logistics agencies so that those agencies can forward them to the front line, allocate and distribute them to the troops. In particular, for the transportation of materials to the front line, the HĐCCMT had to mobilize tens of thousands of short-term, medium-term and long-term laborers, laborers serving on the spot and laborers serving in the mid-line and the front line, ordinary laborers and specialized and professional laborers for many major campaigns at the same time.

In fact, during the 1953-1954 Winter-Spring strategic offensive, due to the many directions of attack and many campaigns taking place at the same time, the National Defense Command had to undertake an extremely large, heavy, and urgent amount of work. The South - Ngai - Binh - Phu free zone (Inter-zone V) was focused on serving the Central Highlands and Lower Laos battlefields; the Thanh - Nghe - Tinh free zone (Inter-zone IV) supported 5 battlefield directions: Binh - Tri - Thien, Central Laos, Upper Laos, the Northern Delta and Dien Bien Phu; the Viet Bac free zone supported the Northwest battlefield, Dien Bien Phu, etc.

Although the construction and operation time was not long and there were many complicated difficulties, the Central Committee of the Vietnam Fatherland Front and all levels made efforts to excellently fulfill their historical mission for the resistance war in general, with the 1953-1954 Winter-Spring strategic offensive and the Dien Bien Phu campaign in particular.

For the Dien Bien Phu campaign, in total, in 210 days (from November 1953 to May 1954), the number of laborers that the National Defense Command mobilized to serve the campaign was 261,453 people with 3 million working days, 20,991 bicycles, 11,800 rafts, 500 pack horses. In addition, there was a military logistics force of 3,168 people, distributed in 7 treatment teams, 1 car transport team with 446 vehicles, 18 military stations and traffic control stations, military supplies and weapons depots. Later, it was reinforced with 4 road repair engineer battalions, 2 signal companies, 2 37mm anti-aircraft artillery battalions (24 guns) and 12.7mm companies.

The amount of food and provisions provided for the campaign was 25,056 tons of rice, 907 tons of meat, 917 tons of other foods, 1,860 liters of cooking oil and 280 kg of fat, 71 tons of military uniforms, 1,783 tons of gasoline, 55 tons of medicine and military medical equipment. 10,130 wounded and sick soldiers were treated (not including the enemy's wounded), more than 3 million bullets of various types, 96,480 grenades, 27.5 tons of explosives, 4,950 hoes, 8,700 shovels, 2,920 knives. The total amount of material provided for the campaign was 30,759 tons, of which 19,989 tons were consumed. The transport volume in the Dien Bien Phu campaign was 4,450,000 tons/km, 36 times the transport volume in the Border campaign (1950), renewing 89 km and repairing and reinforcing 500 km of roads,...

In addition, the Council also guaranteed tens of thousands of laborers, with millions of working days and a huge amount of other material expenses for various tasks before and after the campaign.^[4]). On the transport route 80 of the Thanh Hoa Provincial People's Council, as well as on other routes, our workers, with the spirit of "All for the frontline, all for victory", have continuously competed in carrying goods by bicycle from 165 kg to 215 kg, then 250 kg, then to 320 kg and the peak was 352 kg (by Cao Van Ty and Ma Van Thang)"(^[5]).

Mobilizing and transporting that huge amount of food and weapons from the rear to the frontline (the farthest places such as Ha Tinh, Lang Son, about 500-700 km from Dien Bien Phu) assigned to the military logistics sector was a heavy task and also a resounding achievement of the Central Military Commission at all levels, contributing decisively to the great victory of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. General Vo Nguyen Giap affirmed: “Never before during the years of resistance, our people have contributed so much effort as in the Winter-Spring of 1953-1954, to support the army in killing the enemy (...). Never before have so many Vietnamese people gone to the frontline (...), the rear has transferred a determination to kill the enemy, a revolutionary spirit brought by land reform to the soldiers fighting on the frontline” (^[6]).

For the enemy, the failure at Dien Bien Phu had many causes, including mistakes in organizing supplies for the front. In the bookThe Indochina tragedy,edited by E.Krieg, French scholars wrote in volume III:The Dien Bien Phu trap(Le Priège Dienbienphu) on this issue as follows: “It was confirmed to Nava and Nava also believed that the Viet Minh could not supply Dien Bien Phu; that the coolies, in order to reach there, would eat up four-fifths of their food loads; that the supply of ammunition would not allow the enemy to use a larger number of troops than the French could muster. And also because, despite daily proof, Nava still believed that his air force, with its already very poor means, could destroy the Viet Minh supply lines.

General Nava did not think that Giap (i.e. General Vo Nguyen Giap, NDTri notes) was mobilizing tens of thousands of men and women, 50,000 or 80,000? No one knew the exact number. That group of people had begun to form a very large ant colony to supply the army, moving up to the Thai people's area (...) When creating the Dien Bien Phu porcupine, Nava thought he could attract the Viet Minh there. He thought he had the initiative, which he often complained that the expeditionary army had abandoned since 1950. While he calmly imagined that he was luring the Viet Minh, he did not know that he was letting Vo Nguyen Giap mobilize troops to chain him (...). It was he (Vo Nguyen Giap), not Nava, who was setting a trap in the Thai people's area, in an area very dear to the enemy commander. And on November 20, 1953, the porcupine named Nava fell into that trap" (^[7]).

Winter-Spring 1953-1954 Operational Plan

Bernard Fall, American scholar, in his bookViet Minh 1945-1960(Le Viet Minh 1945-1960) said about the victory of Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu: "First and foremost are the victories in organizing supplies" (^[8]). Ivon Panhinet, French scholar, in the book: “Visible in Vietnam" recorded the lament of a French officer bitterly admitting their failure and Vietnam's victory in the field of supplies for the battle of Dien Bien Phu: "Alas! Our planes lost to the Viet Minh's pair of civilian workers" (^[9]).

It is worth noting that also on the transport routes of the HDCCMT, after the war ended, thousands of French prisoners of war from Dien Bien Phu were brought back to the rear areas to be nurtured and returned to the enemy, in Viet Tri, Phu Lo (by land) and in Sam Son, Thanh Hoa (by sea), after the Geneva Agreement (July 21, 1954),...

3. HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE AND HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE

Regarding the organization and operation of the National Defense Council in supporting the 1953-1954 Winter-Spring strategic offensive and the Dien Bien Phu campaign, some major experiences emerged:

The first, it is necessary and possible to organize a specialized agency for battlefield support work, the HDCCMT. HDCCMT is an agency of the rear, built on the basis of separation from specialized branches of the rear, with a mass nature, but must be properly emphasized on the necessary centralized and military nature. Due to these characteristics, HDCCMT does not necessarily have to report all issues to the authorities at the same level. And when on the transportation route, all participating forces: civil servants, bridges, roads, air defense, stations, barriers, ... must be placed under the unified command of the Council. That is, HDCCMT is both an agency of the rear and relatively independent of the rear, closely related to the army's logistics force but is not a part of the army. The National Defense Council is the agency responsible to the Party, the government, and the army for all activities of mobilizing and bringing human and material resources from the rear to the front line to ensure the army's combat capabilities.

Monday, to build a reasonable organization and direct the effective activities of the HDCCMT, the important issue is to grasp the characteristics of frontline support work, especially at times when the slogan "all for the front, all for victory" is not only a propaganda and agitation slogan but also a direct action slogan of the entire Party, the entire army and the entire nation. The need for frontline support at this time is extremely large, urgent, complicated, related to many sectors, many levels, many localities, to all classes, ethnicities and religions. Although focusing on two main contents and stages: mobilization and transportation, these two issues are closely related to each other, leading to a series of other issues serving those two tasks. In particular, mobilization must pay attention to two important issues: grasping the capacity and mobilizing fairly and reasonably. In transportation, there are three issues that need to be solved: organizing transportation, ensuring traffic and political work.

Tuesday,In organizing and operating the transportation of resources from the rear to the front, the National Steering Committee for the Transport of Resources must organize the supply lines and stations on the transport route. The station is the basis for implementing the transport plan and implementing the policies of the Party and the Government towards the workers and forces participating in the transport. The station is also the basis for the National Steering Committee for the organisation of its vertical sector; at the same time, it is the representative body of the Council at each transport section in the localities where the transport route passes through, and is the link connecting the rear with the front and vice versa. Therefore, the Station is a unified body, with all the components, characteristics and powers of a regional Council. The distance between the supply lines and stations is calculated and arranged reasonably depending on the steep or flat mountain roads, residential areas or remote areas that are often attacked by the enemy. There are routes for the laborers to go and return in a few days, routes for many days, many months, or stations that only stop overnight, stations that are the location of the general warehouse, where there is import and export, delivery of goods between localities,... When necessary, the military logistics force can directly receive resources at the rear, or the rear can send resources directly to the front line to hand over to the troops, but normally the Military Logistics Command is responsible for mobilizing and transferring resources from the rear to the midline, and from the midline to the front line is the responsibility of the military logistics force.

Wednesday,Due to the difficulty, hardship, and fierceness of supporting the front line and the participation of a large number of cadres, party members, and masses, the Central Executive Committee must organize political and ideological work well. During the entire strategic offensive and in a specific campaign, especially the Dien Bien Phu campaign, thousands of party members and tens of thousands of masses temporarily separated from the rear to the front line to perform combat duties, so political and ideological work is extremely important. In order to gather party members, maintain party activities and the Party's leadership on the transport line, gather and educate, and mobilize the masses to carry out their tasks and overcome difficulties, it is necessary to have a unified and tight system of party organizations and unions. Although there are many different Party organization systems of different sectors and localities on the transport route, due to the nature of the work on the route having the common characteristics of unity and concentration, when reaching the route, the existing Party organizations must be unified under the leadership of the Party Committee of the Central Military Commission (if it is the Central and Inter-zone route) or the Executive Committee (if it is the provincial route). These Party Committees have the task of both doing political work, Party building work, and focusing on implementing the support plan. Originally being Party cells of local Party Committees, although on the route they are completely led by the higher Party Committee of the Route, they still have to continue to maintain contact with the old base so that when they return to their localities, their activities can return to normal.

Fifth, the need for cadres to serve the frontline support work is extremely large, so the Council must mobilize and build a cadre team with the necessary quantity and quality for itself. To have that cadre team, the Council at all levels must rely on specialized sectors at equivalent levels in the rear to avoid increasing the payroll, streamlining the apparatus while still ensuring that the work runs smoothly and promptly. Cadres doing frontline support work in general, working on transportation routes in particular, are very hard-working, need good health and high dynamism. They must travel frequently, closely monitor the work to urge work on routes that are often difficult to travel, sparsely populated, or often attacked by the enemy, etc. Therefore, the Council needs to have appropriate health care regimes and policies so that they have the conditions to work long-term. At the same time, we must always pay attention to improving our working quality and capacity; otherwise, a decline or incompetence in our sense of responsibility, in directing and managing our work will lead to huge losses and wastes in human and material resources, causing difficulties and reducing the results of battles and campaigns...

The Winter-Spring Campaign was successful.

The establishment and use of the HDCCMT to mobilize resources from the rear and organize support for the advance along the lines and stations in the 1953-1954 Winter-Spring strategic offensive and the Dien Bien Phu campaign was a unique creation of Vietnam with important historical significance.

Firstly, this was the first time the HDCCMT had taken charge of supporting the frontline as an independent agency, an intermediary connecting the rear with the army. As for transportation, the HDCCMT was in charge of supply routes stretching hundreds of kilometers with hundreds of thousands of laborers, tens of thousands of tons of materials, hundreds of types of vehicles, through dozens of transit stations, across districts, provinces, inter-zones, and countries. That success, in addition to the high awareness of the people in the free-rear zones, the role of Party organizations, authorities, and unions at all levels, in addition to the close coordination of military logistics levels, the active, dynamic, and effective direction and organization of the staff and employees of the HDCCMT at all levels and localities, had the most decisive significance.

Second, the birth of the Council of the National Front for the Liberation of Vietnam in the final stage of the resistance war against French colonialism and the principles of organization, apparatus structure, working style and frontline support activities of the Council were a unique creation of the Party Central Committee, the Government, and the Vietnamese Army in leading and directing the war in general, in supporting the 1953-1954 Winter-Spring strategic offensive and the Dien Bien Phu campaign in particular. The organization and activities of the Council of the National Front for the Liberation of Vietnam made great contributions to Vietnam's victory on the battlefields, leading the resistance war against the French colonialists to glorious victory.

Third, the long-term significance is that the organization and operation of the Battlefield Support Council have left extremely useful experiences for the following historical periods, especially the construction, organization, mobilization and transportation of human resources and material resources from the Northern rear to support the Southern frontline via the Truong Son route in the resistance war against the US, saving the country (1954-1975). During the 1975 Spring General Offensive and Uprising, once again, a similar type of frontline support organization was established: the Battlefield Support Council, directly under the Government. The Battlefield Support Council also contributed greatly to the overall victory of Vietnam on April 30, 1975. Is it true that the Battlefield Support Council, from a unique creation in supporting the 1953-1954 Winter-Spring strategic offensive and the Dien Bien Phu campaign, has become a regular issue of the Vietnamese people's war under the leadership of the Party?

Fourth, from the practice of organizing support for the Dien Bien Phu campaign, it further consolidates and enriches the historical theory about the role of the rear in revolutionary war. That is, when saying that the rear is a constant factor deciding the victory of the war, the issue is not only talking about the rear being built, growing strong in all aspects, being firmly protected, always facing the front, but also talking about the issue of organizing its highly effective support for the front. Because in war, many times the army has to retreat, has to cancel the combat plan, absolutely not because of lack of fighting spirit, or because the rear is not strong enough to support the front, but because of not being able to organize to bring the things the rear has, the troops need to the front at the right time. Organizing support for the front, therefore, is an extremely important issue related to victory or defeat in war.

Fifth, although the war has been over for more than 65 years, the memories of the unforgettable years of those involved, of tens of thousands of Vietnamese soldiers, laborers and thousands of former French prisoners of war who traveled up and down the routes and transport stations of the National Liberation Front and the desire of future generations to learn about history are also raising many issues that we need to pay attention to and respond to. Should, should and can plan the tourist routes "Road to Dien Bien" following the old supply routes, from Viet Bac to the Northwest, from Thanh-Nghe-Tinh to Son La, Lai Chau, Dien Bien Phu, through famous places of the past, such as Co Noi junction, Pa Din slope, Lung Lo pass, etc. On those historical and scenic tours, domestic and international tourist groups can walk, ride bicycles, or by car, through the palaces, field stations, ethnic minority villages, and key traffic points, which are restored similar to the old days, so that they can both remember the scene of a fierce war, enjoy the majestic, poetic scenery and gain more understanding of the diverse culture of the people of the Northwest region of Vietnam during the period of renovation and international integration, including making the Vietnam-France, France-Vietnam relationship more peaceful, friendly, cooperative and sustainable development./.

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Note: Author's address: Associate Professor, Dr. Ngo Dang Tri, Faculty of History, University of Social Sciences and Humanities, VNU Hanoi. Email:ngodangtri@yahoo.com-Mobile 0913593354